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Law as an Instrument of Development, with Special Reference to Malawi

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IT is no secret that developing countries are in a hurry to catch up with the developed countries. All the developing countries have one and the same clear aim of development before them, though they adopt different ways and means to achieve it. Every country is trying to attain the fastest rate possible of economic growth, educational, cultural and moral development. The word 'development' stands for not only economic progress but also for the onward march of society in all its segments of life. Recently, the Research Advisory Committee on Law and Development, International Legal Center, New York, has observed:

"Development is a major goal of our times, yet it is hard to secure agreement on its meaning. Development can be seen as a self-conscious social process by which man in society attempts to mould the conditions of his existence. In a sense, 'development' occurs in all societies. But for our purpose, 'development' refers specifically to the efforts of the LDC (Less Developed Countries) to achieve a better life for their citizens."[1]

The Relationship between Law and Development

Generally, law is associated with lawyers, courts, judges and the police and a common notion prevails, particularly in the common law countries, that law has nothing to do with development as such. Probably, the real reason for such a widespread belief is that during the colonial period, law was mainly employed to suppress the people and their feelings rather than for their development. After the attainment of independence, development has gained priority and over-all significance and the role of law has undergone a drastic change but, as they say that old habits die hard, old impressions also linger.

In fact, law and development go along hand in glove. In a modern state, no major development is conceivable except through the medium of law. In history, there is no instance where a country made progress in its economic and cultural life without improving its legal system. The Romans, the Greeks, the English, the Germans and the Americans all had to change and improve upon their laws as they went along with development in the various aspects of their national life. It seems that law is inextricably connected with

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development. Of course, sometimes, law becomes an obstruction in the way of further development, and it starts playing a negative role but sooner or later it must yield to the demands of development. In fact, it appears that in the long run, law and development are complementary to each other. Law must make room for development and development in its turn must promote improvement in law. It is an international relationship.

I. International Law

In this paper an effort is made to illustrate the relationship between law and development. To begin with I take up the the role of law at the international level. The law relating to states in regard to interaction between them is very significant these days because every state has to enter into various treaties, agreements and arrangements for various purposes. Particularly in developing countries, the process of development to a great extent depends upon the co-operation, collaboration and mutual assistance of the states. Many development projects are being carried out in the Third World in collaboration with either the advanced countries or with other developing countries. All these projects, schemes, loans or aid are transacted through law. The very words in which such agreements are couched may make a world of difference to a country.

To illustrate my point, I take up a recent case[2] which came before the High Court of Malawi. The facts of the case were these: On February 17, 1976, ADMARC entered into a contract with an American corporation called Dominion Industrial Corporation (hereafter referred to as DIC) to purchase from the latter two lots of fertilizer, the first of 30,000 metric tons of sulphate of ammonia, the second of 3,000 metric tons of calcium ammonium nitrate. Fertilizers, it must be indicated here, are essential for improving agricultural yields. In March 1976, DIC failed to provide a guarantee as required for the letter of credit and consequently the two parties agreed to modify the initial contract. Instead of the original 30,000 tons of sulphate of ammonia, DIC had agreed to sell, ADMARC agreed to buy 10,000 metric tons of sulphate of ammonia, the other order remaining as before. The two lots of fertilizer were to be despatched by ship by May 20, 1976. Accordingly, on March 20, 1976, the National Bank of Malawi amended the letter of credit established on February 27, 1976. In the meantime, on March 16, 1976, Barclays Bank International Limited, Southampton, England, issued a guarantee in favour of ADMARC to cover any shortfall by the seller in the performance of the revised contract to the extent of 10 per cent of

the contract value of the two lots of fertilizer purchased.

On May 4, 1976, DIC as charterer entered into a charter-party with the owners of a vessel, *Ekaterini A*, in which the two lots of fertilizer were to be shipped to Beira or Nacala, Mozambique, as ADMARC wished. On the same day, two bills of lading in respect of the two lots were issued and sent to ADMARC. On May 20, 1976, two lots of fertilizer were despatched by *Ekaterini A*, consisting of 5,500 metric tons of sulphate of ammonia and 3,150 metric tons of calcium nitrate. ADMARC received the two bills of lading. Each of the bills bore these printed words in the top right-hand corner:— "All the terms, conditions, liberties and exceptions of the charter-party are herewith incorporated."

To a layman these words would appear without any special meaning but to ADMARC they caused a loss of K20,423.42. How did it happen? Let me proceed with more details. The vessel with fertilizer arrived at Beira on June 14, 1976, at 14.00 hours. It was not berthed until June 28, 1976, at 19.05 hours. I am quoting the exact time as every second of delay contributed to the big loss. Discharge of the fertilizer was completed on July 18, 1976, at 17.00 hours.

By the terms of the charter-party entered into by DIC and the shipowners, the cargo of fertilizer was to be discharged within a period calculated at the rate of 750 tons per weather working day, Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays being excluded and the time lost in waiting for a berth to be counted as discharging time. In the event of the discharge taking a longer period a demurrage penalty was to be levied at a rate set out in the charter-party. Accordingly, the lay-days period commenced on June 15, 1976, at 07.30 hours and expired on June 29, 1976, at 16.30 hours. Thus the demurrage period commenced on June 30 and expired on July 18, 1976, at 17.00 hours. In terms of money, the demurrage was calculated as much as K38,294.91. The shipowners claimed this amount from DIC which in its turn claimed it from ADMARC on the ground that ADMARC was liable as the liability clause was incorporated in the bills of lading. When ADMARC refused to pay this amount, as it thought that it was not liable at all, DIC filed a suit against ADMARC in the High Court. The case was argued from both sides and Justice J.W. Mead gave judgment on November 25, 1977. He held that as the terms and conditions of the charter-party were incorporated in the bills of lading, ADMARC was liable for the demurrage. But ADMARC was not liable for the whole amount of demurrage as the

discharge of the vessel was interrupted between July 5 and July 12, 1976, due to the fault of DIC because it failed to pay funds to cover the discharge expenses. Thus DIC was to pay K17,870.49 and ADMARC K20,423.42. ADMARC proved that it had made every possible arrangement with the port authorities in Beira and with Malawi Railways Ltd for an adequate number of trucks to be made available at Beira port at the material time. ADMARC could not do anything more as the discharge of cargo at Beira was solely under the control of the Beira port. But the court held that ADMARC did not take all reasonable precautions to ensure that the fertiliser was promptly received as ADMARC did not make direct arrangements with the Beira port.[3] ADMARC argued that since it was not a party to the charter-party it could not be held liable. Moreover, it was not supplied with a copy of the charter-party. But the judge rejected its contention and held that the conditions of the charter-party having reference to demurrage at Beira were incorporated in the bills of lading. ADMARC not only lost a sum of K20,423.42 but also suffered a loss of the value of $(US)·22,525.90 in that the goods supplied were short to that extent. In such an eventuality, ADMARC was entitled to be recompensed under the guarantee but the guarantee required any claim thereunder to be made in writing, so as to reach Barclays Bank International Ltd, Southampton, England, on or before June 30, 1976. Moreover, such a claim had to be accompanied by a receipt in duplicate for the amount claimed and by a statement signed by ADMARC that the amount claimed was 10 per cent of the value of the shortfall in the value of goods sent by DIC. Besides these, there should have been a certificate by ADMARC and counter-signed by DIC stating that the shortfall was not due to *force majeure*. On June 26, 1976, ADMARC sent its papers to DIC to be forwarded to Barclays Bank, Southampton. The Chairman of DIC did not sign or send the papers to the Bank. Consequently, Barclays Bank refused to meet the claim. The Chairman explained that he did not send the guarantee papers to the Bank because he received them on July 2, 1976, whereas they should have reached the Bank on or before June 30, 1976.

The High Court held that ADMARC had failed to comply with the requirement of the guarantee. It observed:

"It should have been known to the defendant that a letter posted in Malawi on the 26th June 1976 addressed to New York was unlikely to arrive there within time to allow its content, a certificate for Mr. Silverstone's signature, to be signed and despatched from

New York so as to arrive in Southampton, England, by the 30th June 1976".[4]

This case brings out the significance of law in international trade, commerce, agreements and treaties. It is no reflection on the working of ADMARC. Even an average lawyer might have failed to note the significance of the words in the bills of lading. Only an expert in commercial law could detect the lurking danger in the documents. Of course, ADMARC could at the time of negotiations ask the American corporation to change the terms and conditions of the guarantee as these were disadvantageous to them. But, again, this could have occurred to them only if they had occasion to study the implications of the terms well in advance of the event. In the circumstances, the best course open to ADMARC was to send their agent by air to New York on June 26. He would have secured the Chairman's signature on the certificate and then taken it back to Barclays Bank, Southampton, England.

This does not however mean that this writer supports the judgment of the High Court. With due respect to the learned judge, the case could have been decided the other way round. It could be held that the incorporation of the terms and conditions of the charter-party in the bills of lading was in an oblique manner. At least, nowhere is the word "liability" to be found in the words embodied in the bills of lading, which is the general practice and even the cases quoted by the learned judge are not on all fours with the case in hand. The seller-charterer never supplied a copy of the charter-party to ADMARC. In the circumstances, it could be held that ADMARC was not liable. Even on the conditions of the guarantee, the American company could be held liable for the shortfall in goods as the conditions were clearly unreasonable. Virtually the terms and conditions of the guarantee negatived the guarantee itself. What was the good of giving a guarantee which in all circumstances was not to be fulfilled by the guarantor?

The ADMARC case is not a rare one. The reality is that international law in general and customary international law in particular have been developed mostly by developed countries. Naturally, trading companies in these countries are well versed in its intricacies and loopholes. Developing countries need to know and understand them. Now coming to my original point, the law at the international level is of paramount importance. The ADMARC case makes this very clear. Developing countries are making all-out efforts to alter the course of international law so that it may operate

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equitably for them. The new economic order sought to be established is a step towards this goal. That is why laws relating to territorial waters, high seas, continental shelf, fisheries, etc. are matters of controversy these days.

II. Municipal Law and Development

Municipal law has a tremendous effect on the developmental processes within a country. First, it is obvious that law and order is a pre-requisite for development in a country. It is through law that law and order is maintained. Criminal law, criminal procedure and evidence are geared to this end. Of course, law alone is not enough. Law is to be enforced by law-enforcing agencies, the executive, the police, magistrates and even the people. But no action can be taken in any matter if there is no law under which action can be taken. Sometimes, difficult situations arise because there happens to be no law to curb them.

These days, mushrooms and their hallucinogenic properties are creating a legal tangle in magistrates' courts in England.[5] The legal problem occurs because the only substance actually named by the law is psilocin, a powerful hallucinogen similar to LSD, which can be produced from mushrooms by anyone with a degree in organic chemistry and some laboratory equipment. Since mushrooms themselves are not mentioned in law, whether these can be regarded as illegal is the crux of the technical legal dispute. Many persons arrested for using mushrooms as cannabis had to be released by magistrates for want of a law on the subject. In India a few years back, some anti-social elements created problems for the nation; they melted coins and used the metal for their own profit. As a result there was an acute shortage of change in the market, so much so that people had either to buy without asking for the change due to them or not to buy at all. The police were able to arrest the persons involved in this operation of melting coins. But there was no law at that time against it and so they had to be released. Of course, thereafter, Parliament enacted a law to prevent such illegal practices.

To maintain law and order in developing countries is not easy since even a trivial matter may trigger off a great affray or riot and put at naught the efforts made to develop them. Again, it is through law that power is allocated to various persons in the state and the procedure about attaining power is prescribed by law so that the aspirants may not resort to improper and illegal means to capture political power. Political power is much sought after every-

where. History is witness to the wars and revolutions which have taken place for the attainment of political power. These days every developing country has got its own written constitution and other bodies of laws which organise the state and its power hierarchy.

Economic development involves not only capital accumulation or economic growth but also institutional changes. It is in the field of institutional changes that law plays an important role. The institution of family has to be protected by law. It is by law that national resources are regulated in order to attain the welfare of the people and development of the country. Law regulates the rights and obligations of the people so that they may be able to plan their lives in the best possible way. By ascertaining rights and duties, law enables the people to have certain expectations in case they act in a particular way. When they enter into agreements, they know what rights and obligations would accrue to them. They can seek the help of the state if they are frustrated in their expectations. If a seller fails to supply or a buyer fails to pay, they can invoke the law and the courts to help fulfil their expectations from each other. Without a system of rights and duties which every legal system establishes, no smooth functioning of society is possible, not to speak of any remarkable progress. In fact, modern business would come to a halt if law refuses to raise expectations in the minds of men, on the basis of their conduct or behaviour in relation to each other. In this way, law enables the people to plan and launch upon their enterprises in various fields.

III. Adjudication and Development

One of the main functions of law is to settle disputes and therefore every legal system provides for courts and judges who decide cases which come up before them. In Malawi, this judicial function is discharged by a double channel of courts. There are local or traditional courts which decide cases by applying the customary as well as the Penal Code, the Criminal Procedure and Evidence Code and a few specified Acts of Parliament. There are modern courts also which apply the enacted law. About 90 per cent of all civil cases decided in Malawi are heard by the traditional courts. The success of a judicial system is to be gauged by the quantity and quality of justice it metes out to the litigants. The judicial system affects the progress in a country in various ways.

An example from the Indian legal system would suffice to show how sometimes even good schemes and plans may be thwarted by a

judicial system. In India, the government makes plans ahd passes laws to give effect to them. For example, if there is a plan to construct a bridge over a river or to construct a new railway line, the property owners on whose land the railway line is to be constructed are given notices under the Land Acquisition Act, 1904. After giving them notice, the land is acquired and compensation paid. The property owners, more often than not, question orders of the executive on various grounds in the courts. The courts being already overloaded with litigation, it may take ten to fifteen years to finally decide a case. Until then the government cannot proceed with the scheme. The result is that sometimes very good development schemes are put in cold storage by the judicial system.

Sometimes, justice is lost in a maze of technical rules. This is very often the case in common law countries. In Malawi, by an amendment of the Criminal Procedure Code, it was clearly provided that substantial justice should be done without unnecessary regard to procedural formalities.[6] Moreover, the Legal Aid Act, 1964, enables the indigent litigant to seek help from the Chief Legal Aid Counsel in civil matters. In criminal matters also, legal aid is made available to the accused who may not have sufficient means to defend himself, on certification by a magistrate. Thus the adjudicatory process has been strengthened by providing legal aid in genuine cases.

IV. The Role of Law is Dynamic

No system of laws can be good for all times to come. A legal system takes its birth in a socio-economic setting and its norms are intended to serve certain ends in that setting. If the socio-economic conditions change, some norms of law may be rendered redundant and irrelevant and so they must yield to new norms which emerge to replace them. In such a situation the role of the judge, the lawyer and the law officer is not to stick to the view of law which does not serve its purpose but to reinterpret the law to suit the new conditions so that the law continues to promote development and the welfare of the people. This applies to written laws as well as to customary laws. So far as written laws are concerned, legislators fill the gap and very often amend, modify or revoke a law which does not suit society. But customary law grows and develops with society.

In Malawi, customary law is being remoulded mostly by those who decide cases in the traditional courts. A good example of this is the position of the money-lender in customary law. It is common knowledge that people in the villages borrow money to meet various contingencies in their lives. Some may be

able to obtain simple loans with no interest, others may be compelled by circumstances to agree to pay some interest which may be as high as 100 per cent.[7] The latter form of agreement is called *katapila* or *chimbazo*. It is to be noted that a 100 per cent interest on loans is a recognized practice. It is said that it originated from the practice of borrowing millet for brewing beer.[8] In olden times if a woman borrowed a plateful of millet, she would return the millet either in a larger plate so that its contents were more than the original quantity, or in the same plate as the one used at the time of borrowing but with the contents overflowing it. Sometimes the debtor would give two plates of millet in return, feeling that the gain she had made was partly due to the loan. With the passage of time, this practice hardened into a law and became a part of popular memory in the form of a saying : "Every pound makes another pound". But at the same time, the obligation to pay 100 per cent interest was moral rather than legal and people were reluctant to enforce their right in the village tribunal.

What is the position today? Theoretically, the law remains the same. According to the views of two chairmen of the Blantyre Urban Traditional Court,[9] *katapila* as such is not illegal or offensive to custom. They maintain that a 100 per cent interest is common and recoverable at custom[10]. In fact, in two cases, the High Court gave effect to *katapila* agreements and ordered the debtors to pay the sums of K 28.00 and K20.00 respectively. These were double the amounts borrowed, K14 and K10 respectively. In the latter case, the High Court reversed the judgment of the local court observing:

"While the payment of K 20.00 on a loan of K10.00 may be regarded as exorbitant, the local court accepted that this was the agreement between the parties. However, having made the finding, the local court proceeded to award only K10.00. This is obviously unfair to the complainant whose money was at risk for many months. I propose to set aside the order of the local court of appeal and to order that the respondent will pay the sum of K20.00 together with costs."[11]

In 1973, the National Traditional Appeal Court had to grapple with a case[12] in which the amount lent was K120.00 under a *katapila* agreement. The court observed that even if such agreements were in writing, they would be considered unenforceable. Here is clearly discernible a turning-point. As long as the sum is K10 or K20, the court is inclined to give effect to a *katapila* agreement but if it exceeds that amount, the court is not inclined to enforce it as it becomes clear

that to give effect to it would be unjust and unconscionable. It is quite obvious that if *katapila* agreements are held enforceable in respect of large amounts of loans, say, K1,000 or K2,000, the result would be very harsh for the debtor.

It is to be noted that *katapila* started in respect of small quantities of grain particularly at a time when there was no money. One would not mind returning two plates of millet for one plate but when the subject-matter is a large sum of money, the custom of returning double the amount borrowed becomes unreasonable, particularly when there is no consideration of time. The courts are therefore moulding the law in the right direction. Unless Parliament makes a law to limit the rate of interest, it is the task of the courts to apply the customary law to modern conditions so that the progress of society is accelerated. It requires no astrologer to predict that, as a market economy develops, loans and rates of interest would become more important. Modern conditions of the market and business cannot brook a rate of interest as high as 100 per cent. Whether the customary law is moulded by Parliament or by the courts is not of much significance. The point is that it must be moulded in those aspects which do not suit modern conditions. Similarly, it appears that a change is occurring in the customary law on maintenance. Franz von Benda-Beckmann observed :

"The reason why nowadays the predominantly high number of divorce law-suits brought by wives is more and more tried by the court is in the first place to be found in the associated compensation and maintenance suits. This is perhaps one of the most interesting transformation phenomena in traditional law. The idea that a husband must support his wife and children after the divorce is completely new to the old customary law. The practice of the Traditional Courts in these questions is rather not uniform. The grant of maintenance after the divorce appears to be practised as yet in the Urban Courts."[13]

Benda-Beckmann noted that the National Traditional Court in Blantyre held in a case that the husband must pay to his divorced wife a maintenance allowance. Another change noted by Benda-Beckmann is in respect of the nuclear family. He observed:

"With the progress and development in recent times, the nuclear family (father—mother—child) has come to receive more and more recognition. This holds true especially with the matrilineal tribes.[14] The position of the husband vis-a-vis the brother of his wife is growing stronger—especially when he is not in the village of his wife

but resides in the city or if he has moved to another part of the country. Educated husbands as a rule do not allow the brothers of their wives to interfere any longer in their married life and in the education of the children."[15]

V. Land Law and Development

While speaking on the Registered Land Bill, 1967, the Life President, Ngwazi Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda, observed in his forceful speech:

"Our custom of holding land is entirely out of date and totally unsuitable for the economic development of this country. If our country is or was to develop economically with agriculture as its basis of economic development, the first thing we have to do is to ameliorate the situation or lessen the seriousness of the problem by a change in our methods of land-holding or land tenure. [To do this] legally or lawfully, we had to change the existing laws because we could not do these things under the existing laws. The idea behind the Land Acts is to utilize our available land most economically and most productively so that there is no wastage of land, and no misuse of land. Under the existing law, the available land is being used uneconomically and wastefully. In order to prevent this uneconomic use and waste of land, new laws are necessary because the government needs power to control and regulate the use of land. [This can be done by] first accepting and recognizing the principle of individual ownership of land and second, by insisting that anyone who owns land, whether as an individual, or as the head of his or her family, is strictly responsible for the economic and productive use of his or her land; otherwise it must be taken away."[16]

In order to change the land law to help the development of agriculture, Parliament passed three Acts envisaging the legal foundation for a comprehensive land reform. They are: the Customary Land (Development) Act which provides for the concept of land registration and the re-allocation and re-grouping of customary land; the Registered Land Act, 1967, which regulates registration of land and entries in the land register and the Local Land Boards Act, 1967, which provides for the control organs which are to supervise land transactions. For a smooth transition from traditional to modern law, the procedure laid down is as follows. First, a specified customary land area will be declared as a development area and placed under the control of administrative officers. By this declaration,

the jurisdiction of the chiefs in the allocation and control of land will pass to the allocation officer who is to be assisted by an advisory organ called the Land Committee. The people will be asked to register their claims to the land they use. In the development of this plan the current distribution of land can be altered to suit a more economic allocation and land which has been planned for development projects, such as schools, roads and other public institutions, will be reserved for such purposes. In case there is any dispute, the Land Committee is authorized to settle it, as far as possible, adhering to customary law in its decisions. Finally, the allocation records go to the Land Registry office, where these are registered in the land registry as private land. The village area, pasture land and other land which is not used has to be registered in the allocation records as customary land. The result of registration in the land register is that registered persons will obtain private ownership of the registered land. A special form of property, namely, family property, has also been created. The new laws are being applied with great caution. In the first instance, the Lilongwe Development Area, an area of 500,000 acres, has been declared a development district. The government will carefully and slowly extend the area of reform laws so that "no one who is unwilling will be forced into ownership of land."[17] This land development programme holds high hopes. It was found in 1972 that the average yield of maize in the programme area in 1971/1972 was as high as 1,353 lbs per acre. Yields were higher in the programme area than in the area not then under programme management. Similarly, it was found that the average yield of groundnuts during the same period was higher in the developed programme area (431 lbs per acre) than in the area not then covered under programme management (397 lbs per acre).[18]

Not only that, the survey disclosed that it was possible to experiment with improved methods of cultivation.[19] It is probably too early to assess fully the extent to which the new land law will accelerate development in the agriculture sector. The years to come will record the full impact of the laws of the economy of the country.

VI. Law as a System of Norms

Law is an instrument of development in yet another way. Being a system of norms, it moulds the character and conduct of the people. Law prescribes a pattern of behaviour which people are supposed to follow. Criminal laws prohibit behaviour or conduct

which is regarded as bad by society. In fact, the law-breaker is penalized so that others, including potential offenders, may not resort to the prohibited pattern of behaviour. A crime is regarded as a wrong to the state and, therefore, the state law-enforcing authorities take up the cause of the state. It is the state which is one of the parties in criminal cases. In civil law also, a wrong act is punishable though not in the same way as in cases of crime. A person who breaches a contract is under a legal duty to pay damages to the other party to the contract. Similarly, moral attitudes are developed by law. There is a morality of fidelity to law or to tradition. Moreover, judges insist on certain standards of conduct. For instance, the standard of a reasonable man is generally applied to many situations to determine the liability of the person in question. If the person has acted as a reasonable man, he would be absolved of liability. Who is a reasonable man? The answer to this question would depend on what a judge regards as reasonable. Reason-ableness is to be assessed by the circumstances of each case. An act which is regarded as reasonable in one set of circum-stances may not be regarded so in another. The standard of reaso-nable man is a norm which every good citizens, when he becomes conscious of his rights and duties, would try to observe. Thus law by prescribing normative behaviour attempts to raise the standard of care to be taken by the people in relation to each other. Thus along with religion, morality, and education, law also aims at raising the quality of life. The development of society is a multi-faceted pro-cess; it includes material, moral, spiritual, cultural, educational and intellectual development.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it may be submitted that law is not indifferent to the aim of development. In fact, it is a ready tool for use in the task of development of a society. In the new situation which has arisen in the Afro-Asian developing countries, law and lawyers have to go hand in hand with social scientists to promote develop-ment.

The role of law in the development of a country is at various levels. These days international law has assumed paramount signi-ficance. The ADMARC case is a clear pointer to this. Again muni-cipal law in a country has got to be employed for the acceleration of economic development. First, it is the task of law to ensure complete calm and peace in the country in the absence of which no development is possible. Law-enforcing authorities have a special

role to play to maintain law and order. It is the law which regulates the allocation of power and resources in a society so that there may not be unnecessary conflict or friction. By prescribing a pattern of behaviour for the people in relation to each other, law makes it possible for them to plan their lives and launch upon various enterprises. The laws relating to contract, Tort, trade and commerce, land and movable property are clear examples. Besides, law has to ensure a fairly reasonable judicial systems so that people can secure an easy remedy. It is incumbent on the judge, the lawyer and the law officer to rise to the occasion and interpret laws, keeping in view the development of the country. In this respect, customary law is in need ' of special attention and the judges dealing with it have to mould it to suit the pace of development. The role of law has become dynamic in the new situation. There may come to light many more areas like the *katapila* agreement in customary law, which require fresh thinking and re-interpretation. Law has to pay equal attention to the moral and cultural development of a people, along with their economic or material progress.

FOOTNOTES

1. *Law and Development*, 1974. International Legal Center, New York, p. 15.

2. Dominion Industrial Corporation v. Agricultural Development and Marketing Corporation, Civil Cause No. 101 of 1977.

3. See the judgment at p. 6

4. *Ibid* at p. 8.

5. *The Observer*, March 26, 1978.

6. S. 3 reads : "The principle that substantial justice shall be done without undue regard for technicality shall at all times be adhered to in applying the provisions of this code."

7. Detailed information regarding the legal position of a money-lender at customary law may be gathered from L.J. Chimango's article. *The Money Lender in Court*, Law Department, Chancellor College. In fact, I have also borrowed from Chimango's article but not under any *katapila*.

8. *Ibid* at p. 4.

9. *Ibid* at p. 6.

10. Civil Appeal (Local Courts) No. 17 of 1967 and Civil Appeal (Local Courts) (High Court) No. 15 of 1969, (High Court).

11. Quoted by Chimango, *Ibid* at p. 10.

12. *Majawa* v. *Jere*, Civil Appeal No. 122 of 1973 (National Traditional Appeal Court).

13. Franz von Benda-Beckmann, *Legal Pluralism* in Malawi, 1971, unpublished manuscript, p. 97.

14. The view that matrilineal system is a determinant of underdevelopment in Malawi has been questioned by Dr. Kandawire. *See* Kandawire, J.A.K., "The structure of the colonial system as a factor in the underdevelopment of Agriculture in Colonial Nyasaland. *Journal of Social Science*, vol. 4, 1975, University of Malawi, p. 35. The author raises a fundamental issue : "Similarly, even if virilocality was found to be a positive factor of agricultural development, one would still ask for an explanation of the assumption that agricultural development can be achieved only through the agency of men and not women." *See* p. 37.

15. Benda-Beckmann, *op, cit.* Supra, at 96-97.

16. *Hansard, Proceedings of Parliament (Malawi)*, 4th Session. 1966-67 pp. 399-412.

17. *Id.* at p. 403.

18. *A Socio-Economic Survey of Agriculture in the Lilongwe Land Development* Programme Area 1971/72, 1973, p. 81-82.

19. *Ibidem*

The Kenyatta Era: A Critical Study

Padma Srinivasan

THE most significant aspect of Kenya's colonial history is the Mau Mau upsurge in which the Kikuyu, more than any other people, were involved. What the Kikuyu then suffered was so traumatic that the country's colonial past continues to influence its political development even today.

When the freedom-loving Kikuyu realized that all their fine, ancestral land had been taken away from them by the British settlers, a wave of anger swept through them. Their political consciousness was quickened by the injustices of colonialism and they rose in revolt. This fiery nationalism was an outcome of the Mau Mau revolt that drove them to improve their lot through educational and entreprene-urial efforts. Not only are they Kenya's largest tribe, but they are its most enterprising and best trained people. A lingering consequ-ence of the Mau Mau is the common memory of suffering—the memory of having suffered together and of having suffered the most. This living memory of the wrongs they suffered has helped, more than anything else, to cement an acephalous people who, in pre-colonial times, were scattered and unorganized. It is this that gave them a remarkable dynamism and momentum vis-a-vis other tribal parties in 1960 when their own Kenya African National Union (KANU) was formed. When the constitutional talks were held in 1962-63, KANU had a lead over KADU (Kenya African Democratic Union) which was made up of all the smaller tribes.

Because the Kikuyu have suffered and sacrificed more than any other tribe, it has seemed to them most natural that the fruits of independence must belong primarily to them. The question 'Who gets what, when and how?' could be posed only within the Kikuyu fold—the Kikuyu of Kiambu, to be precise. Kenyatta's leadership style fitted into this pattern for it was, above all, personal, patrimo-nial and traditional. Family ties were a prime consideration in the distribution of largesse. The politics of blood ties and intrigue dominated even Parliament. According to Henry Bienen, the parliamentary majority was kept in a cohesive state by "the operation of a rewards system for Ministers, Assistant Ministers, and backben-chers alike. These rewards were channelled through the President's Office or through Ministries which gave individuals appointments to statutory boards".[1] Indeed, if KANU ever exhibited any cohesion it was because of these extraneous factors. (However, it must not be

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forgotten that one of the binding forces of any party is the reward it can offer to its members.) The inner core of Kenyatta's Cabinet was made up of the Kikuyu of Kiambu (Kenyatta's homeland). Kenyatta used public means for personal enrichment, even as other Kikuyu did. With them he openly shared the view that this was in the fitness of things, as they had sacrificed so much for the nation. In fact, he told many MPs "that in office they had their chance to do something for themselves and he once reproached Kaggia for not having done something for himself in business or farming while in public office".[2]

Kenyatta's strength lay not merely in his being the undisputed leader, after 1949, of the most outstanding ethnic group in Kenya. By 1952 he had risen to the eminence of a national leader. After the Kapenguria trial, he was arrested on October 20, 1952; and on his release on August 14, 1961, he was already an elderly man, the Mzee, the Father of African Nationalism and of the Kenya Nation[3]. His sufferings in prison for eight years and eight months went a long way towards making a legend of him in his lifetime. He personified both fiery nationalism and a united Kenya. Added to all this was an abundance of personal charm and political cunning, by which he led the country towards political stability and economic prosperity. His long period of incarceration meant that he was quite out of touch with political events for a very long time. It is interesting to note that he did not bring the nation to independence through any political organization he himself had nursed, as did, for example, Nyerere in Tanzania, Nkrumah in Ghana, Keita in Mali or Toure in Guinea. Between 1953 and 1961, while he was languishing in prison, Kenya's major parties were being formed. John Spencer says that as a "newly-freed prisoner who came blinking into the glare of world publicity in August 1961", Kenyatta was "diffident, out of touch with his people, his political reflexes rusty after years of detention".[4] But he soon became master of the political situation.

As the leader of KANU, Kenyatta stood for a united nation and transfer of power, at independence, in its entirety to African hands. KADU stood for a limitation of power in the interests of minorities. While KANU stood for centralization of power, KADU pressed for its decentralization. This caused serious difficulties in the constitutional talks preceding the granting of independence. General elections were held in May 1963 for the formation of an interim government after which the constitutional talks were resumed in London and Nairobi. KADU had all along been fighting bravely

for a series of democratic safeguards for minority rights. But KANU pressures on the Secretary of State, Duncan Sandys, seem to have been so strong that fresh amendments favouring centralization over regionalism were accepted. The KADU delegation felt itself constrained to boycott the final plenary session. It was a crucial hour in Kenya's constitutional history. The same day, Ronald Ngala read a strongly-worded letter to the Press expressing his objections to the proposed amendments. In it he accused the British Government of acting in "complete breach of its solemn pledges and undertakings", and described Sandys as being "misleading, even dishonest" in pretending that the changes had been made because the present constitution was unworkable, as in fact it had "not yet been implemented, let alone tried out in practice".[5] This criticism of the Constitution of 1963, allegedly levelled by Sandys, is important as it was used widely by KANU members, even though the constitution was hardly given a trial.

Thus, from the very beginning, a process had begun by which the democratic base was weakened by suspicion and a lack of consensus on fundamental issues. It is not surprising that later developments led to a further weakening of this ill-poised structure. Inevitably but steadily a process began that led to the subversion of democracy—albeit in a piecemeal, haphazard manner. There was, in the context of a tension-ridden, disorganized national party, an inexperienced Parliament and a weak opposition party, only one institution that Kenyatta could use with confidence in the governance of the country—the civil service.

Kenya had a particularly strong bureaucracy as a result of colonial developments. In fact, Kenya's civil service was better developed than elsewhere in East Africa, built as it was to serve the White settlers and provide them security during the Mau Mau revolt. Thus, the strong civil service was an offshoot of the Mau Mau movement.

A colonial civil service, because of the nature of its work, has to be a highly politicised one; its provincial, district and divisional commissioners are policy-makers and not mere policy 'implementors'. But with the onset of independence, a major change has to take place in the structure and the purpose and, indeed, in the very ethos of the civil service, if it is to serve a democratic state. The authoritarian tone of the bureaucracy, inherited from colonial days, has to be reconciled with the atmosphere of free political participation. The policy-forming tradition must be changed into the apolitical role of the

technician. It would need an attitudinal change to reduce the civil servant to anonymity, in which he would be a mere policy 'implementor' and not a policy-maker.

At independence, on December 12, 1963, the new Constitution sought to keep the government's powers in check as a safeguard for minority rights and interests. In order to check the power of the central government and act as a balancing force, the civil service machinery was carefully constituted. The civil service was no longer to exercise any initiative in policy-making. The untrammelled discretionary powers that it had enjoyed till then were taken away. The entire civil service was placed under the control of an independent supervisory body—the Public Service Commission (PSC). It was the PSC alone that could appoint, discipline and remove officials. It advised the Governor-General in the appointment of the highest officials, like the Attorney-General, the Controller and Auditor-General and the Permanent Secretaries. The members of the PSC were themselves appointed by the Governor-General, acting in accordance with the advice of the most independent, the most august, public body under the Constitution—the Judicial Service Commission. The members of the PSC could not be political figures. The security of their tenure was safeguarded because the removal of a member had to be referred to an independent tribunal whose recommendation was conclusive. Civil servants were forbidden to participate in politics.

All this was done under the Constitution of 1963 accepting the concept of the civil service as a neutral tool of policy implementation. Such a concept is of course vital to a democratic polity. But a neutral civil service is antipathetic to authoritarian regimes. An autocrat of the post-independence era would claim that as the supreme reorganizer of society and its institutions he needs, for the developmental tasks ahead, a civil service that is positive, political and committed; both in structure and in functioning it would have to be under his complete control.

Kenyatta found that the 1963 pattern of the civil service put a clog in his executive authority. He therefore lost no time in changing the Constitution that hamstrung his anthority. The Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act (No. 28, 1964) vested wide powers in the President. He enjoyed complete appointive discretion in relation to the Attorney-General, the Controller and Auditor-General, the Permanent Secretaries and even the PSC itself. Futhermore, every person who held office in the service of the Republic of

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Kenya did so during the pleasure of the President. Thus, the President became, in theory, the employer of all civil servants and he could discontinue their services at will. The normative wall which the democratic constitution had built to protect public officers from the personal whims of the politician was broken down. Kenyatta subjected the Constitution to a series of rapid changes, so as to soften down the rigidities of the system and emphasize the importance of his own executive discretion and personal leadership. The official viewpoint was expressed forcefully by Tom Mboya, who urged that what Kenya needed was not a barrage of fetters on the exercise of public power, but "a strong and wise government, founded on the will of the people, by a constitution which embodies the fact of national leadership as seen in the eyes of the people . . . ."[6] If the independence Constitution had endeavoured to establish a 'government of laws and not of men', Kenyatta quickly reversed the position and established, as Mboya said, "a constitution which embodies . . . the fact of national leadership".

Throughout the years since independence, Kenyatta dominated the political scene. It was the concept of the *Mzee*, the "strong and wise" leader, rather than the rule of law which was the guiding principle of the Kenyan polity. He did not need to contest for the Presidency in 1964 when Kenya became a Republic. He was the Prime Minister and appropriate legislation, in the shape of a constitutional amendment, elevated him to the Presidential chair. Subsequently, he was returned unopposed by so-called elections. He controlled the entire executive machinery of the state. With the civil service, which was a subservient and sensitive instrument in his hands, he introduced extension services and rural projects. The Sessional Paper on *African Socialism* (1965) set forth the socialistic objectives of the state and, in accordance with its pledges, Kenyatta started a National Social Security and Medical Insurance system ; he organized the Housing Finance Company of Kenya which helped Africans to get low-interest housing loans ; and he helped African businessmen to get development capital at low interest rates through the Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation.

The Provincial Administration was a positive handmaid of the Presidency and provided a vital source of legitimation for Kenyatta's actions. It was a direct link between the President's office and the countryside. The government was instrumental in creating co-operatives in rural areas and continued to supervise their activities directly. There is no element of popular initiative and the co-opera-

tives of Kenya do not evoke the usual image of self-managing organizations which serve the interests of their own members. They are perceived by the government as a means for effecting public policies in the agricultural sector.

Under British rule, the provincial administration was a powerful, though decentralized, tool in the hands of the Governor for implementing the policies of direct rule. No time was lost (December 1964) in transferring responsibility for provincial administration from the Ministry of Home Affairs to the President's Office. Thus, Kenyatta put the administrative clock back to colonial times, for district and provincial commissioners regained the powers they had lost under the democratic Constitution of June 1963.

The result is that today Kenya's public service reveals the influence of the colonial past on administrative behaviour and procedures and the general nature of administrative life. Even though there has been widespread Africanization, the practices, procedures and precedents of colonial days can still be seen. The provincial administration is still the elite branch of the service. Its officers wear uniforms like the old ones at state functions and exercise remarkable authority, which is derived from their close contact with the President. It is like the close contact their predecessors enjoyed with the Governor of Kenya. Law and order, which was the fundamental aim of the colonial regime, still continues to be the primary concern of the present government. The very same instrument—the same public administration—has secured public order both in the Kenyatta era and in the colonial one.

Why has law and order been such a prime factor in Kenyatta's Kenya ? As a new state it shares with other new states the problems of insecurity and instability that arise from a too rapid pace of social change. The role of a public service, in an environment of runaway change, is a difficult one to define. On the one hand, it is widely recognized that it must initiate development and maximize economic benefits ; on the other, it must prevent the political framework from being swept away in a tidal wave of modernization. Hence the imperative of law and order which has caused most executive heads in developing countries to grasp at the public service as the only means of control available.

Why KANU Faded Away

The fading away of Kenya's only party, KANU, is a fact that must be juxtaposed with the phenomenal rise in the importance of

the civil service. Linked with this is also the fading away of Parliament itself within the political system.

On the one hand, KANU leaders generally approved of the increasing importance given to the Administration as the Agent of the Executive, as they had a preference for a strong, centralized Executive. But, paradoxically, they found themselves at odds with that same Administration. For, it frequently posed a challenge to the power of their party, KANU. Frictions were touched off on several occasions and KANU members or MPs challenged the power of the Administration. The root of the trouble was that, on the one hand, the administrative officers were the servants of the President, the highest authority in the land, and on the other hand, Members of Parliament were the servants of the people. In other words, we may pose their question thus : "Who rules Kenya, President or Parliament ?" It was only when local incidents revealed the truth of the matter that they regretted the ascendancy that the Executive had acquired. "Finally", as Cherry Gertzel points out, "they objected deeply to the fact that the Administration was not responsible to Parliament."[7]

In September 1975 there was a very interesting development that brought the civil service and the government together officially. At a KANU meeting, presided over by Kenyatta, a resolution was passed that all senior civil servants would have to be KANU members ; it also stated that the top-rung officers would have to be life members of the party. This action was justified on the ground that a civil servant, like everyone else, has a right to enjoy freedom of assembly and association. But this, on closer examination, will be seen to be a mockery of the idea of rights, for one should have more than one party or association to choose from. Moreover, what will happen if Kenya, at some future date, does have an alternative party ? Will a bureaucracy, wedded to the aims of KANU, serve it ? The deed seems to have been done to ensure against the rise of another party, and to perpetuate the dominance of KANU. Paradoxically, "Kenya remained a dominant party state ; but it had left KANU, as the dominant party, in a weak position."[8]

KANU—The Weak Party

It is perhaps wrong to call Kenya a dominant party state for it was really Kenyatta and his civil service that dominated the political scene. In June 1964, KANU backbenchers' criticism of the government's ambiguous silence on the question of East African Federation

made Kenyatta feel uncomfortable. This and other clashes in Parliament made him call a meeting of all Ministers and MPs in August 1965, at which it was unanimously resolved that the KANU backbenchers' group stood dissolved and that all matters of concern to MPs would be discussed in the meetings of a new organization called the KANU Parliamentary Group.[9] The unanimously elected chairman of this new group was Jomo Kenyatta himself. MPs would not, after this, dare criticize the government within the hall of Parliament. Kenyatta had, by a brilliant stroke, thrown Parliament out of political limelight. He had prevented it from playing its most vital role of acting as a check on the Executive and, above all, he had taken away its freedom of speech—its *duty* to criticize the government. Not only had he weakened Parliament and shown who was *master* but he had also weakened the party, KANU. For, when the MPs found themselves tongue-tied in Parliament, they went back to their constituencies to speak their minds out. When Kenyatta found that the attacks were too vehement, he administered the medicine – through his provincial administration. He decreed, early in 1965, that all members must obtain a licence from the Administration before being allowed to speak at public meetings, even in their own constituencies. KANU was overshadowed by the Administration.

KANU was also weakened because the opposition parties were not allowed to thrive. In September 1963, the African People's Party (APP), led by Paul Ngei, was wound up and merged with KANU, following a steady trickle of defections. Again, in November 1964, KADU, led by Ronald Ngala, suddenly committed political suicide and joined KANU *en masse*. Ngala was bodily carried across the floor amid shouts of wild jubilation. With the result that dissensions increased within KANU. But KADU was not the cause of the dissensions. They were caused simply by the disappearance of KADU. KANU became devitalized ; and it seems that it is from the very presence of an opposition party, however weak and meagre, that a ruling party gains its will to survive. It is only the coexistence of at least another competitive group that confers reality on a political party.

On the other hand, a one-party system gives that party a sense of being a permanent aspect of the state ; it is this very guarantee of permanence that atrophies it. In an open letter to the President in January 1966, the KANU Organizing Secretary, John Keen, complained bitterly about the "appalling situation of the party".[10] Its various bodies, like the delegates' conference, executive council and

party secretariat meeting, had not met for unconscionable periods of time : its debts totalled $56,000 ; the staff had not been paid for seven months ; and its telephone and postal bills were unpaid. After Kenyatta's death, Robert Matano, Acting Secretary-General of KANU, was still in this position since Tom Mboya's death in 1969, as there had been no party electoral meeting to confirm his post.

This atrophied state of KANU shows that it is only freedom of association in its fullest sense that can sustain a party system, where more than one party balance and check and enliven one another. Political events in Kenya bear out the truth of this statement and show that it is not a mere ideological objection. But dogma apart, there are two other practical objections to the one-party state : a one-party set-up fails to give a proper representation across the country ; and in its working it will always fail to preserve intra-party democracy. The second of these is the more serious objection. On October 17, 1975, Kenyatta warned Parliament that dissidents would not be tolerated. The two-hour Parliamentary meeting was called as he faced a crisis in KANU. This was three days after the Deputy Speaker of the Kenyan Parliament, John Marie Seroney, and another fearless critic of the government, Martin Shikuku, were arrested by plain-clothes police *inside the Parliament building*, at the end of the session. He declared that similar action would be taken against any parliamentarian who did not support the government or tried to obstruct it. It was then that he uttered the momentous words about the hawk hovering in the sky and ready to swoop on the chickens. He made it clear that he had ordered the arrests himself. He said he knew the others who were not following government policy and would act against them if necessary. He mentioned no names. When the secretary of the party, Jesse Gachago, tried to read out a list of names, he stopped him.[11]

Parliament was the only place where KANU members could express their opinions. The party itself, as we have seen, held hardly any meetings. Though this had the effect of enlivening Parliamentary debates, there was the disadvantage that it caused dirty KANU linen to be washed in public. The constant presence of an instituted opposition would force intra-party rivalry to remain private. The problem of dissent became very acute ; it rose from the lower party levels and became a subject of public debate.

Kenya's Unofficial Opposition

A strong backbencher group set itself up as the watchdog of public interest. The advent of the one-party state did not discourage

them at all. Indeed, after the dissolution of KADU the new and enlarged backbenchers group continued to insist that they were the legitimate critics of the Executive. And, within a one-party state, they felt they alone were the conscience of the government. They did not restrict themselves to criticism of matters of detail in legislation. They criticized the government on major issues like land, nationalization and education. In the absence of any opposition party in Parliament, the place seemed 'safe' and homely for the airing of all dissenting views. But backbench opposition, strong as it was, could not force the government to make any major changes in its legislative programme. It could not also lead to any Cabinet crisis. It could not take the place of an organized, instituted opposition which, however weak, acts as an antidote to dictatorship. While the government may have refrained from certain actions because of an instituted opposition, it can carry on unperturbed even in the face of the severest criticism from stray backbenchers. The backbenchers may challenge individual Ministers but they cannot take concerted action against the government. Hence, the first step in dictatorship is liquidation of the opposition party.

The constant criticisms aired by the KANU backbenchers had the advantage of making Parliament a lively body—an interesting showpiece of democracy and not a dull, rubber-stamping body. Another advantage was that the free ventilation of grievances prevented tensions from building up in the body politic. A third advantage also accrued to the President : when KADU was dissolved and incorporated into KANU, friction increased ; and criticism, not only increased, but became more acrimonious ; as a result, *the bargaining power of Parliament, as a Legislature, were greatly weakened vis-a-vis the Executive.*

President's Position in Parliament

Under the Constitution of Kenya (Amendment) Act, 1964, by which Kenya became a Republic, the President was both the Head of State and Head of Government. Executive authority within the State was vested in him. There is an unusual constitutional provision that the President must be an elected member of the House of Representatives. He sits in the National Assembly as a member in his own right. This fact by itself may seem to enhance the position of Parliament within the governmental system. When he stepped into it to address it, therefore, it was as though it glowed because of his presence. For Kenyatta in his address to Parliament said, "The Constitution has provided as a matter of vital consequence that the Head of State

should also be the Head of Government. In addressing this Parlia-
ment therefore I am addressing an institution of which I am also a
vital part. The whole apparatus of the State becomes personified
when I step down to join you. This process of so stepping down is not
only a valuable personal right but also a significant Presidential obli-
gation."[12] If the whole apparatus of State became personified – and,
may we add, glowed with life, for Kenyatta was also "a vital part"
of it—when he stepped down to join Parliament, it is equally true that
without him it is a lifeless body of little or no consequence. More-
over, it was on a lower plane to the position of the President, as the
reiteration of "stepping down" suggests. In consonance with this idea
of Parliament as a second-rate body, Kenyatta rarely stepped down
into it to confer "a significant Presidential obligation" upon it. When
he did visit the House, it was as President ; he used the Presidential
Chair and kept out of debate.

What was the constitutional significance of his absence ? It
meant that the Executive (as distinguished from the Cabinet) did not
have to cross swords with the Legislature ; the Executive was safe
and sheltered behind the Cabinet. It was the Cabinet Ministers who
attended Parliament and bore the brunt of the attacks from critics.
The Executive could remain calm and dignified, even though he him-
self was indeed responsible for all the deeds and misdeeds of his
government. Unlike the Prime Minister in a Cabinet system, he did
not face the fire, nor did he suffer the *ennui* of being a mere figure-
head. Kenyatta stood above the storm of party politics and parlia-
mentary debate—calm and serene, his charisma untouched. The
Cabinet Ministers bore the brunt of it all in the National Assembly
and acted as a buffer between the President and Parliament.

The Democratic Significance of the Senate
The concept of the Senate played a very major part in the con-
stitutional talks that preceded the Constitution of 1963. From the
very beginning (1960 onwards) it was linked up inextricably with the
stand taken by KADU—that power must be limited and that govern-
ment must be decentralized to protect the rights of minorities. It
stood, in other words, for minority rights and 'regionalism' (which
was the Kenyan equivalent of our quasi-federalism). KANU, on the
other hand, presents a sharp contrast. From its inception (in 1960)
we see only one aim—'unity of purpose and action'. Its attitude to
power was that it must be transferred at independence, in a total
form and its attitude to government was that it must be strongly
centralized.

It is significant that KADU demanded a full federation of six regions under a central government, designed to make it impossible for any one dictator or single group to win full power in Kenya. Under KADU's plan there were to be specially entrenched clauses in the Constitution (safeguarding the powers and boundaries of the regions as well as the rights of minorities), which would require not only a majority in both Houses but also the agreement of all the regions. For the purpose of delimiting the regions, a special Regional Boundaries Commission was appointed under the chairmanship of Sir Stafford Foster-Sulton. The Commission performed its difficult task superlatively. The wishes of various ethnic groups were taken into consideration ; large numbers of people from many walks of life were interviewed. After its long labours, it divided Kenya into six regions besides Nairobi Area : (1) Coast Region (including the Northern Frontier District), (2) Eastern Region, (3) Central Region, (4) Rift Valley Region, (5) Nyanza Region and (6) Western Region.

The work of the Commission gave a firm sociological base to the political structure of the 1963 Constitution, besides lending a democratic tone to the entire political set-up. Later on, (in 1964) when regionalism was abolished, the word 'provinces' was used instead of 'regions'. This is not a mere change in terminology for it is significant of the change in the fundamental character of the Kenyan polity after December 1964. It gradually seemed treason against the State (i.e., Kenyatta himself) to speak of regions ; it was despicable, *and dangerous*, to support regionalism or *majimboism*. The Constitution of 1963, which was still-born on the day of independence, was often referred to as the Majimbo Constitution. It became a term of abuse, like 'bourgeois'.

What has been said above might seem like an academic's idle excursion into a lonely bylane of Kenya's history. Nevertheless, even bits of forgotten history may be retrieved with profiit, for Man's fight for freedom is a never-ending one.

It was through Kenya's Senate that the freedom-loving minorities tried to protect themselves. An Upper House was necessary to safeguard the autonomy of the regions and to assure sufficient representation of minorities. For it was recognized that a unicameral legislature elected on the basis of "one-man, one-vote" might very well be completely controlled by KANU, which favoured a greater centralization of power. Ronald Ngala, leader of KADU, upon his arrival in London for the 1962 Constitutional Conference said : "We believe that a two-chamber Parliament with a Senate especially char-

ged with preserving the rights of the regions is the only way to ensure the continuing liberty of the individual."[13] Bicameralism was also supported by Asian merchants and European settlers as a safeguard against hasty legislation.

KADU went to London in 1962 with proposals for a powerful Senate, to be elected indirectly on a regional basis, with five members for each region. A 75 per cent affirmative vote in each House would be necessary for constitutional amendments and a two-thirds majority would be required for the declaration of an emergency. KANU, on the other hand, was committed to a unicameral parliament. With difficulty a compromise was reached. KADU won its second chamber on a much weakened basis, for the representation was to be district-wise. The Senate would at least be able to safeguard the Constitution.

But the Senate was continually harassed by rumours that it would be abolished [14] as well as by a general indifference and negative attitude on the part of ministers. It was never regarded as a dignified House of Elders. (The age-limit was the same as that for the Lower House, twenty-one years.) After 1965 there were increasing difficulties between the two Houses. This was because regionalism—the original *raison d'etre* for the Senate—had been abolished. There were 'entrenched' clauses for the protection of the regions in the Constitution ; and for the amendment of these a 90 per cent majority was needed in the Senate.[15] But with the constitutional amendments passed between October 1964 and April 1965, both regionalism and the regional Authorities were swept away. Moreover, the amending process itself was changed so that any part of the Constitution could be amended by a mere two-thirds majority of each House.

The stage was now set to give the Senate a bad name—as an outmoded relic of regionalism—before abolishing it. Late in May 1966, the KANU parliamentary party passed a unanimous resolution which called the two chamber legislature "the creation of imperialism." It was left standing as a visible testimony of its worthlessness till 1967, when it was abolished.

Conclusion

This article has endeavoured to make a critical assessment of the Kenyatta era. The legacy of Kenyatta's rule will have incalculable consequences for Kenya's future. Kenya's political development has been determined by the fact that the balance of power within the country is tilted in favour of one dominant tribe, the Kikuyu. Tribes have

always had a sense of ethnic and political identity since ancient times. Unlike the castes of India, they pose a more serious problem in the task of nation-building. Political parties tend to follow the boundaries of ethnic consciousness and this intensifies party rivalry. The smooth functioning of Parliament requires that parties competing for power must moderate their hostility within an over-arching, harmonizing ethos. But if party rivalry assumes the dimensions of civil war, the solution will have to be either secession or the strong arm of authority, usually wielded by the party of the dominant tribe. Kenya's difficulties in operating parliamentary institutions do not stem from Kenyatta's actions alone ; they go deeper into the demographic imbalance of the country.

Even if efforts are made in the future to reverse the legacy of the Kenyatta era, it may not be an easy task. For, democratic norms and behaviour are not acquired in a day. The mechanics of law are altered more easily than the attitudes of men. Even if the future statesmen of Kenya—the future Ngalas and Kariukis—were to brace themselves up to re-establish a democratic Constitution complete with checks and balances, rights and safeguards, it would be very difficult for them to de-politicize the civil servants once again and exercise their authoritarian attitudes.

Fifteen years of Kenyatta's rule prevented Parliament from developing into an august body, with its own conventions and individuality. The lives of many fine parliamentarians were embittered by frustration, defeat and detention and a few outstanding lives were cut off by untimely death.

Kenya has not had the benefits of a party system. Even re-vitalizing KANU will be a forbidding task—not to speak of reviving the ghost of a KADU or a KPU, in view of the fact that so many courageous men have died mysteriously.

In Kenya today, there is the ubiquitous fear of disunity, with ethnic and economic tensions pulling the country apart. This fear has forced the establishment to seek *unity* at all costs. Thus Kenya never needed Kenyatta more than now. So Kenyatta lives on, even though his mortal frame is entombed in marble. Kenyatta today (if recent reports in *The Daily Nation* and *The Standard* from Nairobi are any indication) is even more of a legend than he ever was. If there had been no legend around Kenyatta, alive, it would have to be woven afresh now. More than ever, it now seems treason to criticise him, his deeds and his thoughts. His marble mausoleum, flanked by flaming torches, is within the precincts of the very

Parliament which converted into a chicken-coop. But it was, no doubt, of the Kenyatta of the Mau Mau days that President Daniel Arap Moi was thinking when he said : "He inspired us to resist subjection."[16]

FOOTNOTES

1. Bienen, Henery. *Kenya : The Politics of Participation and Control*, New Jersey, Princeton University Press; 1974; p. 83.

2. *Ibid* , p. 76

3. What non-Kikuyu leaders said of him to urge his release frcm prison is especially important in this regard.

Odinga strongly emphasized in the Legislative Council the fact that Kenyatta was regarded as leader "in the heart of hearts by the African people".

Tom Mboya wrote on May 15, 1963 : "We elected Kenyatta to lead us. He is father of our Nationalism and nobody can change that".

Ronald Ngala, leader of the Opposition, KADU, wrote on April 7, 1961 : "The British must face the fact now that all the communities in Kenya would like to see Kenyatta out because we believe that we can then form the stable government which the country so badly needs.

"It will not help Kenya to form a government just because we have the constitutional authority or orders from Her Majesty the Queen. We must form a government that has power and support from the people of Kenya".

See Patel, Ambu H. (Compiler) *Struggle for Release of Jomo and his Colleagues*, Nairobi, New Kenya Publishers. 1963. p. 16, p. 37, and p. 39, respectively.

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Houari Boumedienne: A Tribute

PRESIDENT Houari Boumedienne, Algeria's revolutionary leader and strongman, died on December 27 after a rare blood ailment (Waldenstroein's disease) had held him in a coma for more than forty days. The 46-year-old President, an impassioned nationalist, organized the Algerian revolution against French colonial domination and raised himself and this oil-rich north African nation of 17.5 million people to a position of leadership in the Third Word. Ever since he seized power in a bloodless coup in 1965, Boumedienne had assumed total control and imposed an individual breed of politics. He wielded extensive powers as Head of State, President of the Council of Revolution, the country's top executive body, President of the Council of Ministers and Defence Minister. His death has left a chasm in the ranks of the anti-imperialist fighters of the Third World and created a dilemma for his countrymen.

Mohammed Ben Brahim Boukharouba (Boumedienne was his *non-de-guerre* adopted when a young guerilla of that name was killed in the early encounters with the French) was born in a poor landowner's family of seven children in 1927. He turned to revolutionary activities in his early twenties. As a young man, Boukharouba beat the conscription rules of the French army and fled to Cairo in 1952 to study at the Al Azhar University. That was the year when Cairo was in revolutionary turmoil which brought about the removal of King Farouk. At Al Azhar Boukharouba finished Islamic studies and acquired a considerable knowledge of Marxist revolutionary methods. But Islam rather than Marxism shaped his political ideology. At Cairo, he was soon drawn into a group of Nasser-influenced Algerian nationalists, among whom was Ben Bella. However, the two men had nothing in common except their burning passion to see Algeria independent. By 1954 when the National Liberation Front openly revolted against French rule, Boumedienne was already an important member of the Front; he had had his military training in Egypt and in Spanish Morocco and had already participated in several encounters with the French. He rose quickly through the ranks and by 1960 had established himself as the most formidable of the "historic chiefs" of the FLN struggle and assumed command of the guerilla armies. These latter he shaped into a disciplined fighting force with a revolutionary mission: soldiers having two weapons— "rifles on their

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shoulders and political principles in their conscience". When independence came to the country two years later, the army was the only source of efficiency and the power base from which Boumedienne ultimately took over as the President of the Revolutionary Council a few years later.

This was in June 1965 when Boumedienne staged a blocdless coup as Defence Minister in Ben Bella's Cabinet. Though the two leaders had been through the revolutionary independence struggle together relations between them had become strained because Ben Bella had concentrated more and more power in his own hands. Boumedienne meanwhile tightened his control on the army, arrested Ben Bella and his aides in a pre-dawn swoop on June 9, postponed the Afro-Asian Conference scheduled for June 29, then cancelled it and on July 5 took over as President of the 26-man Revolutionary Council. In this latter Council all political authority was vested. Boumedienne then was unknown and only 30 years of age. He spoke in classical Arabic which he had learnt at the Al Azhar University in Cairo and which was barely understood by his countrymen.

Boumedienne was basically a modest and shy man who tried in vain to discourage the personality cult fostered by his own subordinates. As Defence Minister he seemed to reflect the impoverishment of his country; he lived in austere surroundings and wore ill-fitting battle fatigues. But, as Algeria prospered and overcame, a decade later, the impoverishment and technical manpower shortage of the post-independence era, the once ragged guerilla President with piercing green eyes and high cheek bones, became one of the most prestigious and respected leaders of the Third World. He took to wearing expensive suits, moved into a spacious seaside villa and gave up his cheap Algerian cigarettes for Havana cheroots. It was then that he was accused of having become bourgeois but Boumedienne had by then already succeeded in projecting an ascetic image to the world, won recognition as a dedicated freedom fighter and put forth his "socialist revolutionary" ideology.

Boumedienne's was a socialism based on the tenets of Islam. But he maintained: "Our Socialism is without philosophy". He was a firm believer in world peace but on the basis of his own Algerian experience he counselled the adoption of guerilla tactics as the only means to liberation. Boumedienne's unwavering support for the Palestinian Arabs was remarkable. Algeria in fact is a

member of the hardline Arab Resistance Front together with the PLO, Syria, Libyan Jamhariyah and South Yemen, opposing President Sadat's peace manoeuvres, Boumedienne was also the champion of Algeria maintaining an unequivocal support for the Polisario Front nationalist guerillas in the Western Sahara. This support has continued despite being drawn dangerously close to a war with its strong royalist neighbour, Morocco.

Nevertheless, Boumedienne's uncompromising pursuit of Algeria's Socialist revolution and the Third World's "struggle against imperialism" was blemished by what he himself condoned as "tactical accommodation" with the West. Even though Algeria consistently maintained an anti-American posture it retained commercial and trade contacts with the United States. The United States was the largest purchaser of Algerian oil and natural gas. What is praiseworthy however is that despite this "tactical accommodation", Boumedienne did not in any way compromise his country's interests or its independence. Despite pressures, during his conference with President Nixon in April 1974 on the West Asia crisis, Boumedienne refused to revive diplomatic ties which had been severed in 1967 during the six-day Arab-Israeli War.

This pragmatism was also evident in his relations with the Soviet Union. Algeria accepted the much needed military and economic aid from the Soviet Union without being drawn into its ambit. In the country, the Algerian Communist Party was banned and its leaders exiled.

Boumedienne's greatest contribution however was to his own country. In the little over a decade that he was at the helm of affairs, Algeria moved from being an impoverished and weak state with an agricultural economy linked to the metropole to a position of stability and leadership in the Third World. He had restored to Algeria its indigenous character and culture and moved it out of the travails and miseries suffered during its struggle for independence. But he silenced all internal opposition as he assumed dictatorial powers over the years. By 1976, Boumedienne, confident of his own position, had allowed for the first time open political debate during the drafting of a new "national charter" and constitution. Under its provisions, more than a decade after he had seized power, he legitimised his position as he was formally elected President for a six-year term in December 1976 by more than 99% of the votes cast. He was the only candidate.

Houari Boumedienne

Boumedienne's death highlights the complex problems that the country faces today. Not only problems that are endemic of a military dictatorship—problems of succession—are likely to arise but a large number of the country's problems, which under dictatorial rule had been understandably kept in the background and the simmering discontent long silenced, would raise their ugly head. Despite its oil wealth, Algeria's economy is in a bad way resulting in mass unemployment—60% among the rural population and 20% in the cities – which is the country's most pressing problem. Widespread shortages throughout the country have added to the discontent of the populace. Then again, Algeria's foreign policy postures—support to the nationalist Polisario Front guerillas and participation in the anti-Israel Arab Rejectionist Front—which have taken it dangerously close to a confrontation with its royalist Moroccan neighbour and drawn it into the vortex of violent Arab politics are also likely to come under review. Algeria thus stands at the crossroads and the policies that the new leadership would adopt are of as much concern to the Algerians as to the world at large.

Vanita Ray

India-Africa Relations
Vanita Ray

Anti-apartheid Year

The year 1978-79 was observed as Anti-apartheid Year throughout India. Under the auspices of the Indian National Committee for the Observance of Anti-apartheid Year, which has Mr Asoka Mehta as its Chairman, a series of seminars, exhibitions, film shows, rallies and meetings were organized to focus people's attention on the evils of apartheid and the atrocities committed on the Africans in their homeland by the White minority regimes of Southern Africa.

Mr Asoka Mehta visited Zambia in the last week of October. In Lusaka, he had talks with the Zambian Prime Minister, Mr Daniel Lisulo, and reiterated India's continuing support to the liberation fighters. [See also **Activities of the Centre, pp. 117-120**]

World Conference on Southern Africa

Delhi was the venue of an international conference for the liberation of Southern Africa organized by the All-India Peace and Solidarity Organization. Inaugurated by President N. Sanjiva Reddy on September 28, the conference was attended by delegates from more. than 80 countries, including representatives of the various liberation movements of Southern Africa.

In his inaugural address, Mr Reddy, reiterated India's total identification with all nationalist movements against apartheid, racism and neo-colonialism. "Our support for the liberation movements," he said, "has been unqualified", and went on to add, "we cannot be silent spectators in a worldwide effort to bring hope and success to millions in the developing countries as members of an enlightened world community of nations." He warned of "the consequences of violence in tension-ridden areas" (such as Namibia and Zimbabwe), "already weary of injustice, intolerance and bloodshed..." and hoped the minority regimes in these countries would discern "the writing on the wall and by wise statesmanship recognise the realities of the situation" and ensure that the legitimate demands of the Africans and the South Africans were met in letter and spirit.

A message from Prime Minister Morarji Desai, read out to the delegates, stated: "My Government has pledged all possible support to the freedom fighters of Southern Africa..." and went on

to urge all freedom-loving peoples to co-operate with each other in ensuring human and democratic rights in Southern Africa. Further, a call was extended to the minority regimes to realise the futility of the artificial social system that they had structured before it was too late.

The Chairman of the World Peace Council, Mr Ramesh Chandra, expressed the conference's solidarity with the frontline states of Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia in their struggle for the liberation of Southern Africa. This struggle, he said, could not be discussed in isolation, but rather in the global context of the worldwide battles for peace and national independence. The conference called on all government and non-government forces to demand that the three imperialist powers stop using their veto to prevent the imposition of mandatory economic sanctions against the racist regime of South Africa.

The South African National Congress leader, Mr Alfred Nzo, indicated that South Africa had doubled its military budget in the last few years and heightened the war psychosis.

The conference Declaration hailed the liberation fighters who were poised for final assault on the racist regimes of Pretoria and Salisbury and called on all anti-imperialist governments, political parties, mass organizations, peace and solidarity movements as well as inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations for "all-out support" to the liberation movements of Southern Africa and a "full-scale offensive against all collaboration with the racist regimes.

The Declaration condemned the designs of "imperialism and its allies" to split and divide the liberation movements. The imperialist powers, it explained, were interested in safeguarding the interests of the trans-nationals, banks and monopolies plundering the wealth of the peoples subjected to apartheid. To counter these moves, the conference called for unity of the liberation movements since that "is the guarantee for final victory."

In response to the conference's call and the Indian Government's assurance of moral and material help to the fighting organizations in South Africa, Rhodesia and Namibia, where racist regimes have imposed an armed struggle upon the African peoples, an All-Party National Solidarity Committee is to be formed under the aegis of the All-India Peace and Solidarity Organization. The Committee, on which will be represented all the national political parties, trade unions and mass organizations, as well as leading

public figures, is to intensify the campaign of support to the liberation struggles in Southern Africa and organize collection of all forms of material aid for the embattled peoples of that region.

India Denounces Multinationals

India denounced the role of multinational corporations in Southern Africa in the UN General Assembly session which met in October. Speaking in the Decolonisation Committee, which discussed the activities of foreign economic and other interests which were impeding decolonisation in Southern Africa, Mr Baldev Prakash, a member of the Indian delegation, explained how the multinationals with the help of the racist regimes were exploiting the majority black population of Southern Africa. The mineral and natural resources of the region, he said, had been depleted and a cheap labour policy implemented. He emphasized that the continued survival of the Ian Smith regime and its prosperity was in "itself proof and a scathing indictment of those multinational companies and governments who have been condoning sanction-busting activities. We would urge those member-states, particularly those represented in the Security Council, who have traditionally been reluctant to agree to such measures, to drop their opposition in the wider interests of regional stability and international peace and security." By way of conclusion, the Indian delegate struck a warning note that it would be "only at the risk of tremendous bloodshed and holocaust" that the peoples of these Southern African countries could be denied freedom by colonial and racist regimes. "A choice had to be made now before it is too late", he said.

To date, 350 multinationals are operating in South Africa. Of these, the US multinationals in South Africa are the largest and their interests are growing faster than in any other African country. Their turnover in 1974 exceeded 1.5 billion dollars, an annual growth rate of 20%. In contrast, the US investment in Africa as a whole entered a deficit to the tune of 4 billion dollars last year. In Zimbabwe also, British and American capital controlled the multinational corporations; an important example is the Anglo-American corporation running the Wankie coal-mines.

Support for Namibian Independence

Moral, political and material support in their struggle for independence against South Africa was assured to the peoples of Namibia by India's External Affairs Minister, Mr Atal Behari Vajpayee. The assurance was conveyed to Mr Sam Nujoma, Presi-

dent of the South-West African Peoples Organization (SWAPO), when the latter called on Mr Vajpayee during his visit to India in April. India, Mr Vajpayee stated, was committed to the independence of Namibia, and this, he believed, could be achieved only by an intensification of the armed struggle. Diplomatic initiatives at various international conferences, the Minister maintained, were necessary to pressurize the South African regime, but this could only be supplementary to the struggle of the peoples themselves.

During his visit, beginning on April 1, the Namibian leader also called on President Sanjiva Reddy and Prime Minister Morarji Desai, and apprised them of the grave and "explosive situation" prevailing in his country. The SWAPO President, who has been recognised by the UN as the sole negotiator for the Namibian peoples, laid down four conditions for a negotiated settlement. Namibia, he said, should be accepted as a political entity and its territorial integrity recognized. South Africa should withdraw its army from Namibia and release all political prisoners held for participating in the freedom struggle. Another preliminary condition was the acceptance by South Africa of a transitional administration by the United Nations till free elections were held to determine Namibia's freedom.

At the ninth Special Session of the UN General Assembly, called to discuss the question of Namibia, in the last week of April, Mr Vajpayee once again reiterated Indian support for Namibian independence and called on the South African Government to terminate its illegal occupation by the end of the year. For the United Nations, he said, it was the "last chance to take decisive steps to bring genuine independence to Namibia."

South Africa, Mr Vajpayee said, wanted the UN to recognize the elections to be organised by it for the purpose of legitimising the internal settlement. Such a step, he explained, would deprive the Namibians of their rights, their national self-respect and their natural resources. South Africa, he said, was promoting the territory along tribal lines and prosecuting the national forces. Under such circumstances, the dangers of South Africa's continued occupation of Namibia were understandable. South Africa should therefore vacate its illegal occupation of the territory, Mr Vajpayee stated, and went on to add, free and democratic elections under United Nations auspices should be organized, the national integrity of Namibia and Walvis Bay recognized and the international community should step up its assistance to the Namibians.

Meanwhile, on July 12 representatives of five Western states the (U.S., Britain, France, Canada and West Germany) and SWAPO agreed on an independence accord for Namibia at a meeting at Luanda in Angola. The Western plan, approved by both SWAPO and the South African authorities and endorsed by the frontline states (Tanzania, Zambia, Botswana and the two Marxist ones in Angola and Mozambique), called for UN supervised pre-independence elections in Namibia before the end of the year. According to the plan, about 5,000 UN troops could move in to maintain order during the transitional period along with a civilian staff of about 1,000 administrators provided by the UN. It was agreed that the question of the reintegration of the disputed deep-water port of Walvis Bay into an independent Namibia would be settled at later negotiations between South Africa and independent Namibia.

The accord followed 15 months of intensive negotiations between the five Western powers, the frontline states and SWAPO representatives. The plan countered proposals advanced by the South African Government which still continues to administer the mineral-rich territory under a League of Nations mandate, which anyhow was revoked by the United Nations in 1965. South Africa's plan would have retained a veto by the White minority.

The Western plan later received support in the Security Council. On September 29, the Council voted for the creation of the largest ever United Nations civilian and military force to be known as the United Nations Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG), which would ensure the process of early independence in Namibia.

India extended its wholehearted support to the Secretary-General's plan for the transfer of power and expressed solidarity with the Namibian peoples. Mr Vajpayee, speaking in the Council for the first time, warned South Africa that sanctions would have to be imposed in the event of its flouting the Council's decision.

Support for Indian's suggestion to impose sanctions against South Africa came from the Foreign Ministers of Nigeria and Kuwait. They along with India and the five Western powers (United States, Britain, France, Germany and Canada) appealed to Pretoria to co-operate in the implementation of the proposal.

The five Western powers, authors of the plan, along with Mauritius and Nigeria, cosponsored the resolution approved by the Security Council. It reaffirmed the legal responsibility of the UN over Namibia, decided to establish under its authority the UNTAG

and called on South Africa to co-operate with the Secretary Géneral in implementing the independence plan. The resolution contained a provision, included at Indian insistence, which put Pretoria on notice, that any unilateral measure it might take in relation to the electoral process, including unilateral registration of votes and transfer of power, would be considered "null and void."

The successful course of negotiations for Namibian independence between the representatives of SWAPO and the five Western powers has also been welcomed by the 15th Summit Conference of the Organisation for African Unity which met in Khartoum from July 18 to 22.

Raids on SWAPO Bases Condemned

The External Affairs Minister, Mr Vajpayee, in a statement issued in New Delhi on May 5, condemned South Africa for its attack across the borders on SWAPO (South-West African Peoples Organization) bases in Southern Angola. He described it as another act of "unprovoked aggression" made possible by South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia. The statement referred to South Africa's qualified acceptance of the Western proposals for elections under UN auspices in Namibia as a sad and unfortunate commentary on its attitude. South Africa's obstinacy as typified by such acts strengthened the conviction of those "who are sceptical about a peaceful negotiated settlement of the Namibian question".

In the Security Council also, this condemnatory note was maintained ; India took South Africa to task for its raids on SWAPO bases and warned the Security Council that if it failed to take strong measures, including total sanctions to curb the Pretoria racist regime from attacking African states, it would drive them to seeking assistance "outside the Council". Mr Rikhi Jaipal Singh, India's Permanent Representative to the UN, pointed that the May 4 South African attack was not an isolated incident. It was the manifestation of the declared policy of the Pretoria regime to attack any African country of its choice with the aim of perpetuating its racial domination of Africa. This stand was taken when the Security Council examined the Angolan charges of South African aggression in the first week of May.

South African troops had crossed into Angola on May 4, in what was described as a "limited military operation" against several SWAPO guerilla bases. The South African Defence Minister, Mr P.W. Botha, said at Cape Town that the operation was ordered "as

a result of the ominous build-up of SWAPO forces in Southern Angola." A two-pronged attack, whose targets were SWAPO bases, was organized; South African troops were airlifted 158 miles into Angola and also crossed the border to attack lesser bases near the Namibian frontier. Subsequent reports confirmed that South Africa had launched a major ground and air attack on targets in Southern Angola and destroyed an important guerilla base killing several hundred insurgents.

Following the debate in the Security Council, India sponsored a resolution, along with Mauritius and five other non-aligned member states, which condemned South Africa and demanded "immediate and unconditional withdrawal" of its forces from Angola. Later, however, the draft was watered down, at the insistence of the five Western member states of the Council, to drop the demand for immediate sanctions.

Indian Council Registers Protest

The South African Indian community, 757,000 strong, registered its strongest protest to date against the South African Government. It unanimously voted to suspend all further meetings of the government-created South African Indian Council in August. The protest motion, passed after a heated debate, was made because long-standing grievances of the community put forth by the Indian Council since its inception in 1946, had remained in abeyance. Chief among these was the plight of Indian shopkeepers who had under the terms of the "Group Areas Act" been forced to abandon their shops in lucrative business areas reserved for the Whites. What galled the Indians most was that these shops were often taken over by recent immigrants from Greece or Portugal. Even though Indians enjoy more privileges and higher pay than the 19 million Blacks of South Africa, this falls well below that of the 2.4 million 'Coloureds' and the ruling 4.4 million Whites.

Donation for Victims of Oppression

The Indian High Commissioner in London, Mr N.G. Goray, presented a cheque for £5,000, contributed by the Government of India, to the International Defence and Air Committee for Southern Africa. The cheque was handed over to the President of the Committee on April 7 at a brief ceremony at India House. The fund is designed to aid, defend and rehabilitate victims of unjust and oppressive arbitrary procedures in Southern Africa.

Vanita Ray

OAU's 15th Anniversary

An Africa Day function was organised by the Indian Centre for Africa, under the auspices of the Indian Council for Cultural Relations, to mark the 15th anniversary of the founding of the Organization for African Unity (OAU) in New Delhi on May 30. The function attended, among others, by Heads of African Missions, was addressed by the Minister of State for External Affairs, Mr Samarendra Kundu, who focussed on the two most important questions that the Africans faced in 1978—Zimbabwe and Namibia.

For a solution of the Zimbabwean stalemate, Mr Kundu called for continued pressures—political, economic and diplomatic—on the UK and the US for convening an all-party conference where a consensus could be reached on transitional arrangements. Such a consensus would lead to elections on the basis of "one man one vote" for the setting up of majority rule, he said. Further, he expressed India's strong condemnation of the internal settlement effected in Salisbury and lauded the OAU for its recognition of the Patriotic Front as the main liberation movement in Zimbabwe. The Patriotic Front, he added, displayed the necessary flexibility to negotiate a transitional arrangement leading to majority rule.

Mr Kundu stressed the necessity of strengthening and promoting African unity and expressed the hope that there would be a renewed thrust in the policies and actions of OAU member-states towards resolving intra-African disputes. Unity, he stated, was necessary to save the non-alignment movement from being affected adversely. He warned that failure to evolve unity would lead to a deviation from the grave problems prevailing in South Africa and might even lead to external military involvement on the continent. India's co-operation with the OAU and the other developing countries in the Group of 77, to bring about a new international economic order, was highlighted. India, the Minister added, would be happy to co-operate with OAU in ensuring that Africa derived maximum benefits from its relationship.

The All-India Peace and Solidarity Organization celebrated the OAU anniversary on May 24 in Delhi. Messages were received from Mr H.N. Bahuguna, Union Minister for Petroleum, Chemicals and Fertilisers, and the Janata Party President, Mr Chandra Shekhar. Representatives of various political parties, including the Janata MP, Mr Ram Dhan, Mr H.K. Vyas of the CPI and Mr. M.K. Pandhe of the CPI-M., speaking on the occasion, condemned the brutal suppression of the peoples of South Africa, Zimbabwe and Namibia. They also

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took to task the Western powers for supporting the racist South African regime for its vested interests.

The chief speaker of the day was the South African National Congress representative in India, Mr Kay Moonswamy. He praised India's bold stand since 1946 when she raised for the first time the question of racism in South Africa. He condemned the South African Government's racist policies and added that the revolutionary peoples of South Africa would oppose the Vorster regime tooth and nail. Vorster, he said, was "the Nazi of our era."

Desai at Kenyatta's Funeral

The Indian Prime Minister, Mr Morarji Desai, attended President Jomo Kenyatta's funeral in Nairobi on August 31. The Kenyan leader, a known Mau Mau extremist who led his country to independence in 1963 and then presided over one of Black Africa's most stable and effective governments for 15 years, died peacefully in his sleep on August 22.

Kenyatta was buried on August 31, to the chanting of Protestant, Roman Catholic, Muslim and traditional African prayers in a marble-walled tomb on the grounds of Parliament building. A large and distinguished gathering, among whom were representatives of 82 countries including 11 Heads of State or Governments, attended the funeral ceremonies. African leaders present were Presidents Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, William Tolbert of Liberia, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Siaka Stevens of Sierra Leone. From Southern Africa came Chief Leabua Jonathan of Lesotho. From the Western world came Prince Charles, representing his mother Queen Elizabeth, and the US Supreme Court Justice, Thurgood Marshall, who helped to draw up Kenya's Constitution in the early 1960's. General Zia-ul-Haque represented Pakistan.

On October 14, at a colourful ceremony in Nairobi's Uhuru (Freedom) Park, the former Vice-President under Jomo Kenyatta— Daniel Arap Moi—was sworn in as independent Kenya's second President. A former teacher, 54-year-old Moi, who had served as Vice-President for 12 years, declared that he would continue the policies of his predecessor. All the former Cabinet Ministers who had served under Kenyatta were retained. Mr Moi further said Kenya's foreign policy would remain unchanged and the "mixed economic system" of private enterprise and government participation would be retained. In its relations with foreign investors, the new President explained that the government would take a non-partisan attitude

but would seek to prevent "exploitation" of Kenyans by non-Kenyans.

The smooth political transition in Kenya has set at rest speculation about the possibility of turmoil following Kenyatta's death. The entire process of selection of Kenyatta's successor was short, simple and facile. This became possible because almost all shades of political opinion favoured the candidature of the former Vice-President. Mr Moi was the only one to offer his candidature for Presidency of the nation's only political party—the Kenya African National Union (KANU). The last major obstacle was overcome when Mr Oginga Odinga, a former Vice-President and the only Kenyan to form an opposition party under Kenyatta, withdrew his opposition to Moi.

Kundu Visits East and West Africa

The Minister of State for External Affairs, Mr Samarendra Kundu, made a 12-day official visit, early in September, to countries in East and West Africa. The tour, which took the Minister to six African countries—Kenya, Ethiopia, Liberia, Ghana, Senegal and Zaire—was intended to promote economic and cultural co-operation between these countries and India.

Mr Kundu is the first Janata member and the first Indian Minister to visit West Africa in the last five years. Also, his visit to Ethiopia, the first stop of his tour, made him the only non-socialist bloc representative at the fourth Revolutionary Day anniversary of that country. The visit was thus not only to promote bilateral co-operation between India and these countries but also to apprise African leaders of the recent political and economic developments in India.

In recent years, India's economic activities in these African countries have increased considerably. India recently signed an agreement on economic, cultural and technical co-operation with Liberia. The Planning Minister of Liberia, who visited India in February 1978, showed interest in Indian technology, especially in the field of iron-ore mining and in the setting up of a small steel plant. In Ghana, another stop on the African tour, India had already agreed to set up a consortium of important Indian organizations associated with agriculture and agro-industries which would go into the question of exploiting the country's vast agricultural potential. A team of experts from the Indian Institute of Foreign Trade is to be sent to carry out an extensive survey and to identify areas of active co-operation.

Tanzanian Vice-President in India

The Tanzanian Vice-President, Mr Abboud Jumbe, made an eight-day official visit to India, arriving in Delhi on April 3. He held talks with President Reddy, Vice-President Jatti and Prime Minister Desai. The leaders exchanged views on the international situation, particularly the recent developments in Southern Africa and the growing relations between Tanzania and India.

At a Press conference, Mr Jumbe expressed his satisfaction with the exchanges he had had with the Indian leaders. He was hopeful that relations between the two countries would progress by leaps and bounds. He expressed the appreciation of his countrymen for the bilateral co-operation with India and the Indian support for their common struggle against hunger and poverty.

A joint communique was issued at the end of his visit on April 11. In it India and Tanzania condemned the "internal settlement" reached by the illegal White minority regime of Ian Smith in Zimbabwe. The two countries expressed their "grave concern" at the critical situation obtaining in Zimbabwe and pledged their full support to and solidarity with the people of Zimbabwe and the Patriotic Front (of Nkomo and Mugabe) which had been in the forefront of the liberation struggle.

The Indian and Tanzanian leaders called on Britain and the US to reiterate their commitment to the Anglo-American proposals and convene in the shortest possible time a conference to follow up the Malta talks.

On Namibia, the other focal issue in Southern Africa, the two leaders noted the efforts undertaken by the five powers to bring about a negotiated settlement for a peaceful transition to majority rule and independence of Namibia in accordance with the UN resolutions. They reaffirmed their commitment to the full independence and territorial integrity of Namibia.

Bilateral co-operation between India and Tanzania was described as "most encouraging". The two leaders had reviewed the developments in bilateral relations in the fields of trade, economy, education and culture, industry, science and technology and expressed satisfaction at the growth of these relations. They also indicated that co-operation between the two countries would continue to be the objective of collective self-reliance among developing countries.

Algerian Special Envoy in Delhi

A Special Envoy of the Algerian President, Mr Houari Boumedienne, paid an official visit to India in April. Arriving in the

capital on April 16, Mr Layachi Yaker, the Special Envoy, who is also Vice-President of the country's National Popular Assembly, held talks with President Sanjiva Reddy, Prime Minister Desai, and Foreign Minister Vajpayee. He discussed the forthcoming Non-aligned Co-ordinating Bureau's meeting in Kabul in May. Bilateral relations and the level of trade between India and Algeria were also discussed. Mr Yaker expressed optimism about India-Algeria relations adding : "It is the wish of the Algerian Government to see that our friendship and co-operation are permanently strengthened".

India-Libya Co-operation

At the end of a nine-day official visit to India by the Libyan Vice-President, Major Abdul Salam Jalloud, a joint communique, issued on July 25, called for greater co-operation between the two countries and the developing world so as to strengthen national independence and the non-aligned movement. The two countries stressed that every effort should be made among the non-aligned countries to bring about optimum utilization of their capacities, capabilities, resources and technical abilities through bilateral, sub-regional, regional and multilateral co-operation.

The communique recorded the "grave anxiety" of India and Libya over the tensions that continue to prevail in some regions of Africa and expressed their conviction that African problems should be left to be solved by the Africans themselves "in the African context" through peaceful negotiations and without foreign interference.

On bilateral relations, the joint communique noted that concrete and effective steps would be taken to intensify exchanges. A joint commission would be established at Ministerial level, which would meet periodically to review, guide and plan exchanges between the two countries.

Closer Ties with Seychelles

President Albert Rene of the Seychelles has reaffirmed his government's avowed policy to develop closer trade and economic relations with India. Speaking in an interview on June 6, to mark the first anniversary of the overthrow of the Manchem regime by the pro-left Seychelles Peoples United Party led by President Rene, he said his country would sever its dependence on racist South Africa and seek alternative markets in India. The guiding force behind the new government's policies is the strength it draws as a member of the

non-aligned movement and its commitment to combat racism and colonialism and promote mutually beneficial cooperation among the non-aligned.

The Government of India on its part has echoed these senti-ments: the two governments have jointly explored the possibilities of closer cooperation. India has lifted the ban on the export of pulses and vegetables to the island state. The Seychelles Government, on its part, has shown its preference for closer links with India. This is shown by its invitation to the Indian Navy to attend its Liberation Day celebrations on June 5, the pride of place given in its harbour to INS Udaygiri and Trishul, and the signal honour given to them to provide a 21-gun salute when the new national anthem was played for the first time at the end of the military parade.

Foreign Minister's Visit

The Seychelles' Minister for Foreign Affairs and Tourism, Mr Guy Sinon, made a week-long visit to India arriving in New Delhi on October 30. Talks were held with the Minister of State for External Affairs, Mr Kundu, and the Minister for Tourism and Civil Aviation, Mr P. Kaushik.

Both Indian and Seychelles leaders stressed the need for gradual reduction and ultimate elimination of the presence of foreign military naval forces and of the great power rivalry in the Indian Ocean, so that the UN Declaration of the Ocean as a zone of peace could be implemented as early as possible. Mr Sinon pointed out the anomaly that while the great powers discussed the Indian Ocean issue amongst themselves they had completely ignored the littoral states.

The identity of approach of the two countries as members of the UN, the non-aligned movement and the Group of 77 was reiterated by Mr Kundu. He also expressed the desire of the two countries to strengthen bilateral relations. India, he assured, was prepared to extend necessary economic and technical co-operation to Seychelles.

As regards the Indian Ocean, Mr Kundu supported the idea of a zone of peace and emphasised India's commitment to the cause. He said India would extend its whole-hearted moral and material support to the liberation movements in Southern Africa.

During Mr Sinon's visit two agreements—one on economic and technical co-operation and the other on air services —were concluded. The first agreement provides for the setting up of joint ventures and

exchange of visits of experts and government officials in the economic and technical fields.

The air services agreement provides that Air-India and Seychelles Airlines would be entitled to operate a maximum of two services a week between the two countries on a specified route. Both airlines could operate Boeing-707 aircraft or aircraft of a similar capacity on the routes.

Since 1976, Air-India has been operating one service a week to Seychelles on the Bombay/Seychelles/Mauritius route. Seychelles Airlines has not yet started operating to India.

Zambian PM in India

Zambian Prime Minister Daniel Lisulo paid a nine-day official visit to India, arriving in the capital on December 6. Accompanied by a high level delegation, he held wide-ranging talks with Prime Minister Desai, Foreign Minister Vajpayee and President Reddy.

A joint communique issued at the end of his visit on December 10 noted with "grave concern" the situation in Southern Africa which had reached "flash-point" and called upon the international community to step up material, moral and political support to the liberation movements.

Mr Lisulo and Mr Desai called upon Britain, as the responsible colonial administering authority, to take "immediate and positive action to deal firmly and effectively with the situation" in Zimbabwe. They agreed that any negotiated settlement should be based on the original Anglo-American proposals already accepted as a basis for negotiations. The two leaders "reaffirmed their commitment to increased material assistance to the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe for the effective prosecution of the liberation struggle." The communique also noted the growing aggressiveness of the minority racist regimes against the frontline states and their persistent failure to comply with UN resolutions. Such a situation threatened international peace and security.

The joint communique also condemned apartheid in South Africa and the two Prime Ministers observed that "sooner or later an explosion would take place in that country unless the countries with huge vested economic interests there put pressure on the racist regime to end apartheid". Continued repressive measures by South Africa "will inevitably lead to revolt by the oppressed peoples of that country", the communique warned and called upon the international community to tighten and extend the scope of UN sanctions against

the illegal regimes in Southern Africa.

On the question of Namibia, the communique condemned the Pretoria regime's unilateral move to hold elections and the recent arrest of SWAPO leaders, and urged the Security Council to urgently consider the imposition of sanctions against the South African regime.

Reaffirming their commitment to the non-aligned movement, the two leaders expressed their conviction that the extraordinary meeting of the co-ordinating bureau of the non-aligned in Maputo in January 1979 "will be an important occasion to emphasize the continuing and resolute support of the movement to the liberation movements of Namibia, Zimbabwe, South Africa and to the frontline states."

The communique also noted the recent developments and moves to resolve problems in West Asia and the Indian Ocean, expressed deep concern at the growing arms race in the region and called for a spirit of accommodation and co-operation in the north-south dialogue.

The two Prime Ministers noted with satisfaction that co-operation between their countries in the economic, scientific, technological, social and cultural fields had been progressing and felt that there were considerable prospects for intensifying co-operation in these fields and identifying new areas of mutually beneficial cooperation. They also agreed that current trade exchanges between the two countries should be further increased taking into account the requirements and possibilities of the two countries.

Agreements with Libya

India and Libya signed in New Delhi on July 19 four agreements for co-operation in various fields which when fully implemented would involve an outlay of Rs. 1,200 crores. The agreements, signed during the visit of the Libyan Vice-President, Mr Jalloud, to the country, would open the way for co-operation in the fields of trade, agriculture, railway industrial projects and peaceful uses of atomic energy.

The two agreements dealing with co-operation in the industrial, economic, scientific and technical spheres and the one on peaceful uses of atomic energy were clubbed together in a protocol signed by Prime Minister Desai and the Libyan Vice-President. Under the protocol, the two countries agreed to set up a joint commission at ministerial level to promote economic, scientific and technical

co-operation. It would meet at least once a year. Regarding the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, it was agreed to hold further discussions between the two countries. India however offered to train Libyan students in nuclear science.

The two other agreements, one on trade and the other on the setting up of a joint Indo-Libyan Electricity Company, were signed by the Commerce and Industry Ministers of the two countries. The two countries also decided to collaborate in the field of railways and India offered to help Libya extend its railways. India will offer a tender for the construction of the 100-kilometre railway line from Tripoli to the Tunisian border. India also agreed to set up a factory for the manufacture of railway sleepers for the Libyan railways.

Another highlight of the agreements is that India would participate in the construction of two townships for a population of 10,000 each in Libya. It was agreed to hold further negotiations on this subject in the near future.

In recent years, India has been increasingly associated with the development of Libya's infrastructure and social services. There are about 2,500 Indian engineers, technical experts and doctors working in Libya. India is helping Libya in a variety of projects from the Tripoli thermal power station worth Rs 100 crores to the construction of housing and industrial complexes. The total value of the projects in which India is participating is worth Rs 450 crores. A large number of public-sector undertakings, including BHEL, International Airports Authority, National Buildings Construction Corporation and Indian Road Constructions Ltd are engaged in various projects. A private firm, Dasturs, is planning Libya's major steel mill.

India-Algeria Agreement

In New Delhi on August 31, India and Algeria signed a memorandum of understanding covering commercial relations, economic and industrial co-operation and sharing of technical knowhow. The agreement was concluded at the end of a three-day visit by an Algerian delegation of economic and technical experts led by the Director for Economic and Financial Relations in the Algerian Foreign Ministry, Mr Mourad Bencheikh.

Under the agreement, both sides identified commodities which they could purchase from each other and expressed optimism that the volume of trade between them could increase considerably. In industrial co-operation, India offered to extend technical knowhow and assistance for the construction of five heavy machine-building

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plants in Algeria. It proposed to help organise surveys, design consultancy, project execution, commissioning and training personnel. India also assured that Algerian demands for Indian experts would be met to the maximum extent possible once details regarding job descriptions were made available.

India is also to assist Algeria in setting up a training institute of water resources on the pattern of the institute at Roorkee. A technical mission under the aegis of Water and Power Development Consultancy Services (WAPCOS) will visit Algeria later in the year for preparing the feasibility report. WAPCOS has also agreed to arrange missions to visit·Algeria for a study of problems relating to water resources, development, agriculture and land reclamation. Specific areas of co-operation will then be identified. One of the possible areas of co-operation is that of dam structures.

This decision was announced in Delhi on August 30 following talks between WAPCOS Chairman O.P. Chadha and the Algerian delegation of experts.

Sudanese Team in India

A high-level Southern Sudanese delegation headed by Dr Lawrence Wol, Regional Minister for Finance and Planning, arrived in Delhi on October 9. The team, on a 16-day visit to India, acquainted itself with India's progress in agriculture, industrial estates, bicycle manufacturing units, handicrafts and handlooms, tourism development industry, river transport and technical and vocational training facilities.

Southern Sudan is an autonomous region administering its own budget and development programmes with a vast potential for growth.

Indian Knowhow for East Africa

A major breakthrough in the export of technical knowhow in the field of village industries in East Africa has been made by the Khadi and Village Industries Commission. Under an agreement concluded with the Tanzanian Government, the Commission had by June this year supplied to the former details of equipment and machinery concerning handmade paper, power ghanis (electrically powered oil crushers) and fruit preservation industries. The Commission has also deputed technical staff to Tanzania for the implementation of the programme of these industries and has trained Tanzanian staff in India in pottery, lime, gobar gas, ghani, oil and fruit preservation industries.

Vanita Ray

India's expertise on gobar gas has now been internationally accepted. In Sri Lanka the Commission is conducting an experiment to run a three-way power station where gobar (methane) gas is one of the three components of energy- the others being solar energy and hydel energy. The Zambian and Fiji authorities have also taken a keen interest in these programmes. Representatives of these countries have visited the Commission's centres of production and recommended the initiation of similar projects in their own countries.

Co-operation with Kenya

India and Kenya are to co-operate in engineering goods, chemicals, leather goods, steel and textiles. This was the outcome of talks following the visit to India, early in October, by an 11-member Kenyan delegation led by Mr Okika Amaya, Assistant Minister of Commerce and Industry. The Kenyan delegation expressed its eagerness to learn from the Indian experience of industrialization and economic growth and explored possibilities of co-operation between the two governments in industrial consultancy and small-scale industry.

India is already participating in various joint ventures in Kenya. These include paper mills, textiles, engineering works and pharmaceuticals; a joint Indo-Kenyan industrial project for the manufacture of synthetic fibres is under construction at Thika near Nairobi. Indian exports to Kenya in 1976-77, valued at Rs 2,415 lakhs, included metal manufactures, iron and steel, cotton and jute manufactures, chemicals and pharmaceuticals. Over the same period, imports from Kenya included dyeing, tanning and colouring materials, sisal fibres and waste, copper wire bars and raw cashew.

Later in November, a visiting four-member Kenyan ministerial delegation led by Mr Odiya Oprong, Assistant Minister for Labour, expressed his country's keenness to set up sugar factories with Indian collaboration. Kenya, he indicated, proposed to establish three sugar factories which would produce 600 to 800 tonnes of cane a day. The total outlay would be Rs 500 crores.

The delegation, which visited several industrial estates in Bombay, explored possible link-ups in the industrial spheres of sugar, rice-milling industry, textiles, oil extraction plants for sunflower and copra and heavy engineering. They also wanted collaboration and assistance in agro industries.

Presently, Kenya is importing 30% of its sugar requirements

from Cuba and other nations. Nearly 70,000 hectares is under the sugarcane crop and there are already two sugar factories in Kenya.

Loan for Egypt

India has offered Egypt a long-term loan of $25 million to finance rural electrification projects, including electrification of water wheels and other methods of irrigation and agriculture, power distribution, electrical industries and for training technicians. The offer followed a meeting between the Egyptian-Indian Energy Committee which met to discuss the means of implementing the protocol signed in New Delhi last year between the Ministries of Power of both countries. Other Indian companies have also offered to take part in joint projects with electricity companies for the implementation of electrical projects in Egypt. The well-known firm of Tatas has extended assistance to the Egyptian company dealing with mechanical and electrical projects for implementing an Egyptian-Indian joint venture.

Nigerian Trade Delegation in India

A 34-member Nigerian trade delegation, which visited India in the third week of September, has visualized the possibilities of joint ventures between the two countries in iron and steel technology. Headed by the Chairman of the Lagos Chamber of Commerce, Mr A D. Lawson, and comprising a cross-section of various interests—agro-based food processing, auto spare parts and accessories, building and civil engineering, electronics, handlooms, irrigation and other agricultural equipment, furnitures, pharmaceuticals, rolling mills, stationery and sports goods—the trade delegation toured industrial units throughout the country.

At the end of its 12-day visit, the delegation recommended co-operation between the two countries in petro-chemical industries. It expressed a desire for collaboration in the setting up of small industrial units and for stepping up trade.

Exports of Indian goods to Nigeria were of the order of Rs 22 crores in 1977-78. In view of the non-availability of many items, India imports from that country had remained negligible. Despite growing exports India's share in the total imports of Nigeria was only 0.6 per cent.

Management Support for Nigeria

A Rs 200 million contract extending management support to the Nigerian Railways was concluded in Lagos, Nigeria, on

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October 5. The contract was signed by the Permanent Secretary in the Nigerian Federal Ministry of Transport, Mr Ibie, and Mr G.P. Warrier, Chairman of the Rail India Technical and Economic Services (RITES), a public sector undertaking. A management team of 36 experts and a task force of 398 would help the Nigerian Railways for a period of three years concentrating on areas such as utilization of rolling-stock, passenger and goods operations, communications and training facilities. RITES is to provide all the back-up support.

The Indian Railways have since the early sixties rendered assistance to the Nigerian Railways by deputing officers to man them and provide the necessary training. Nigeria has 3,500 route km railways which carry oil, steel and cement needed for the industrial development of the country. The Railways employ about 27,000 personnel.

Closer Economic Ties with Senegal

Following the visit of the Senegalese Minister for Industries, Cheikh Amidou Kane, in the second week of October, prospects of closer economic co-operation between the two countries appeared bright. The Cheikh indicated during his talks with Indian officials that Indian assistance would be of great relevance to the pattern of social and economic development that was planned for Senegal. He emphasized that Indian experience in the fields of appropriate technology and in several sectors of agriculture would be of great assistance to Senegal.

One of the possibilities of joint ventures between the two countries, suggested by Cheikh Amidou, is the establishment of a phosphatic fertiliser plant in Senegal. There should however be an explicit understanding that India would agree to purchase a share of the complex fertilisers manufactured in the plant. India could also participate in the construction of an irrigation and power system on the Senegal River. Besides Senegal, Mauritania and Mali are involved in the Senegal River project which is being partly financed by the World Bank. Guinea is also expected to join in the project.

For implementation of this proposal, the Senegalese Minister suggested a three-pronged approach to co-operation between the two countries: contacts at the official level, and linkages between voluntary agencies and private entrepreneurs in the two countries. He however wanted India to waive restrictions on export of capital to

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Senegal so that Indian private entrepreneurs would be in a position to set up industries in his country in collaboration with Senegalese entrepreneurs. Senegal, Cheikh Amidou indicated, proposed to send a team of officials and experts from different ministries to India to finalise a programme of co-operation in the economic and cultural fields.

The Senegalese Minister also emphasized the importance of cultural exchanges and called for Indian assistance for his country's film industry.

India's involvement in Senegal's development dates back to 1974. In that year agreements for co-operation between the countries were concluded during the visit of Senegalese President Leopold Sedar Senghor to India.

Indo-Tanzanian Commission Meets

The Indo-Tanzanian Joint Commission met in Delhi in the first week of December under the auspices of its co-chairmen, India's Foreign Minister Vajpayee and Tanzanian Minister for Finance and Planning E.J.M. Mtei. The Commission agreed to extend co-operation and collaboration between the two countries. Views were exchanged on increased Indian participation in the Third Five-Year Plan of the Tanzanian mainland and the First Three-Year Plan of Zanzibar. Planning in the Republic is not yet integrated.

One of the proposed joint ventures is for the production of cashewnuts. A feasibility study is to be undertaken jointly for possible exploitation of 50,000 acres earmarked by the Tanzanian Government. Cashews so produced would be exported to India. Another sphere of co-operation is in the field of oil exploration.

Indian teams of experts from public and private organisations would visit Tanzania and make an on-the-spot in-depth study and examination of planning and related matters with a view to identifying possible areas of Indian participation.

The Indo-Tanzanian Commission was set up three years ago. Since then trade has increased by 50%. India has also over this period extended considerable co-operation in the fields of small-scale industries and transfer of technology.

Trade Pact with Zambia

India and Zambia signed on December 8 their first Trade Agreement under which India would export vehicles, tractors and

other machinery to Zambia and buy large quantities of metals from it. These would include 25,000 tonnes of copper, 5,000 tonnes of zinc, 3,000 tonnes of lead and 200 tonnes of cobalt annually.

India has also decided to give Zambia a credit of Rs 10 crores on a government-to-government basis. This credit would be for 15 years at 5% interest and would enable Zambia to purchase capital goods from India and help finance projects in agriculture, small-scale industries and other areas. This is in addition to a credit of a similar amount which will be processed through the Industrial Development Bank of India and used for setting up new industrial ventures.

The five-year agreement was signed by India's Foreign Minister, Mr Vajpayee, and his counterpart, Dr S.G. Mwale, in the presence of their Prime Ministers.

Zambian Pilots to be Trained in India

Indian Airlines will train 25 pilots and 18 engineers from Zambia in the following year. An agreement to this effect was signed on December 9 in New Delhi between the Indian Airlines Deputy Managing Director, Mr G.D. Mathur, and the representative of Zambian Airways, Mr E.M. Haimhe.

Aid for Botswana and Zambia

India is to help Botswana and Zambia to set up small and medium scale industries. This was the outcome of the visit by a four-member Indian delegation, led by Joint Secretary B.R.R. Iyengar of the Ministry of Industries, which visited the countries in May. In Botswana, the Indian experts found good possibilities of setting up handloom industries. To date, nearly all of Botswana's requirements are imported; the only industry of the land is carpentry and sheet metal work but even the materials for carpentry have to be imported.

In Zambia, which was visited last year by a team of Indian experts to advise on the setting up of small-scale industries, the delegation held discussions and advised the Zambian authorities ·on the strategy for industrialisation and on the setting of priorities for the country's Second Five-Year Plan.

Both Zambia and Botswana have hitherto depended mainly on the export of minerals. The wide fluctuations in world market prices have adversely affected the economies of the two countries. They have now decided to set up industrial infrastructures.

India has already assisted the Kenyan Government in establishing industrial estates. Recently, the World Bank extended to the

Kenyan Government $10 million for setting up industrial estates. The Government has expressed the hope that India will provide both technical help and equipment in utilising this amount. Already a number of Indian experts are working in Kenya. Hindustan Machine Tools have also decided to set up a machine tools unit in that country.

Aid for Malawi Industries

India has assured Malawi of its continued assistance for the development of small-scale industries in that country. The assurance was extended to the Malawi Minister for Trade, Tourism and Industry, Mr S.C. Hara, by the Minister of State for External Affairs, Mr Kundu. The Malawi Minister arrived in Delhi on November 26 on a 13-day visit to India at the invitation of the Industries Minister, Mr George Fernandes.

Cultural Pact with Zaire

A Cultural Agreement was concluded between India and Zaire (formerly Belgian Congo) on July 4 in Kinshasa. Under its terms the two countries agreed to promote co-operation in the fields of education, science and technology, art and culture, mass media, sports, journalism and public health. The agreement would facilitate exchanges of specialists, professors, technicians, students and research workers. It also provided for the setting up of a joint committee consisting of representatives of the two countries to examine ways and means of implementing the agreement. The committee would meet alternatively in Zaire and India.

The Zairian Foreign Minister, Mr Asal Bozumba Idzumbrik, paid rich tributes to India at the signing ceremony.

Medicines for Ethiopia

A consignment of 7,700 kgs of medicines and surgical goods was presented by the Indian Ambassador to Ethiopia, Mr Vinay Verma, on behalf of the Government and people of India, for the rehabilitation programme of the Ethiopian Government. The Ethiopian Commissioner for Relief and Rehabilitation, Mr Shimelus Adugha, received the consignment.

DOCUMENTATION
India's Stand on Disarmament

(Text of Prime Minister Morarji Desai's address to the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on Disarmament, June 9, 1978)

WE have met here at a crucial period of the world's history. Nuclear armament, despite its dangers and threat of extinction to the whole world, has been escalated to a stage when even a small part of its weaponry can destroy the whole planet. Conventional arms and the armed forces of the world have attained astronomical proportions and numbers. Even without the nuclear armament we have witnessed during the last war what a scale of destruction the clash of these arms and forces can bring about. We in India believe that this Special Session of the UN General Assembly on Disarmament has not met a day too soon and I bring to this august Assembly the greetings and good wishes of the peace loving people of India.

Even though the central theme of this session is disarmament, it is also concerned with setting mankind firmly on the path of peace which is also the path of sanity. I have no doubt, Mr. President, that you will impart to its deliberations the patience, the strength of purpose and the clarity of vision that this momentous task demands. I offer my felicitations to you, Mr. President, on being called upon to preside over the Session.

Our sages long ago envisaged an ideal which is in the Vedic benediction:

It means
May all people be happy;
May all people be without jealousies;
May all people perceive the Good;
May no one feel sorrow and misery.

It is this ennobling vision of the world of happiness and contentment which I have always borne within me ever since I came in contact with the philosophy and personality of Mahatma Gandhi. It is a vision which we all should cherish and should strive to turn into a reality, not in the distant future but in our own time. This presupposes an atmosphere in which, to quote the Biblical saying, and I quote: "They shall beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks; nation shall not lift up sword against

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nation, neither shall they learn war anymore".

The destructive potential of modern weapons used during World War II made the world fearful of war and made it crave for peace. At such a moment of realisation was the UN founded. Almost simultaneously India achieved freedom through non-violent means under the unique leadership of Mahatma Gandhi which paved the way for the peaceful liberation of most of the nations from the colonial domination during the last three decades. Viewed against this background and in the context of the near propitious and the prospects of banishing war at present are brighter than at any time before.

The Quest for Peace

It is a sad thought that since times immemorial, the history of societies has always been interpersed with the history of wars. It is even sadder to reflect that, far from being condemned, the warlike attributes and image of conquering heroes have been exalted and glorified. The literature of every language, and children's books even now, are replete with accounts of human slaughter in battles and wars. Some later-day conquerers have even tried to seek comfort in the theory of evolution through natural selection and survival of the fittest to provide plausible scientific support to the cult of genocide. Refinements of such arguments -racial, material and cultural—are still presented to us with varying degrees of sophistry. War had been an accepted instrument of advancing national interests in the past, but it no longer commands the same conventional legitimacy.

The current earnest quest for peace, however, seems to stem from fear of total annihilation. It is my conviction that fear is the worst, everlasting and demoralising influence on man; it should not therefore be the fear of war but love of peace which should rule our conduct. International power politics, however, appears to be merely the pursuit of selfish group interests—bringing to surface much that is not noble in man -- his pettiness, his jealousies, his suspicions of fellowmen, his greed to acquire and dominate. The result is a general feeling of insecurity and fear leading to culmination in war. Peace is not merely cessation of war, but a positive sense of identification with the concern for others. Instead of war, peace must abide in the minds of men, little good can come of working for peace without a deep conviction that in peace alone there is human fulfilment and happiness, but even if the goal appeared distant it is well worth striving for, because movement in this direction

itself reduces the causes of conflict. If we all seek peace, the world will one day become a real human family as embodied in our ancient saying, i.e. the whole world is one family. In more than fifty years of public life, in office as well as in prison, may I say in all humility that I have been sustained by the conviction, imparted to me by Mahatma Gandhi, that the noblest of ends cannot but be debased by resort to evil means to achieve them. The pursuit of truth with courage and sacrifice—Satyagraha—was for Gandhiji not only an article of faith but a guide for practical action. His whole life was a testimony to the truth that the only real, and indeed the ultimate, · freedom, is freedom from fear. This fact has received homage from many, but has also been scoffed at as utopian or unrealistic in the grim world of real-politic. I believe that Gandhiji's message of non-violence and the innovative instrument of Satyagraha that he gave us have great relevance in our predicament as we grope for a way out of the present impasse.

If we comprehend the unique and explosive crisis we collectively encounter, we must move towards disarmament through a solemn resolve to outlaw war and settle disputes through the beneficent process of negotiations. Only so would we be true to our character. So long as war is regarded as legitimate, disarmament will be a chimerical illusion. Many wars have been fought in the past because nations were ruled by the desire to acquire power and domination or material goods from others. But after every major human holocaust—whether the European wars of the French, the revolutionary period or the World War in this century—either because of temporary repentence or exhaustion—there have been attempts to build a structure of peace such as the Congress of Vienna, the League of Nations, or our own UN.

Nevertheless in the working of these institutions some countries have become involved and have involved others in power politics, convassing for blocs, competition for spheres of influence, promotion of sales of armaments and piling up of arsenals of terror, conventional and nuclear. The much vaunted nuclear deterrent has failed to put an end to the arms race. In fact, it has stimulated further competition involving vastly destructive weaponry. The delays and difficulties which the super-powers have experienced in coming to an agreement to the test ban—partial or total—on limitation of nuclear armaments, and reduction of the armed strength of NATO and Warsaw Pact countries, over the last 30 years, indicate the utter futility of trying to secure even partial disarmament through a policy

of balancing of forces rooted in mutual suspicion and fear. The commitment to disarmament must therefore be total and without any reservation, Though in actual implementation, having regard to the hard realities of the situation, we may accept the principle of gradualness in a time-bound programme, we must keep in view the final objective and in a spirit of dedication to that objective work out a non–discriminatory programme based on universal application shorn of any monopolistic feature or preferential treatment.

A Discriminatory Treaty

In this context I should like to refer to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty of which much has been said in this hall and outside. India is among those who have not signed this treaty. There has been considerable misunderstanding of our motives. To remove these I should like to declare that we yield to none in our commitment to comprehensive disarmament. We are the only country which has pledged not to manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons even if the rest of the world did so. I solemnly reiterate that pledge before this august Assembly. ·In fact, we have gone further and abjured nuclear explosions even for peaceful purposes. We ask from others no more than the self-restraint we impose upon ourselves. But our objection to the treaty is because it is so patently discriminatory. It makes an invidious distinction between countries having nuclear weaponry and those devoted to the pursuit of nuclear research and technology entirely for peaceful purposes. Paradoxically, the treaty gives the former a monopoly of power and confers on them freedom for commercial exploitation of nuclear knowhow, while on the latter it places restrictions which may impede peaceful development of nuclear science. Along with the partial test-ban treaty, the NPT has placed the nuclear military powers in a position which enables them to continue with the utilisation of nuclear energy for military purposes while telling others : "Thus far and no further". Despite protestation of peace and despite realisation of the danger of nuclear warfare, the super-powers between them have conducted 254 nuclear tests during the last eight years. The weapons now with the super-powers are deadlier and larger in numbers. The NPT has thus failed to arrest the growth of nuclear armaments either qualitatively or quantitatively as anticipated.

The history of the deliberations of this Assembly and of the various committees, particularly the conference of the committee on disarmament shows that even though the USSR and the US have been active between themselves and with others they have yet to

provide a basis on which general agreements on the several aspects of disarmament could be reached. I am sure they recognise this and it is the general view that the onus for finding the solution of the problems connected with nuclear disarmament lies heavily on them. In the discharge of that responsibility, suspicion and fear can have no place. This is not a matter of ideology or narrow national interests but of an assurance against the tragedy that the erosion of such a trust may entail and which may engulf the whole world. It is in this sense that we regard nuclear armament as a threat to the very survival of humanity.

I am glad that the distinguished Presidents of the US and the USSR expressed their determination to finalise expeditiously the negotiations for the elimination of the testing of all nuclear devices, whether for development or military purposes, and for the Salt II agreement. Certain other agreements, for instance, the banning of radiological weapons, are in the offing. It is in this hall that President Carter solemnly declared last year that the US will not use nuclear weapons except in self-defence. I am also happy that President Brezhnev has spoken of the replacement of balance of terror by balance of trust. While these are welcome signs, holding out some hope for the future, we have yet to see these benevolent intentions translated into action. I therefore share the concern of the distinguished President of France over the delays in these negotiations and the limited nature of the deliberations on disarmament which have preceded the convening of this conference. My own earnest submission to this Assembly is that the problem of disarmament, particularly in the nuclear field, cannot be solved by a system of checks and balances devised as a result of bargaining. It can only be solved in a total manner keeping in view the whole of the globe and not the regions into which, presumably as a matter of political convenience or strategy, some countries seek to compartmentalise the world. It is idle to talk of regional nuclear free zones which could continue to be endangered by nuclear weapons. Those who have such weapons lose nothing if some distant area is declared non-nuclear. The nations without nuclear capacity who imagine that their inclusion in such zones affords them security are suffering from a delusion. We are convinced that there cannot be a limited approach to the question of freedom from nuclear threats and dangers but the whole world should be declared as a nuclear free zone.

It is now widely recognised that we have given sufficient time to the policies based on violence to work out a system of peace and

security and that we have now reached a point of exhaustion. We have therefore to take decisive steps to turn the minds of nations away from violence as an insurance of safety and security, and take them towards non-violence and Satyagraha as means of resisting wrong.

A Four-point programme

Although I have urged and will continue to urge that the ultimate solution lies in the general acceptance of the philosophy and practice of non-violence I believe with Gandhiji that one step is enough for me to start with but that step must mean abjuring of violence as an instrument of national policy and be a substantial reduction in the weapons and forces of violence.

That first step in my view must consist of :

(1) A declaration that utilisation of nuclear technology for military purposes including research in weapon technology must be outlawed;

(2) Qualitative and quantitative limitations on nuclear armament and immediate freezing of the present stockpile under international inspection;

(3) Formulation of a time-bound programme—not exceeding a decade—for gradual reduction of the stockpile with a view to achieving total elimination of all nuclear weapons ; and

(4) A comprehensive test-ban treaty with provision for safeguards to prevent breach of the treaty which in my view can only be through independent inspection.

The ban should apply to atmospheric, underground and under-sea tests and those in space. I would also add that the system of safeguards should be based on universality and non-discrimination. We must ensure that the system of inspection and safeguards is enforced objectively and without bringing politics into such enforcement.

For initiating a programme of disarmament in the conventional field, we should not wait until nuclear disarmament is completed. We should this very year begin efforts to work out an agreement on disarmament and drastic reduction of armed strength in the conventional field. I can assure this Assembly on behalf of my country that India will cooperate to the fullest extent in the formulation of these various programmes and will pledge itself to their implementa-

tion.   In fact, I visualise a time when the use of armed forces would not be necessary even for internal security.

Replacing Bombs by Bread

Mr. President, the resources of the world we live in are too precious to be wasted on destruction. Millions round the globe suffer from want, from malnutrition, from under-development and from a despair about today and tomorrow. We have misused the world's wealth for too long. Let us now resolve to harness science and statesmanship to the cause of welfare and happiness of mankind. Let us send out from here a message of succour and relief to the poor, the infirm, the under-nourished and enable them to draw an assurance that a better life in a better world will be theirs.

It would be too much to claim that the eyes of all those people are on our Assembly for many of them are unlettered and preoccupied with the exacting task of earning their daily bread; even the literate citizens of the advanced countries are not in a position to restrain their governments. But they do know that all their comfort and affluence will be wiped out if someone presses a button somewhere. This apprehension is one of the basic causes of the anguish which makes life precariously uncertain in affluent countries, especially among the young. All this adds to the responsibility of all of us here who represent the nations of the world, big and small, rich and poor.

It is evident that no scheme of global peace and disarmament can last unless it is linked with the creation of an equitable world economic order. The nuclear powers and their close allies are also those who dominate the world's economy and seek to manage it to their own advantage. Their military and economic strength support and reinforce each other. The poorer countries have to face not only the threat of domination but also the denial of fair return for their produce and their labour. Disarmament could and should serve the larger purpose of correlating the economic injustice and deprivation to which two-thirds of humanity is subject today.

Even if a small portion of the one billion dollars a day that are now spent on armaments could be diverted to the benevolent service of mankind through the spread of irrigation, the feeding of the under-nourished, to educating the unlettered, to curing and ministering the sick and the infirm in all countries, to purifying the world's air and water, and to enlarging the understanding of other people's cultures, it would bring the ideal of a brave new world nearer achievement. I

suggest that this Assembly recommend the setting up of a fund which would carry out studies in disarmament and non-violence and find out ways and means of replacing bombs and bullets by bread and books. Working for abolition of war is not only a historical necessity ; not also a moral imperative but a human duty. It is a plain matter of enlightened self-interest since it is indissolubly linked with our very survival.

The Great Adventure of Survival

If all this power of destruction came from the human intellect, surely that same intellect can create something more compassionate and benevolent.

The old prophets and seers who laid the foundations of human civilisation may not have seen the mushroom clouds of atomic bombs, but they knew the nature of power, with their capacity to see the whole tree within the tiny seed. In one of our ancient books— the *Kathopanishad*—there is a parable of a boy of tender years who carries on a dialogue with the God of Death who is also the God of Justice; the God offers the boy all the riches, all the pleasures and all the glory that can be. But Nachiketa, the boy, wants to know the nature of life and death and immortality. God parts with the mystery but, like all mysteries, it is not so mysterious. Victory over death, he says, comes from self-control. Likening the body to a chariot, the mind to reins, the senses to horses, and the objects of the senses to the roads, he adds :

He who has no understanding and whose mind
is not firmly held, his senses are unmanageable,
like vicious horses of a chariot. But he who
has understanding and whose mind is always firmly
held, his senses are under control like good
horses of a chariot.

What is true of the individual is true of the world community. Man who has invented these engines of destruction is also filled with a desire for immortality. At this moment, death and life are poised, as on a razor's edge.

It is for us to choose what we will, but let us choose life, it is for this Assembly, representing the collective wisdom of mankind, to launch a movement in the conscience of men and embark on the great adventure of survival with the determination not to compromise with truth.

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Book Reviews

Flashpoint South Africa by Bob Hitchcock. Robert Hale & Co., London. 1977 £5.95.

RACE relations within South Africa have been the concern not only of its own people but also of the world at large. The situation created by apartheid in the country has reached explosive proportions endangering the peace and security of the whole of Southern Africa   Despite the international community's pressure on South Africa to revise its policies, there has been a further tightening of the racist laws rather than any let-up in its 'crime against humanity.' The increasing consciousness of the blacks and international moral—to some extent material—support have intensified the conflict between the oppressed non-white races in the country and the racist regime. The simmering discontent of the exploited people found expression in Sharpeville and Soweto. Is the situation really bad? Has it reached flash-point? Is there no possibility of improving race relations without an explosion, a bloodbath, and the holocaust which seems inevitable? Written in late 1976 with the Soweto incidents looming large over his mind, Bob Hitchcock discusses the South African situation of the day in his professional (journalistic) style in *Flashpoint*.

In the first chapter "Profiles of Apartheid" the writer gives instances and practices the apartheid system has created in South Africa reflecting white arrogance, inhuman exploitation and helplessness of the non-whites. Then he discusses the problems faced by the different races in South Africa by devoting a chapter to each race. Thus "The Coloured Dilemma," "The Indian Lament," "The Oriental Puzzle," "The African Agony," "The White Problem" cover the problems and race attitudes of the Coloureds, Indians Chinese, Africans and the Whites respectively. His observations are typical of many a journalist who looks at apartheid in only its external manifestations and fails to go deeper to analyse the malady. Hitchcock fails to look at the problem of apartheid in its economic aspect, as a scheme to exploit the non-white—particularly black—labour. The author—to use the words of the publishers—details 'the magnificence of the White contribution to the greatness of South Africa' and ignores or belittles the contribution of other races. Throughout the book he concentrates on what he calls "white brain power and initiative" which have turned South Africa into an indus-

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trial power house. He conveniently forgets the facts of history that the white prosperity of South Africa was built by the sweat and perspiration of millions of blacks who worked in its gold and diamond mines, the productive labour of thousands of "indentured" Indians on the sugar plantations of Natal and the back-breaking efforts of 50,000 Chinese mine workers in the Witwatersrand mines.

Hitchcock devotes an entire chapter, "Bulldog of Africa", to discuss Vorster's policies including his "outward reach"—an attempt by South Africa to counter its international isolation and its misadventures into Angolan territory in 1974. He shows his journalistic superficiality in describing Vorster—"As an after-dinner speaker he (Vorster) can be scathing, charming or hilariously amusing in a dry way, to suit to the mood of the occasion......On very important occasions.. the new suit is close to looking immaculate though spoilt invariably by being too long in the sleeve, sometimes perilously close to covering the knuckles. His formal suits and shirts are conservative. His ties bright, predominantly striped." (p. 22). Another entire chapter is devoted to discussing the career of Buthelezi, Chief Minister of Kwa-zulu Homeland.

In the chapter "Fight for Whites" the author discusses the craze among Coloureds to be considered White and the "stereotype" attitudes in the South African society which consider the characteristics of Whites as superior and desirable. The chapters "The Sporting Spirit" and "A Strange Morality" discuss, respectively, apartheid in sports and the inhumanity of the Immorality Act of 1950. Finally, the chapter "Today and Tomorrow" dwells on the relations between South Africa and the rest of the world. The author here tries to expose, through trade statistics, the double standards of countries which call for stricter international action against South Africa on the one hand and have trade relations with it, mostly through secret deals, on the other. His criticism however is aimed at the Third World (particularly black African countries) and the Communist bloc. What one finds shocking is his declaration: "I have sympathy for the South African Police. I know how frightening a savage mob can be" (p. 191). "The savage mob" which the South African police shot at consisted of young school-children of Soweto most of whom were shot in the back while fleeing from police Sten-guns and automatic weapons. No more evidence is required to know from whose point of view the book is written.

A Tamil proverb says that for a man aghast with fear any dark object appears to be a ghost. So also, the author, under the shock of

communist victories in Angola and Mozambique, finds a communist hand in anything and everything that is done to fight the apartheid system. He takes the government to task for having failed lamentably "to create a situation which would have nipped in the bud *the creeping poisonous influence of communism* within." (p. 187) (emphasis added). The strike by the underpaid and exploited black workers is called "a disruptive tactic of communist provocateurs." (p. 192). To cover up the institutionalized state violence of apartheid Hitchock compares the situation to the state violence in South American countries and describes it as the type "repulsive even to the Kremlin's masters of that kind of thuggery." (p. 196). He is afraid that if the one-man-one-vote principle is implemented in South Africa it could lead to a "collapse of the economy and *civilized standards. And within no time Soviet domination*" (p. 8) (emphasis added). Mozambique and its President, Samora Machel, are always referred to as 'Marxist'. To add to all this he accuses that "the great Kissinger plan for Rhodesia seemed to be tearing apart at the seams, with the Russians guiding the Black nationalists on well-worn communist lines of conference sabotage." (p. 207).

The author seems to have a pre-determined ideological stand that smacks of partiality. His sympathies are misplaced. For example, it is not the discriminated and exploited non-whites who evoke a sense of pity in the writer but Prime Minister Vorster being questioned on his country's racial policies by "a formidable German interviewer." (p. 33)

Flashpoint South Africa has very few flashes of objectivity and critical understanding in what otherwise appears to be a superficial and prejudiced account of the situation in South Africa.

<div align="right">B. CHANDRAMOHAN</div>

Sobhuza II Ngwenyama and King of Swaziland by Hilda Kuper. Gerald Duckworth & Co., London. 1978. £15.00

SWAZILAND is a small territory, an enclave in South Africa, that survived attempts at its annexation by the Boer Republics mainly because the British, who at that time ruled the Natal and Cape Provinces, did not want the Boers to have access to the Kosi bay beyond Swaziland. But then gradually most of Swaziland's resources and public services were leased out to whites by the chiefs for petty gifts in the late 19th century. By the early years of this century the British, who had already taken effective control of

Swaziland, introduced the Concessions Partition Proclamation of 1907 by which one-third of the total land was set aside for the exclusive use of the Swazi. But at the same time they were forced to leave the other two-thirds, unless under agreements, with the concessionaires. The Swazi tribal chiefs sent a delegation, unsuccessfully, to London to protest against their alienation from two-thirds of their land area. World War I caused an interruption in their attempts to get back this land. The Chief Regent and the advisers now felt that the only way left for them was to challenge the very legality of the partition and subsequent orders in the courts. It was in such bleak circumstances for the Swazi that Sobhuza II became the Ngwenyama (Lion) of the Swazi in 1921. His career since that time has seen many developments and in 1979 he still leads his independent country.

Beginning with "An Essential Introduction'' which gives- a background to the subject and dwells on her experiences in the course of writing this biography, the author, Hilda Kuper, presents a perspective of the Swazi way of life. This forms the scene of Sobhuza's life related in the other chapters of the book.

The chapters interspersed between the introductory chapter and the epilogue contain an account of the events and incidents that have a significant bearing on the life of Sobhuza II from his birth (in 1899) to 1977 when the post-script was written. These deal with the social, political and economic conditions in Swaziland and how the king constantly tried to improve them since he became the Paramount Chief of Swaziland in 1921. But then he was powerless to effect the desired changes against the interests of the British whose Protectorate Swaziland was. The author rightly points out his position: "Sobhuza had little authority to solve the many serious mundane problems affecting the peace and livelihood of his people''. (p. 111). In World War II Sobhuza supported the British.

The post-World War II period was one of promise, for important new enterprises were planned. Hopes were based on 'A Ten-Year Plan' (1945-55) on the promise of generous funding under a second Colonial Welfare and Development Act of the British Government. In the intervening period till the independence of Swaziland in 1968, the British made several attempts to impose a Westminster-style constitution. In 1973 the British-designed constitution was repealed and thereafter the king tried several different political institutions in keeping with the Swazi ethos and mode of life. He now bears the full burden of sovereignty of the country.

The book is an official biography of the king written by a well-

known anthropologist who in 1972 became a full-fledged Swazi citizen. It suffers from the limitations of an official biography of a person still in power as Head of State. Admiration for the king, though justified by his fine qualities, verges on excessive eulogisation. But then the virtue of the book lies in the fact that the writer has done a very good job of writing the biography with an almost complete understanding of the Swazi way of life, their customs and rituals. Hilda Kuper shows a sympathetic understanding of the Swazi situation and takes the reader very close to an understanding of the role played by Sobhuza II, the longest reigning living African monarch.

The author, in the epilogue, raises a fundamental question, whether a monarchy is less democratic than a Republic, and goes on to answer: "... this particular study runs counter to a self-satisfied and unfounded belief current in many circles, particularly in the west, that a traditional African king is a tyrant, that African monarchy is tantamount to African despotism, that an anointed monarch is less representative of the wishes of the majority than an elected President". (p. 347). But this contention cannot be generalized keeping in view the historical fact that monarchies very often tend to absolutism. The case of Swaziland, particularly during the reign of Sobhuza, at best remains only an exception rather than a rule.

The book contains a very useful glossary with English translations of Swazi words without which it would be difficult to understand the particularity of the social and political institutions in Swaziand. In short, it is a painstaking study which reflects not just the life of an individual but gives an insight into the Swazi society and history. There is no doubt it is a valuable addition to the limited number of books written about the country.

B. CHANDRAMOHAN

Problems of Socialist Orientation in Africa. Mai Palmberg. (Ed). Uppsala 1978. 243pp.

THAT research should be relevant and geared to the needs of African countries is now being increasingly recognised. The book under review deals with the contemporary socio-economic and development problems of Africa. It is a kind of a thesis on the viability of the non-capitalist path of development. Most of the papers, proceedings of an annual Seminar of the Uppsala Institute, attempt a critical evaluation of the socialist experiments

being conducted by some of the 'progressive' African states and throw light on the many pitfalls involved in them.

During the first decade of Africa's independence, most planners suggested models and tools of development which had been shaped primarily for western Europe and the US. To them, colonialism seemed to have acted as an engine of growth. Foreigners, it was argued, bring new skills, new tastes, new capital and expanding markets. With the passage of time the competitive efforts of private enterprise were expected to stimulate modern productive techniques. Africa, after the diffusion of western ideas, was expected to act as an economic means to market incentives, resulting in capital growth. The first African National Economic Plans were thus shaped by this economic philosophy which is popularly known as Western liberal theory. The concept of socio-economic change which formed the basis of this mainstream thinking in the 5)'s and 60's was furnished by many scholars. Much of the theoretical foundation of this approach is to be found in Talcott Parsons and others. They were content to abstract the general features of the developed modern economy and hurriedly identified them with the equality ideal type features of some of the underdeveloped economies. Development was thus viewed as the transformation of one type of society into another. They argued that the gap between the developed and the underdeveloped societies could be filled by diffusion of knowledge, skills, organisation, values, capital and technology from developed to underdeveloped countries. The model of this process was provided by W.W. Rostow.

The Marxist and 'dependentist' schools criticise the above approach and emphasise that the domination by industrial nations within the international system is a tremendous constraint on the internal development of underdeveloped countries. According to them, the external constraints subtly operate through financial, economic, technical and cultural channels, leading to the birth and growth of privileged and marginal classes. Thus, they assert that no genuine economic development is possible within the framework of semi-colonial or neo-colonial economic relationships.

It is between these two main theories, the developmentalist and the 'dependentist,' including the Marxist, that a vigorous intellectual debate is under way today. In a meeting of the Commonwealth Vice-Chancellors held in Canberra in 1971, Colin Leys said : "Throughout the underdeveloped world a confrontation is developing between two opposite views of the cause of underdevelopment and the goals of development."

The editor of the book, Mai Palmberg, initiates the discussion on the inadequacies of the existing socio-economic systems in Africa. Writing of the present-day conditions in the African states in general, he remarks (p. 11) : "Instead of constructing their own economy they have become even more dependent on export markets, the investment and price policies of MN Companies, and on foreign grants and loans. While in a growing state bureaucracy is manned by Africans in a position to raise their own standard of living, as truly junior partners, the great majority of peasants and workers have not been able to reap the fruits of independence." This neo-colonial phenomenon of underdevelopment and misery has become most glaring in recent times. Little wonder that analyses of the resulting dependence and underdevelopment in Africa have "already been advanced by a few students of Africa's political economy—Samir Amin, Giovanni Arrighi, Amilcar Cabral, Basil Davidson, Rene Dumont, Frantz Fanon, Colin Leys, Kwame Nkrumah, Ann Seidman, John Saul and Immanuel Wallerstein—and their formulations have now been developed by a new generation of critical scholars—Robin Cohen, Steve Langdon, and Richard Sandbrook" (Timothy Shaw and Malcolm J. Grieve on p. 54).

Inspired by such writings and disillusioned by the performance of the western 'trickle down' model of development, some progressive African countries have at times undertaken programmes aimed at gaining greater control of their national resources. Some of the African states which proclaimed their adherence to Socialism have been Nasser's Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Mali, Algeria, Tanzania, Somalia. Others like Ethiopia and Malagasy also claim to subscribe to this ideology. Case studies of some of these 'progressive' countries (in the book under review) however reveal the problems and handicaps from which they suffer. For instance, they have generally failed to evoke mass enthusiasm for national reconstruction which alone could remove the widespread poverty of these countries. In this connection, Clive Y. Thomas remarks (p. 36) : "It is therefore not altogether surprising to observe how closely economic strategy in the non-capitalist societies follows the classical colonial lines of primary export specialisation on the basis of natural endowments reluctance to deal with the national capital in a progressive socialist oriented way is rationalised on the basis of fears of the likely inefficiencies in production." Writing of the failure of Socialism in Nasser's Egypt, Perthi Multanen (pp. 191-92) remarks: "We once again sum up some of the central

reasons for the fact that the path of socialist orientation of Egypt ended unsuccessfully.. the class character of national democracy in post-revolutionary Egypt remained saturated with a petty bourgeois mentality. The revolutionary democrats of Egypt could not recognise the role of the proletariat in the liberation revolution." Thus the masses continued to be ignored in this African Socialist model as before.

Again, in Zambia and Tanzania no fully developed working class capable of political leadership arose. Mai Palmberg concludes (p. 223) : "Neither in Zambia nor in Tanzania we have seen development of an active alliance between the 'revolutionary democrats' and the workers and peasants." Because of this the masses remained out of the purview of planners.

Drawing our attention to still another handicap from which the socialist-oriented African countries suffer, Lans Rudebeck, writing on the development strategy in Guinea-Bissau, says (p. 180): "Sooner or later it will become necessary to coordinate policies systematically not only with Cape Verde but also with other West African regimes whose developmental options may differ from those of Guinea-Bissau. This difficult theoretical and political problem was never directly confronted in the writings of Amilcar Cabral........." International links are obviously essential to continued development in the direction of socialism once the struggle for independence is over. Thus a total break with the international economic order as envisaged by some radical Marxists is neither feasible nor practicable.

These papers clearly indicate the inadequacies of the present socialist development strategy in the absence of mass mobilisation and international help. The real test of a development strategy is how far it will help in meeting the basic needs of the masses as against the rising standards of a small elite only. This alone can ensure mass mobilisation without which no economic breakthrough is possible. Without such an economic breakthrough, not only Africa but the entire underdeveloped world will face its worst crisis. Writing in this vein way back in 1969 a distinguished Indian researcher, Dr. Tarlok Singh, prophesied: "Movements in favour of the underprivileged—specially landless agricultural workers, tenants, Harijans, the tribal people and the urban poor—are still weak in resources and leadership. In the absence of speedy transformation, they will increasingly take on political expression. It is all too easy for local discontents to link up and turn into large-scale movements of revolt."

What is needed is the elimination of the emerging elitism and

its attendant classlike mentality. The emphasis of the economy on the interests of the elite must be withdrawn; instead, it should be on the needs of the masses. A structural change in the economy is required so that the subsistence agricultural sector is modernised in order to increase the production of food for the masses. The basic thrust of the development objective should not be exports but the fulfilment of the needs of the people such as food, clothing and shelter. Minimum public services such as health, education, public transport, and drinking water should also be matters of priority. For this, the investment programme will have to be so modified as to raise the incomes and employment opportunities of the landless labourers small farmers, and the urban unemployed. Such an investment strategy would generate a more equitable income distribution and consequently a pattern of demand which would emphasise the satisfaction of basic needs. Along with the basic transformation of the socio-economic structure, such a programme needs a heavy dose of foreign aid. This proposal may sound too idealistic but help from the prosperous western countries is certainly overdue. To accelerate development in the UDC's changes in the world economic order itself are also essential. This view has been confirmed by many recent studies. There are already signs that the international economic order may be so modified as to make the richer nations more responsive to the demands of the UN international development strategy for a Second Development Decade in Africa.

The strength of the study in question lies in the fact that it has initiated a discussion on development problems. The well-documented exposition through these papers by some distinguished Africanists might auger well for more focussed and in-depth studies in individual countries of Africa in the future. It is likely to deter the African States from following either the elitist developmental approach or the radical socialist one blindly; instead it might motivate them to pursue a basic needs programme for the uplift of the starving millions. Above all, the study might give a non-specialist reader a kaleidoscopic introduction to the wide range of socio-economic problems confronting Africa today.

RAMAN G. BHARDWAJ

Activities of the Centre

THE following is an account of the activities of the Indian Centre
for Africa for the period April to December 1978:

Reception to SWAPO President

The Centre held a reception in honour of Mr. Sam Nujoma,
President of SWAPO, who had arrived in India at the invitation of
Mr. Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Union Minister of External Affairs, at
Vigyan Bhavan on April 2. · After the reception a public meeting,
presided over by Mr. Sikandar Bakht, Union Minister of Works and
Housing, was held. Mr. Nujoma spoke on the current situation in
Namibia.

Senegalese Cultural Evening

The Centre extended its cooperation to the Embassy of Senegal
and the India-Senegal Friendship Association in organising a cultural
evening at Azad Bhavan Auditorium on April 5 in which Indian
artists also took part.

Reception to Tanzanian Vice-President

A reception was held in honour of Mr. Abboud Jumbe, Vice-
President of Tanzania, at Azad Bhavan on April 6. Mr. Jumbe
also met Tanzanian students in Delhi.

Africa Day

The Centre, in cooperation with the Dean and Heads of African
Missions in New Delhi, observed Africa Day. A reception and a
meeting were held at Azad Bhavan on May 30 to mark the occasion.
The Minister of State for External Affairs, Mr. Samarendra Kundu,
presided.

South Africa Women's Day

The Centre collaborated with Springdales School, New Delhi,
and the African National Congress to observe South Africa
Women's Day on August 9. Miss Pakeeza Sultan from the Centre
and Mrs. A. M. Simong of the African National Congress spoke on
the occasion.

Visitors

The Centre played host to Mr. Abdul Wahib Abdally, Secretary
of the Ministry of Cultural Affairs, and Mr. Azedin Beshchaouche,

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Director-General of Antiquities and Museums of Tunisia, during their stay in Delhi. They visited, among other places, the National Museum and the Department of Archaeological Survey of India.

In July general assistance was provided by the Centre for Miss Njenga and Miss Sally Njenga of Kenya during their stay in Bombay.

Mr. Deep Chand Behary, a well-known writer of Mauritius, was given a local hospitality grant of Rs. 5,000 in November. Mr. Behary, a graduate of Shanti Niketan, had come to India in connection with the publication of his books.

General assistance was rendered by the Centre to Dr. Nathan Sodzi of Department of Electrical Engineering, University of Kumasi, Ghana, during his visit to the country in December.

Library

The Centre maintains a well-equipped library on Africa. Being a research library dealing with a specific area, it has a small but valuable collection of books, periodicals and newspapers. The collection has been enriched by the regular addition of materials purchased by the Centre and by materials sent by the African Missions in Delhi, Indian Missions in African countries, foreign institutions like the Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, International Defence and Air Funds, Library of Congress, American Institute of African Studies, SCOLMA, Economic Commission for Africa and other agencies publishing books on Africa.

The library, besides providing general services, offers to scholars and readers information on current events and happenings in Africa through its Press Clippings Section which maintains 117 files of news items, editorial comments and feature articles. Material from eight Indian dailies was added to the files during this period.

Ten readers became members of the library and about 200, including research scholars, university and college professors, students of African studies from universities in Delhi and outside Delhi, foreign students, journalists, officials from various institutions and organisations as well as from the Ministry of External Affairs going to African countries visited the library and made use of its clippings section and reading-room.

Africa Quarterly

Vol. 17 of the journal was completed and the first issue of Vol. 18 was brought out this year. 20 more subscriptions were entered

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bringing the total to 204. Vols. 13-14 and 16 of Africa Quarterly are now available in microfilm in the library.

A new editorial board of Africa Quarterly was constituted under the chairmanship of Mr. Asoka Mehta. Mrs. Shanti Sadiq Ali, member of the Governing Body of ICCR, is Executive Editor of the journal. A meeting of the editorial board, presided over by Mr. Mehta, was held at Azad Bhavan on December 30.

Anti-Apartheid Activities

Since August 1978 the Centre has been organising anti-apartheid activities to mark 1978-79 as International Anti-Apartheid Year. The ICCR is the sole implementing agency for this programme all over the country. The following functions were held in Delhi:

Namibia Day

The ICA observed Namibia Day on August 26 at Teen Murti House. A public meeting, presided over by Mr. Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Union Minister for External Affairs, was held to mark the occasion.

Exhibition

The Indian National Committee for the Observance of Anti-Apartheid Year which has Mr Asoka Mehta as its Chairman organised an exhibition, "Life Under Apartheid", at Vigyan Bhavan from September 29 to October 2 to coincide with the International Conference on Apartheid held at the same venue by the All-India Peace and Solidarity Organisation. The exhibition was viewed by hundreds of people from all walks of life including delegates from various parts of the world, including the African Continent.

Publications

A brochure on "Life Under Apartheid" was also brought out and 2,000 copies of it were distributed. The Indian National Committee had decided that three pamphlets should be prepared under the anti-apartheid programme. The task was assigned to Mrs. Sadiq Ali Dr. Anirudha Gupta, and Mr. H.S. Chhabra. Two thousand copies of Mrs. Sadiq Ali's pamphlet on "Racial Discrimination" have been published. Mr. Chhabra and Dr. Gupta have written on "India's Role in the Struggle against Apartheid" and "Profiles in Courage and Defiance". These are in the press.

A pamphlet on Nelson Mandela, published by the ICA-ICCR, was translated into 11 Indian regional languages: Hindi, Urdu, Tamil, Telugu, Malayalam, Marathi, Gujrati, Bengali, Assamese,

Oriya and Kannada. The other pamphlets will also be translated into various languages.

Film Show

The Indian Centre for Africa on behalf of the Indian National Committee organised a film show at Azad Bhavan on November 25. A reception and a public meeting addressed by the High Commissioner of Ghana, Dr. Paul Boekye Duah, as the Dean of African Missions in New Delhi, were also held. "The Rising Tides," the film screened on this occasion, traces the history of the mounting resistance against apartheid in South Africa from the time of arrival of white settlers to the Soweto uprising of 1970.

Student Get-together

A get-together of African and other foreign students as well as Indian students was organised at Azad Bhavan on December 7. Mr. Daniel Lisulo, Prime Minister of Zambia, who was on a state visit to India, addressed the meeting. Mr. Asoka Mehta, Chairman of the INC, presided.

Conference on Racialism and Apartheid

The Foreign Students Association organised a conference on the problems of apartheid in Delhi in December. Financial assistance was given to it by the Indian National Committee for this purpose.

Bombay

The exhibition "Life Under Apartheid" was held at the C.J. Hall from October 20 to 25. It was inaugurated by the former Chief Justice of India, Mr. M. Hidayatuallah.

The Nagpur University held a seminar on "Apartheid in the Present Time : An Anachronism" on December 2. It was inaugurated by Mrs. Sadiq Ali.

On December 4 Mrs. Sadiq Ali addressed the teachers and students of Nagpur University. The lecture was followed by a question-answer session.

Two films— one on South Africa and the other on Namibia supplied by the ICCR—were shown at the University of Nagpur between December 3 and 5. The films are now being shown to students by the S.N.D.T. Women's University at Bombay. They will be later screened in Pune, Kolhapur and Aurangabad.

Madras

A seminar and a public meeting were organised in Tamil Nadu on October 7 and 8. Mr. Asoka Mehta, inaugurated the seminar.

Calcutta

A symposium was organised in collaboration with the Indian Council of World Affairs, Calcutta, and the Ramakrishna Mission Institute of Culture, at the Shibananda Hall on November 16.

A public meeting was held on December 10, Human Rights Day, at Sisir Mancha (Calcutta Information Centre).

A joint seminar organised by Lady Brabourne College, Presidency College, St. Xavier's College and Loreto College, was held on December 16.

A symposium was held at the Yogananda Hall of the Ramakrishan Mission Institute of Culture on December 15 to discuss "Human Rights and Apartheid".

A seminar was held at Jadavpur University on December 24.

A get-together of Indian, African and other foreign students was organised at the International Students Hostel on December 25.

A booklet, "Homage to Nelson Mandela", received from the ICCR, was translated into Bengali, Oriya and Assamese in December.

Trivandrum

A seminar was held on November 19 with Dr. V.K. Sukumaran Nair in the chair. Three papers were presented as the seminar, one by Dr. F.I. George, Professor and Head of the Psychology Department of Kerala University, on "The Impact of Apartheid on Education and Science", another by Dr. Jacob Fapen, Director, Indian School of Social Science, on "The Economics of South Africa's Apartheid" and the third by Mr. Nalrpat, Executive Director of the Mathrubhumi Printing and Publishing Company on "India's Role in Combating Apartheid".

Bangalore

The week-long programme for the observance of U.N. International Anti-Apartheid Year began in Bangalore from November 10. It was inaugurated by the Chief Minister of Karnataka, Mr. D. Devaraj Urs, at the Institute of Engineers Hall at Vidhana Veedhi, Bangalore. The next day, a meeting was organised by the Bangalore University Scheduled Castes and Tribes Students Association at Hostel No. 1, Prim Rose Road, Bangalore. Mr. A.B. Jakanpur, Minister of State for Regulated Markets, Government of Karnataka,

was the chief guest. The Gokhale Institute of Public Affairs organised a public meeting at 11th Cross, Malleswaram, on December 12. Mr. Nittoor Srinivasa Rao, former Chief Justice of Karnataka, was the chief guest. The Lions Club of Gandhi Nagar, Bangalore , held a meeting at Hotel Ashoka on December 13. As Mr. K.H. Srinivas, Minister of Information and Youth Services, Government of Karnataka, who was to be the chief guest, could not attend the meeting, Mr. S. Sivappa, Chairman of the Karnataka Legislative Council and the Indian National Committee—Karnataka Branch, took the chair.

On December 14, trade unions and working class unions organised a public meeting at the Karnataka Federation of Chambers of Commerce Hall, Kempagowda Road, Bangalore. December 15 was declared Women's Day to express solidarity with the suffering peoples of South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe. The meeting was jointly organised by two prominent women's organisations, the Jagratha Mahila and Leela at Conference Hall, Vidhana Soudha. Justice Y.V. Chandrachud, Chief Justice of India, and Justice D.M. Chandrashekar, Chief Justice of Karnataka, were the chief guests. The same day in the morning the Vallabhbhai Patel Institute organised a meeting at the University Law College, where the Minister for Finance, Mr. S.M. Yahya, was the chief guest. On December 16 the closing function was held at the Conference Hall of Vidhana Soudha. The valedictory address was delivered by Mr. Govind Narain, Governor of Karnataka.

Hyderabad

A state sub-committee for implementation of the anti-apartheid programme was constituted under the chairmanship of the Education Minister of Andhra Pradesh in Hyderabad. Mr. G. Ram Reddy, Vice-Chancellor of Osmania University, is convener of the committee, which held its first meeting on December 15 in Hyderabad to chalk out a detailed programme for the region.

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Africa Quarterly

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Administrative Weakness in Contemporary Africa

Gatian F. Lungi and John O. Oni

CONTEMPORARY African public bureaucracies are direct heirs of colonial administration. In Britisn, French, Belgian and Portuguese colonies, colonial administration was basically the same. It operated on the precepts of Weber's paradigm of bureaucracy. According to Esman[1] colonial administration had the following features: it was primarily concerned with the maintenance of law and order and the provision of modest public services in a *laissez-faire* economy; it emphasized the hierarchical structure of authority which excluded client groups from participating in administrative decision-making ; it operated on the notion of separation of policy making from policy implementation and the political neutrality of the civil service personnel; and it focused on instrumental efficiency in attaining the overall objectives of colonialism. It could further be added that until the last years of colonial rule, Africans were excluded from positions of responsibility in the civil service, with the possible exception of indigenous rulers (i.e. the Chiefs) who occupied relatively important intermediary positions in the bureaucracy. It was thus a bureaucracy concerned with consistency and control, order and predictability.

At independence, African governments inherited many features of colonial administration. However, independence brought with it several pressures on governments. One factor behind anti-colonial sentiments was socio-economic inequality and underdevelopment of colonial economies generally. Independence was accompanied by an intense demand for public goods and services. There was also a great expectation that governments would undertake major responsibilities in bringing about economic transformation. It was believed that independent governments would introduce participative structures in administration and policy-making processes. Many African administrators hoped to rise to senior positions within the civil service. In short, independence demanded a pluralistic public administration which could deal with expanded public goods and services, economic development, political participation in decision-making by citizens and Africanization of the civil service. It demanded innovation and experimentation rather than order and predictability.

In response to these demands, many African governments

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undertook the following measures. First, the public sector was expanded at a phenomenal rate. This was done in two ways: by creating new public agencies and corporations and by nationalizing private corporations. Second, governments initiated several major economic development projects such as the building of infrastructures, opening new factories and industries, investment in agriculture, constructing power stations and other associated programmes. Third, many governments expanded social services such as education, social security and insurance, welfare programmes and medical services. Finally, there were both quantitative and qualitative changes within the civil service itself. There was a rapid programme of Africaniza-tion of civil service personnel and managers in public agencies and corporations. This entailed replacing expatriates with nationals in positions of responsibility. This was accompanied by the expansion of the civil service. Between 1961 and 1970 African civil service grew at an average rate of 7% per annum. It employed about 60% of all wage-earning labour in countries south of the Sahara, excluding white-dominated countries in the south. Administrative personnel alone consumed about 48-51% of government recurrent expenditures. As Dumont perceptively observes, administration is the main industry in post-independence Africa.[2] During the same period several governments, such as those of Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Tanzania and Zambia, attempted to reform administrative structures to widen citizen participation. This was done through decentralization exer-cises such as the delegation of administrative power to regional and provincial headquarters (examples are Nigeria, Zambia) or the creation of rural institutions for peasant self-management such as Ujamaa Villages in Tanzania and Rural Reconstruction Programmes in Zambia.

However, the expanded role and scope of public administration has not been matched with successful performance. Critics of African administration agree that its performance has been highly inadequate. Evidence of this inadequacy is presented in daily newspapers, govern-ment reports and in a number of events such as frequent commissions of inquiry into administrative malpractices, constant reshuffles of senior civil servants and managers of public corporations and, more drastically, in military coups d'etat. Almost everywhere in sub-Saharan Africa there are familiar administrative pathologies: corrup-tion, nepotism, ethnic conflicts, inefficiency, incompetence, bureaucratic red-tape and ritualism, low employee morale and poor interpersonal relations and uncreative managerial leadership. Two illustrations, one from Nigeria and the other from Zambia, portray

vividly the current state of African public administration. Alarmed by heavy losses in public corporations, the Federal Government of Nigeria observed:

> The present state of statutory corporations, state-owned companies and allied organizations has given the Federal Military Government some cause for anxiety. Sufficient time has elapsed to enable an objective judgement to be passed on whether or not these various organizations have credibly satisfied their objectives. The state of public opinion in the last five years and more provides available evidence that these organizations have failed to fulfil their expectations.[3]

The Zambian case is more pathetically presented by President Kaunda thus:

> I must indicate how disgusted I have been in the past by the apathy, sheer lack of initiative and indiscipline which has been prevalent in the Civil Service. I must say that this has not helped to accelerate development... in future I will certainly take the strongest measures possible to deal firmly with any manifestation of apathy and indiscipline in the public service... let alone any manifestation of corruption...the present administration which served the UNIP (United National Independence Party) Government leaves much to be desired.[4]

Quotations could be multiplied but whatever country they describe, the administrative situation is unsatisfactory, and by 1979 it was apparent that African public administration had failed in two of its basic missions: the promotion of national economic development and the improvement of the quality of public goods and services. As development critics have pointed out, African governments have aided the process of underdevelopment.[5] The quality of public goods and services has fallen below that of the pre-independence era. Social programmes such as education have become tragic experiments; and far from being reconstructed, rural areas have deteriorated below pre-independence standards,

Struck by this semi-permanent state of administrative crisis in African countries, critics have come up with various theoretical formulations to explain its causes. Some have blamed the inherited colonial structures and processes as the cause. Others have identified the politicization of public administration as the main source of current problems. Others still have construed administrative inadequacy as a function of socio-cultural conditions. It is to the latter that we must now turn.

Socio-cultural Theories of Administrative Weakness

Socio-cultural theories seek to explain human behaviour in organizations in terms of beliefs, norms, values and symbols. These are assumed to guide choices and set limits on how organizational

members perform their duties and relate to each other. In addition to values, there are also social roles and structures and these help pattern relationships and interactions between organizational members and clients. Another assumption behind the socio-cultural theories is that the social acceptability of organizations depends upon the kind of functions they perform. Those performing seemingly irrelevant or tangential roles are usually not easily accepted or institutionalized.

Theorists seeking to explain administrative inadequacy from this viewpoint assume that the socio-cultural orientation of African societies is at variance with modern bureaucracies, that these societies' structures and individual roles are geared toward particularistic behaviours and, therefore, clash with universalistic norms of bureaucracies, and that being Western transplants, bureaucracies are not yet fully accepted by these societies. For the purposes of orderly discussion socio-cultural theories are placed under three categories. These include the Malintegration Theory, the Underinstitutionalization Theory, and Role and Group Theory. These theories overlap considerably by their content. However, their arguments are sufficiently distinct to warrant individual treatment.

The Malintegration Theory

Adherents of the Malintegration Theory view administrative weakness as a function of individual maladjustment in a dynamic environment of social change. The individual bureaucrat is viewed as possessing a malintegrated personality as a consequence of disruption in the socio-cultural process. The African socialization process begins in a traditional setting but is completed in the colonially introduced modern bureaucratic organizations. This transition produces the "individual identity crisis" which is believed to

> render the transitional bureaucrat lacking in commitment, insecure in action, suspicious in interpersonal behaviour, dominated by anxiety, and generally ineffectual in the "art of associating together".[6]

In yet another way, malintegration is an outcome of the dichotomy between the sacred values and primordial sentiments of the bureaucrat's background on the one hand, and the secular norms of organizations, on the other. Unable to come to grips with either type of values the bureaucrat.

> engages in a wildly erratic animic type of behaviour, or is overcome by inertia, or retreats from the situation behind a facade of bureaucratic ritualism.[7]

Undeniably, the introduction of colonial bureaucracies in African societies must have been disorienting to a considerable degree.

Similarly, some of the problems pointed out by malintegration theorists, such as bureaucratic ritualism or lack of commitment to organizational goals, exist in contemporary African bureaucracies. However, beyond these facts, the theory runs into difficulties. First, the degree of malintegration among African bureaucrats who manifest dysfunctional behaviours has never been quantified. It is thus empirically uncertain whether malintegration is in any way related to dysfunctional behaviours of African bureaucrats. Second, the malintegrationists would find it difficult to justify their assumptions with regard to the performance of African bureaucrats during the colonial era. Colonial bureaucracies employed Africans in clerical and other junior administrative posts. Most of these were semi-illiterate peasants relatively unfamiliar with Western bureaucracies. Even as they worked in these bureaucratic settings they did not abandon their indigenous customs, social roles and commitments. Yet their performance was recorded and has been hailed today as impressive. They performed their administrative duties with a degree of adequacy that has rarely been achieved in contemporary African bureaucracies. It is common knowledge that without them, the history of colonialism in Africa would be quite different. However, it is curious to observe today that among the most irresponsible administrators in independent Africa are those who had excellent records in colonial bureaucracies. The malintegration theory cannot shed light on this discrepancy..

Third, the theory can be attacked on its own premise. The incompatibility of values within an individual does not necessarily result in erratic behaviour in all contexts. Many attitudes and their associated norms and values are situation-specific and there is no evidence to suggest that bureaucracies are such situations in which Africans manifest value incompatibilities. In addition, dissimilar values or beliefs are not always dichotomous or mutually exclusive. They can play complementary roles in reinforcing or discouraging certain behaviours. It must be remembered that colonial administrators did not hesitate to employ African institutions and welcome behaviours and values associated with them to achieve their goals when Western bureaucracies proved inadequate. This was explicitly reflected in the policy of indirect rule which permitted African institutions to operate within the colonial bureaucracy, especially in the former British territories known as "protectorates".[8]

A fourth and final comment on the malintegration theory is that bureaucrats everywhere evidence some degree of cultural malintegration, even in non-crosscultural settings, but this has not been

demonstrated to be related in any way to their performance in organizations.

Given these shortcomings, the malintegration theory loses much of its persuasiveness. Its basic flaw lies in identifying wrong factors leading to current administrative problems. The arguments raised in this theory do not demonstrate the cause-effect relationship between socio-cultural malintegration and administrative weakness.

The Underinstitutionalization Theory

According to the underinstitutionalization theorists, administrative weakness is a function of the transitional nature of public organizations in developing countries. Transitional bureaucracies are those that have not yet been sufficiently institutionalized, but operate as drifting, erratic organizations created to be instrumental tools towards certain ends. Selznick differentiates organizations that are institutionalized from those that are not thus:

> The term "organisation" thus suggests a certain bareness, a lean, no-nonsense system of consciously coordinated activities. It refers to an *expendable tool*, a rational instrument engineered to do a job. An "institution", on the other hand, is more nearly a natural product of social needs and pressures—a responsive, adaptive organism.[9]

Charles Perrow provides a more lucid explanation:

> Some organisations are merely organizations—rational tools in which there is little personal investment and which can be cast aside without regret. Others become institutionalized, They take on a distinctive character ; they become prized in and of themselves, not merely for the goods and services they grind out. People build their lives around them, identify with them. The process of institutionalization is the process of organic growth, wherein the organization adapts to the strivings of internal groups and the values of the external society.[10]

A transitional bureaucracy lies in between the two extremes.

Fred Riggs, one of the leading underinstitutionalization theorists, has labelled the transitional bureaucracy a "prismatic organization" and transitional society in which it operates the "prismatic society". This geometrical term comes from the process through which light rays pass through a glass prism and are defected to produce seven colours of light. Prismatic rays are those in the process of defraction. From this he draws a parallel with organizations in transitional societies such as those found in contemporary Africa:

> In societies which are in the process of industrialization and modernization, where the new and old exist side by side in a heterogeneous mixture, one sometimes gets the impression that administration can be viewed as having a clock-like separatedness, but this impression is misleading. Indeed, one of the characteristics we might add to our model of a country in the

process of modernization is *overlapping*. By this I mean that the formal apparatus, like the administrative bureau, gives an illusory impression of autonomousness, whereas in fact it is deeply enmeshed in and cross-influenced by remnants of older traditional social, economic, religious and' political systems.[11]

Due to this overlapping of elements from two different systems, institutions in prismatic societies are hybrids with heterogeneous (overlapping) but not integrated norms (or poly-normativism). In prismatic organizations, bureaucrats are relatively free to do what they want, since other institutions, namely, political parties, interest groups, courts and legislative bodies cannot exert any effective control over them. The tastes of these bureaucrats are wasteful in terms of public goals and their inefficiency is inevitably high. Since a prismatic society has no commitments to prismatic organizations, there is also lack of social control on the behaviour of bureaucrats. The latter will play all sorts of games to further their selfish interests : they will engage in corruption, practise nepotism and tribal politics and emphasize the accumulation of personal power. These concerns take up most of the bureaucrats' time with the end result that official duties suffer.

The underinstitutionalization theory has several appealing elements. First, it is true that bureaucratic organisations are relatively recent in Africa, save for Ethiopia. During the colonial era there were few bureaucratic institutions and many Africans did not interact with them except during tax-collection campaigns. Even those who worked in them did not identify with them; they were always "the whiteman's institutions". It was barely 15 years ago that Africans dominated these organizations both numerically and politically. Even then, the majority of African population was still removed from bureaucratic settings. Second, the manner in which modern organizations are treated by African leaders indicates that society has not yet come to prize them for their intrinsic value. For example, government departments and ministries are created and abolished very frequently. Universities are closed at the will of the government. Public corporations are treated in a similar manner. The general impression that is created is that of a drifting group of organisations rather than responsive, adaptive bodies. Third, the problem of irresponsible bureaucrats cannot be refuted.

Yet the theory has serious shortcomings. First, it is not certain how long a time should pass before an organization is transformed into an institution. For example, Chinese Communes are relatively recent in origin but they have been institutionalized to a

very considerable degree. The Nazi Party ruled Germany for just a little over a decade, yet Nazi organizations were institutionalized in Africa at the end of the 19th century. Africans have controlled them since the 1960's. It is not certain whether during this period some organizations have not yet become institutionalized.

Another criticism of the theory is that it assumes that only institutionalized organizations perform adequately, and that only those in advanced industrial societies are capable of adequate performance. First, we are familiar with ad hoc bodies such as commissions and temporary bureaux that are short-lived and have not been institutionalized but accomplish their tasks in a very satisfactory manner. Second, there are examples of highly institutionalized bureaucracies whose performance has hardly been adequate. The latest imperial bureaucracy in Ethiopia furnishes an excellent example. It had been transformed into a modern bureaucracy in the Weberians sense in the late 19th century. In the early 1960s it had been augmented by American assistance. Yet just before it was overthrown it had gained the reputation for being one of the most competent bureaucracies in Africa, save for the repression of its citizens. Thus institutionalization on its own does not necessarily make an organization more adequate in performance or its administrators more competent. Much institutionalization can be pathological.

Third, the institutionalization argument tends to imply that developing countries are inherently incapable of producing effective organizations until they become developed. This is contradicted by the fact that within these countries there exist very effective organizations usually in the private sector. Organizational effectiveness is thus not an exclusive property of industrially advanced nations.

A fourth criticism of the theory is that it presupposes that for an organization to be institutionalized it must meet the Western criteria for such a process. For example, Riggs argues that such organizations must be controlled by other institutions such as political parties and so on. Organizations in Japan have indicated that it is possible for institutionalization to take place by integrating values from other societies with those of indigenous society. For example, the Japanese bureaucrats have combined Western competitiveness with corporate collaboration, impartiality with respect for seniority and age.[12] Thus, two cultures need not produce overlapping elements, nor does integration come about only when values from one culture are suppressed in favour of those from the other.

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Finally, there is the question of lack of control of adminis-
trators by other institutions such as political parties, courts and so
on. To a certain extent government institutions are feeble in Africa.
However it is inaccurate to assume that administrators are free from
external control. Strong control is exercised by executive presidents
on administrators. Nwabueze[13] observes that in former British
colonies the president of the country plays a very significant role in
public administration. He appoints, promotes, demotes, reshuffles,
monitors and dismisses senior civil servants and managers of public
corporations. In countries where military governments are in power,
such as Uganda, administrators are brought even under more tight
control. Yet not even Amin's Uganda has curbed administrative
irresponsibility. If anything, it has promoted it. Irresponsibility,
therefore, can spread even in an administration which is tightly
controlled.

A final criticism against Riggs' argument is that lack of
external control on bureaucrats does not always lead to the latter's
irresponsibility. During the colonial era, for example, policy makers
in metropolitan centres allowed a wide latitude of individual freedom
in administrative actions in colonies. Many European administrators
and African clerks exercised ample discretion in executing govern-
ment policies. Indeed, the practice of indirect rule in British
territories required the reduction of control and supervision from the
top to permit chiefs and other administrators to manage their quasi-
autonomous institutions.

Like the Malintegration Theory, the arguments raised by this
theory fail to establish casual relationships between underinstitutiona-
lization of organizations and administrative weakness found in
them.

The Social Role and Group Theory

Adherents of this theory focus on the impact of African
corporate kinship on individual bureaucrats' behaviour. Robert
Price, one of the leading proponents of the theory, argues,

> it is the corporate nature of kinship units, rather than the extent of their
> membership, that places strain on bureaucratic organizations within
> African societies.[14]

The Role and Group Theory is best presented in steps. First, in tradi-
tional Africa, society is organized on the basis of corporate groups.
Social, economic and political rights, obligations and duties reside
in the group, not in the individual. Second, this corporate definition
of individual existence renders it difficult to separate the individual's

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role into distinct role-sets. Compartmentalization of roles cannot occur, unless a culture legitimates some degree of individual autonomy from group membership. Third,

> When bureaucratic organizations are embedded in social systems based on corporate descent groups, the kinship group will tend to appropriate to itself any bureaucratic positions held by its members. Just as an individual's debts or crimes are conceived of as group obligations and responsibilities, so his possession of a post in a governmental institution is viewed as a group possession. The jurisdiction of the kinship role-set penetrates the bureaucratic organisation.[15]

Consequently the bureaucrat behaves in a particularistic manner when he encounters members of his extended family or kinship group in a bureaucratic setting, and will seek to enhance wealth, status and the influence of his group. Administrative inadequacy, then, comes about due to the violation of universalistic rules in favour of particularistic ones. What societies in the West perceive as corruption or nepotism is morally agreeable in African societies.

Like the other two theories, the Social Role and Group Theory is accurate in identifying current problems In African administration. Price's own study among Ghanaian students and practising administrators reveals that, attitudinal-wise, his assumptions are not entirely misplaced :

> It is clear from the content of their responses to the open-ended questions that the Ghanaian civil servant on the whole believes that the members of his extended family will generally fail to recognize the validity of organizational role-demands that conflict with obligations of the family role-set, that they would not be likely to engage in "role compartmentalization".[16]

Beyond recognising problems, however, the theory has several flaws emanating from either ignorance of the African society or deliberate distortion of African social reality. This article is not a defence of African culture or its impact on personal behaviour in contemporary organizations. However, when theories depart from reality, they need drastic revision or abandonment.

First, the assumption that individual organizational roles are perceived within the corporate nature of African societies is a half-truth. Individuals in African societies, as elsewhere, adjust their roles as they do with their attitudes, according to the context they find themselves in. Well before independence, African societies recognized the difference between the role played by their members in what they then termed the "boma" (whiteman's government) on the one hand, and the role they played in indigenous or corporate settings, on the other. According to Pye[17] African societies gave great respect and status to the civil servants and other bureaucrats because they belonged to "a different set of governmental authority". This distinction

has remained clear in the minds of many Africans even after independence. However, the bureaucrat's irresponsible behaviour made it difficult for the majority of the people to receive government services. The alternative was to seek personal alliance with friends and relatives in bureaucratic settings in order to receive government services. Thus, the bureaucrat's behaviour was antecedent to and a primary cause of nepotic practices.

Evidence from several cases dealing with corrupt behaviour indicates that many African bureaucrats embezzle funds not to assist their kinsmen but to further their own material interests.[18] Similarly, tribal appointments are not based on the wish to help one's own tribesmen but to strengthen one's position in the government bureaucracy by appointing people who can be relied upon. Nepotism and tribalism in African administration are not the outcome of indigenous cultural practices or corporate relationships but of the frustration caused by bureacrats themselves.

The argument that corruption is morally acceptable in African societies denies the fact that these societies can distinguish government from corporate property. It would be difficult to imagine any African society that cannot tell the misuse of public property or public theft from legitimate personal and corporate property. Of course, there are cultural differences in the definition of what constitutes the misuse of public property. African societies have lived with public property from time immemorial. Their concept of public or government and corporate property was sharpened further by their experience with colonial bureacracies. They may not have worked in government bureaucracies but colonial laws made the distinction unmistakably clear to them.

Another objection to the Social Role and Group Theory concerns the assumption of universalistic-particularistic dichotomy. Bureaucratic universalism refers to impartial treatment of clients and adherence to impersonal rules and procedures when discharging one's duties. This was not absent in indigenous African societies. Universalistic orientation began early in the child's life. Children were socialized toward impartial treatment of all adults, strangers from other cultures, and non-family members. Behaviour that tended to be selfish or favoured family members in the presence of others was castigated. Indeed it was this universalistic orientation that led Africans to welcome Europeans in their lands. If the indigenous norms of impartiality were to influence contemporary bureaucrats, then there would be considerably less nepotic practices today. However, indigenous norms were lumped together and

denigrated as primitive in the colonial era. They are still regarded as such today. On the other hand, many African monarchs, like their European counterparts, filled their bureaucracies with relatives and friends. This stood in sharp contrast to practices by members of the society at large, and in the personal behaviour of bureaucrats at the kings' courts it was always the norms of the wider society and not the dictations from kings that held the sway. Nonetheless, even among the most nepotic African monarchs, competency was often preferred to blood relationships. The current proliferation of nepotic practices appears to have weak roots in indigenous African cultures, and the charge that particularistic behaviour is promoted by norms and roles of the corporate group is overstated.

The social role and group theory still leaves us with much ignorance about the causes of maladministration in contemporary Africa.

Conclusion

This article has briefly dealt with three socio-cultural theories of administrative weakness in contemporary Africa. It has been argued that the theories have been useful in identifying current problems but inadequate or unconvincing in explaining their causes. One factor leading to unrealistic assumptions about African culture and society and their impact on administrative behaviour has been stereotyping. Many socio-cultural theorists have not studied African societies objectively, and those who have, like Price, have formulated their assumptions on age-old colonial prejudice towards these societies. Such studies become self-fulfilling prophecies with little or no positive contribution to the understanding of problems confronting African administration. Unless efforts are made to combat this tendency, the study of African organizational behaviour will continue to be misguided.

There is also an element of naivity among socio-cultural theorists in that they tend to regard African culture as a uniform social phenomenon. Of course there are certain elements common to all African cultures as much as there are common features among Western cultures. However, there are some important differences not only among indigenous cultures but also in the manner through which different societies were colonized. These may or may not have any differential impact on modern organizations.

The theorists scarcely discuss other factors such as organizational decision-making processes, structures and political economy except as dependent variables. They assume that socio-cultural

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factors play an overriding role in bringing about administrative weakness in Africa. Even if one were to accept this assumption, it would be difficult to see socio-cultural conditions playing a leading role in all periods of national development. It is possible that socio-cultural conditions become governing factors in African organizational behaviour at certain periods in time and in certain areas. The fact that African bureaucrats behaved or performed their duties adequately in colonial administration and failed to maintain the same level of competence after independence may suggest that the time dimension is important, and that other factors such as political economy may play the upper hand in the process of administrative decay. Henry Bretton hypothesizes thus about post-colonial administration:

> Deteriorating social and economic conditions, combined with the absence of strong moral and ethical leadership and restraints, place enrichment through corrupt practices in a different light. It quickly becomes the thing to do. Increasingly, those in position to avail themselves of the opportunity will seek to obtain a modicum of social security by augmenting their income through illicit channels.[19]

Of course no one theory can adequately account for current administrative problems in Africa, and multidimensional perspectives are required for broader and deeper insights into these problems. Yet it is equally important to identify governing factors behind administrative crises at various stages of national development in different countries. Undoubtedly, socio-cultural conditions do have an impact on administrative behaviour in contemporary Africa, but we must reject the assumption that these play a leading role in bringing about administrative inadequacy. More important, we must rid ourselves of the implicit notion inherent in the socio-cultural theory that all impacts from indigenous African society are dysfunctional to contemporary bureaucracies. On the contrary, there are a number of undiscovered elements in these cultures that can help restore organizational vitality. The richness of interpersonal relations in indigenous African societies is one such potential.

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Human Rights and U.S. Aid to Ethiopia: A Policy Dilemma

Seleshi Sisaye

SOME of the more important policy questions concerning foreign (Western) aid relate to its role in Third World countries undergoing revolutionary political changes. An issue of particular importance in contemporary aid programmes is that of human rights. The activities of Ethiopia's present military government have received considerable public attention especially since some of these have occurred during a period when US foreign aid has laid emphasis on human rights. As a means of generating discussion on the relevance of human rights, this paper examines the history of US-Ethiopian relations and places the human rights question in the broader context of nations undergoing radical socio-political transformations.

Economic and Political Relations

Economic cooperation between Ethiopia and the US began in the 1940's. The first known economic treaty between the two countries was signed in Addis Ababa on September 7, 1951, and became effective from October 8, 1953.[1] Under the treaty, they entered into an agreement defining the conditions under which US firms could invest in Ethiopia, the regulations under which they were allowed to operate and their rights and immunities as foreign investors.

In order to further strengthen the economic ties between the two countries a 25-year military assistance agreement was signed in 1953.[2] Under the agreement, the US was given the right to establish a base in Asmara (later known as the Kagnew Station), the capital city of Eritrea Administrative Region. The US agreed to leave the Kagnew Station, if asked to do so by the Ethiopian government, and to provide the necessary arms and military training to maintain Ethiopia's territorial integrity[3], a commitment which might be considered as rental for the Kagnew base. Since then, it has equipped a 40,000-man army in Ethiopia and trained almost half of its officer corps[4]. By 1971 it had spent over $170 million on arms, military equipment and training of Ethiopian armed personnel,[5] accounting for approximately two-thirds of the total US military assistance to Africa. By 1976 military aid had reached more than $200 million and helped Ethiopia "...to acquire some hundred and fifty million dollars' worth of tanks, planes, artillery, and rifles".[6]

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US military aid had helped to modernize the Ethiopian army and made it one of the better equipped armies in Africa.

Economic aid to Ethiopia with its thrust on the development of infrastucture in the form of schools (for example, the Agricultural and Mechanical College at Alemaya, the Jimma Agricultural School, the Awassa Training and Demonstration Centre to train community development agents and others that had been started under the Point-4 Programme), agricultural distribution and marketing facilities and airline development totalled approximately $300 million. In addition to outright economic aid, there were cultural and educational exchange programmes conducted through the Peace Corps, a volunteer agency which provided teachers, nurses and hospital aides. In the sphere of health, the US was involved in the Malaria Eradication Service Programme while in agriculture, it initiated several rural development projects, the best known of which is the Ada Project.[7] In transport and communication, the Trans-World Airlines (TWA) assisted in the improvement of the Ethiopian Airlines and civil aviation.

Even though the economic aid was not significant compared to military aid, US assistance contributed to the formation of the basic infrastructure which laid the foundation for later socialist development efforts. A commentator of Ethiopia has attributed the recent developments there to US involvement in the training of military which "...has had an effect both on the muscle and the thinking of the military."[8]

Geopolitical Interests

Although the US has economic interests in Ethiopia, its primary concern is geopolitical aiming to stabilize the Ethiopian political situation. Because Ethiopia occupies a strategic position on the Horn of Africa and controls a number of outlets to the Red Sea, the base in Kagnew had enabled the US to carry out surveillance and military intelligence activities in the Middle East as far as the Indian Ocean until the early 1970's. At that time, the Kagnew base lost its importance as satellite communications replaced earlier stationary surveillance techniques. Even though there was a decline in the use of the Kagnew Station, US-Ethiopian ties were of continuing importance as a counterbalance to the growing Soviet influence in Somalia.[9]

Diplomatic relations between the US and Ethiopia developed smoothly until 1974 when Emperor Haile Selassie was deposed, the Crown abolished and replaced by a Provisional Military Government.[10]

The change in government with the accompanying transformation in Ethiopian society, Ethiopia's internal and external conflict accompanied by the growing influence of the Soviet Union in the Horn of Africa, combined with the US concern for human rights, created uncertainty in US-Ethiopian relations and ushered in a changed diplomatic atmosphere.

Impact of Human Rights

The crisis in diplomatic relations between the US and Ethiopia began over the issue of human rights. The first incident occurred in November 1974 when the Provisional Military Government of Ethiopia executed sixty former senior government officials. International organizations, including the International Commission of Jurists, and the UN expressed apprehension over the events in Ethiopia on the ground that the executions took place without a fair trial or due process of law.[11] The US also expressed its concern and dissatisfaction about this violation of human rights. The promise of the military to transform Ethiopia without bloodshed was questioned in the light of the executions.

While Western newspapers and magazines described the executions as unplanned but violative of the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, an analysis by Peter Schwab[12] defended the action of the military government as just and legitimate and as a calculated move in the transformation of Ethiopia from feudalism to socialism. Schwab's analysis defended the executions as being necessary to eliminate and neutralize the feudal and aristocratic elements of society and criticized the condemnation of the Western countries as being based on liberal values that "do not take into account the feudal history and record of Ethiopia,"[13] but rather were based on "moral and legal grounds."

This paper will now address itself to the relationship between human rights and US development assistance programmes by examining the interpretation of human rights as expressed in development assistance programmes in Ethiopia. In other words, what is the relevance of the human rights concept as it is presently applied to societies undergoing revolutionary social and political transformation or, to state the isssue more concisely, what is the relevance of the Western democratic concept of human rights when applied to a radically socio-political environment?

Policy Implications

Even though the US authorities voiced concern over the internal

situation in Ethiopia, it was not expressed in policy measures and aid for Ethiopia continued until 1977. In 1974-75 alone, the US allocated economic aid to the tune of $31 million, mainly in agricultural loans[14] in addition to the $12.5 million military assistance.[15] But the bilateral relationship deteriorated when Ethiopia moved toward the left and declared a programme of national democratic revolution in April 1976.[16] The government formally adopted "scientific socialism" and declared that its aim was to eliminate "feudalism, bureaucratic capitalism and imperialism" from the country and to lay the foundation for the establishment of a "people's democratic republic."[17]

Gradually, the government began to criticize Western countries, more specifically the US as it hesitated to continue providing military aid[18] contrary to the advice of Ethiopian specialists.[19] When President Carter took office in January 1977, he promised that aid to countries violating human rights would be reduced. Ethiopia was included among these countries. However, other countries (e.g., South Korea) were exempted for national security reasons.[20] The policy was very vague in its definition of human rights and the exception provided for those countries where US interests were involved only served to confuse the issue further. Although the Carter administration failed to develop an articulate definition of human rights, the strong stand taken by Congress affected both military and economic aid to Ethiopia.[21]

The situation in Ethiopia was aggravated by its failure to provide prompt compensation, despite an earlier promise, for private properties that had been nationalized. This policy was in conflict with the US mandate that adequate compensation would be provided for nationalized US properties.

As the US delayed shipment of arms to Ethiopia (for example in February 1977) and suspended a military grant of about $16.6 million on the human rights issue, Ethiopia began surveying possibilities of military assistance from the Eastern countries.[22] To allay the fear of an arms shortage, the government invited Cuba and the Soviet Union to replace US military assistance. This enabled the Russians to gain influence in Ethiopia, a situation which has been seen by the Western press as an opportunity for Russia to strengthen its position in East Africa and the Middle East.[23] The US, on the other hand, tried to gain some influence in Somalia.[24] Gradually a change occurred in the foreign alliances of both Ethiopia and Somalia. Somalia evicted the Soviets and asked for support from Western nations in its efforts to gain control of the Ogaden region of

Ethiopia since it appeared that victory was imminent. Ethiopia, dissatisfied with the slowdown of US military aid, ordered Washington to close five of its facilities, including the Kagnew Station and the office of the American Consul-General in Asmara; a naval medical research unit, the US Information Service office and library in Addis Ababa and the Military Assistance Advisory Group. Only the US Embassy and the USAID office were allowed to continue their activities.[25]

Some of the reasons for the termination of the 21-year US-Ethiopia military ties have been noted by David Ottaway, a *Washington Post* reporter stationed in Addis Ababa. He observed that Ethiopia's decision to close the five US facilities reflected the difficulties the US had in dealing with Marxist and Socialist regimes throughout Africa.[26]

While military aid was terminated, economic aid through the USAID Mission Office in Addis Ababa continued, although at a reduced level. The fact that the USAID office was not closed implied that economic assistance would continue. Why was economic aid continued and military aid cut off when the human rights issue applied to the country as a whole? This question will be the theme of the policy discussion that follows.

Human Rights and Development Aid

Since the US had to terminate its diplomatic relations with Cuba when Castro took power, it was assumed that the same scenario would be repeated in Ethiopia. Nevertheless, even when the government declared socialism as its national policy, contrary to all expectations, a break in diplomatic relations between the two countries did not occur. In fact economic aid to Ethiopia increased during this period of time as the US came to be involved in drought and rehabilitation projects, settlement programmes, informal education, rural health and in the organization of training seminars for civil servants both in Ethiopia and abroad as well as the provision of short-term training sessions to upgrade medium and higher level government officials.[27] In addition, the USAID Mission proposed several projects in the areas of health, education and agriculture which are now under study at the Planning Commission in Addis Ababa.

According to informed USAID sources at the Africa Bureau in Washington, and the USAID Mission in Addis Ababa, there has been a change in the philosophical approach of the AID Mission programme. The Mission has attempted to understand both the socio-economic situation in the country as well as the political programmes for change

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undertaken by the government and designed its programmes to conform to the country's developmental objective. Past strategies advocated the use of inhouse experts who administered development programmes independently of national objectives. The present strategy has been to analyze a given socio-economic setting and attempt to maintain at least an indirect influence on these programmes.

The argument that capitalist donor organizations, such as USAID, cannot provide effective assistance to societies undergoing revolutionary changes is an interesting one in relation to USAID policies as they apply to foreign policy issues, including the human rights issue. The stand that has emerged from the Ethiopian USAID Mission appears to be an encouraging sign of continued high-level economic aid. This position provides a useful test case for USAID since Ethiopia has demonstrated a pattern of revolutionary change which has been witnessed in several African nations—Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe (through the Patriotic Front led by Nkomo and Mugabe). A revolutionary government also appears to be inevitable in Zaire as a result of the uprisings in the Shaba region caused by its frustrations with Mobutu Sese Seiko.

The pattern of socialism that is emerging in Tanzania and Ethiopia is a clear example of the development directions that African nations are beginning to take. And, as indicated by its Ethiopian economic assistance programmes, the US now realizes that to maintain its influence in Africa, it needs to reshape its foreign policies with a view to accommodating the developmental interests of these regimes.

Informed sources indicate that the US experience with socialist countries (e.g .Cuba) has influenced its African policies. The US has realized that the wisest political option for it is to work with these governments, by its local aid mission listening to and learning from their nation-building experiences rather than conducting programmes dictated by the Mission Aid Office located in the capital city or Washington, by using national and local resources rather than US resources, and by participating in national programmes on a collegial basis.

Second, since a number of African nations are now following a revolutionary path, the USAID strategy has been to appoint progressive officials as mission representatives who would demonstrate a humanistic concern for the poor. Their approach to development would be moderate.[28] Although these appointments do not mean that the underlying US policy has changed, the change in development tactics has managed to convey a favourable impression to Third

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World officials, thereby maintaining US ties—and influence.

In addition, there has been an attempt to reduce the number of US officials abroad. In Ethiopia, the strength of USAID personnel was cut from 25 to 12 (USAID still represents one of the largest aid missions in Africa) to be able to work more smoothly with the government in the coordination of aid programmes.

These changes need also to be considered in relation to the geopolitical situation of the particular aid recipient. The case of Ethiopia is somewhat obvious as it occupies a strategic position in the Horn of Africa and severing diplomatic ties with it would effectively hurt US influence in Eastern Africa. In addition, continued economic aid to Ethiopia needs to be examined as it affects US relations with Somalia. Whether in the long run development programmes would allow the US to gain greater influence than that possible through military aid is another associated issue. In other words, economic assistance and the cooperative participation strategy advocated by US aid may, in its long-term implications, have more influence on the social and economic institutions of Ethiopia than the provision of military aid.

However, discussion of these questions requires a research methodology capable of dealing with policy issues surrounding international power relations in the Horn of Africa as they relate to the human rights issue.

The power politics-human rights nexus in the Horn of Africa may prove to be a critical test for US development policies and its advocacy of human rights. The US ability to continue aid programmes in Ethiopia may indicate its ability to reshape its foreign policies to accommodate its foreign interests and to adapt itself to the revolutionary changes emerging in contemporary Africa. Since Ethiopia has continued to receive economic assistance while being charged with human rights violations, an examination of the Ethiopian case in regard to the implementation of the human rights missive will be instructive. However, a review of the aid policy in Ethiopia requires a look at US aid policies.

USAID policies began to change in 1973 when the Foreign Assistance Act *"directed AID to undertake far-reaching reforms in the US* bilateral development assistance programmes."[29] (Emphasis original). The Act required USAID programmes to be concentrated in the least developed areas where the majority of the population was poor and their capitation income well below the world's acceptable levels. In order to promote the development of these people, the Foreign Assistance Act stressed the increase of US assistance revenue as much

as possible to *"address the global development problems which impact on the US economy and our national well-being."*[30] *"Further efforts to achieve peaceful political change in Africa can be strengthened by assistance to promote economic stability in the region."*[31] (Emphasis original). Moreover, USAID claimed that "the US Development Assistance Programme is designed to focus on basic human needs by supporting broad-based, participatory growth to help developing countries increase the production, income and employment of the poor majority of their population."[32] (Emphasis original)

On the basis of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, rural programmes promoting the participation of the majority of the poor people in the least developed countries have been stressed. The cumulative effort of these programmes is to transform the socio-economic order of these societies through gradual peaceful change.[33] But the question that arises is to what extent is the Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 consistent with the socio-economic changes occurring in Ethiopia? According to the USAID report for 1976, there have been a number of mutual development interests between the programmes of USAID and those of the Provisional Military Government of Ethiopia. The report stated that

> Despite some differences in philosophy, however, ... the Ethiopian Government's emphasis on self-reliance, mass participation, equity, benefits for the rural majority, and a more service-oriented government are clearly consistent with AID's own analysis of development needs in recent years and are consistent with AID's current legislative emphasis.[34]

Accordingly, USAID has proposed various programmes that are consistent with its own policy objectives and which also conform to the socialist development ideology of the Ethiopian government. These include USAID'S participation in the development of arid lands, agriculture (minimum package), drought and rehabilitation programmes in the drought and disaster prone areas of Northern Ethiopia and in the South in Upper Didessa and Gemou-Gofa[35] and rural roads (later of course rejected by Congress.)

Some Policy-oriented Research Issues

Nevertheless, the question still remains: Why does the US continue to supply economic assistance to a country it has accused of human rights violation? Are these programmes intended to have a political counter-insurgency component or do they reflect major policy changes in USAID programmes? It is not the intent of this paper to discuss these questions in detail but rather to bring them to

the attention of researchers interested in US-Ethiopia relations.

According to the media, the American public and informed sources within USAID, there is concern about the so-called authoritarian regimes in Africa where there is little respect for individual political freedom. The US, while expressing its concern several times, has not developed specific policy guidelines incorporating human rights. While the Harkin Amendment addressed itself to human rights in US Development Assistance Programmes and outlined the extent to which US aid could be used to solve the problems of stagnation and welfare in Third World countries, it is necessary to develop this general policy within a more specific political setting. More particularly, the policy needs to be articulated within the context of the changing political climate in Africa.

Individual political freedom, as it evolved in the Western industrialized nations with their tradition of representative democracy, has not developed in Africa where the majority of the population cannot read and write. Their primary concern is daily subsistence. Such an underdeveloped economic system has not led to the formation of an institutional infrastructure allowing political participation by organized interest groups or to the development of political parties representing the interests of various social and economic constituent groups. Individual political freedom can be meaningful only in a society where the institutional capability to exercise that freedom has developed. However, the concept of individual political freedom needs to be redefined in a underdeveloped society attempting socialist reconstruction after a history of elite domination of political and economic institutions because the development approach focusses on improving the quality of life of the poor majority of the population. For example, in Ethiopia, it has been pointed out that the government has shown its concern for human rights in its land reform measures and other equity-oriented programmes.[36] Land redistribution, the formation of peasant associations, the move towards local autonomy through decentralisation and the formulation of a well-defined socialist economic policy promote human rights by promoting the welfare of the majority of the people.

But it has also been indicated by several other sources that the present situation is not conducive to the promotion of individual human rights. Whether the emphasis is on short-term violation of individual human rights in a nation declaring a revolutionary political transformation to a socialist regime, or whether it is on human rights deemed to be violated in the long run by malnutrition, illiteracy and the limited opportunity structure of a traditional, conservative

regime safeguarding the rights of the elite[37] is a policy dilemma.

This writer hopes that researchers analysing these issues will consider the extent to which human rights issues, including the degree of individual political freedom as defined in Western industria.ized countries, apply in a society where more than 90 per cent of the population is concerned with its daily subsistence. On the other hand, politics, or the exercise of power by government, also implies the reciprocal participation of its citizens, no matter how physically deprived or illiterate, since governments are ultimately accountable to those whom they rule.

The Ethiopian experience has been used here as an illustration of the emerging attempts of donor agencies to redefine human rights within the . context of an underdeveloped nation passing through a transitional period during which "human rights" may be violated out of necessity for the achievement of its ultimate objectives. At this point it is difficult to predict the general aid policy that will result from continuing diplomatic relations with these countries. Nevertheless the need for policy reformulation in the light of the changing political structures in Africa is under considerable public debate. It raises a number of fundamental questions about the means and the ends of the development process as implied in Western aid programmes. The fact is that the emphasis on reaching the minimum level of 40 per cent through orderly change has not been effectively implemented due to institutional structures preventing access to the intended aid recipients. In addition, the human rights debate has concentrated on violations of individual political freedom while granting less importance to the majority of the population for whom subsistence is of greater importance than individual political rights. Compensation has also complicated the aid picture with its emphasis on just remuneration. While on the economic face of it, such remuneration appears justified in the light of its political implications, it actually involves human rights in that those losing property have already contributed to the economic underdevelopment of the nation and are now to be paid again by removing resources from a subsistence population.

Lastly, the human rights issue needs to be examined within the context of the two dominant world development philosophies, Western democracy and Eastern socialism. Implict in the behalf of those African governments which are proclaiming socialism as a political objective is the fact that Eastern-style socialism is emerging over Western-style democracy as the dominant force behind development efforts. While Western aid programmes continue to attempt social

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transformation through gradual reform, the socialist approach is emerging as an alternative means of development. If socialism becomes the dominant means of development, then the foundations of Western aid programmes, the concept of human rights and individual freedom call for a redefinition within the context of government programmes attempting to establish institutions ensuring the human and political rights of the majority rather than what the elites formerly favoured under Western aid programmes. How the human rights position of US aid programmes, having developed in an advanced, industrialized nation with a highly developed stable political infrastructure, will be redefined for those Third World countries which have declared socialist objectives, are under-developed, agricultural, and with no political infrastructure but which are also condoning violations of individual human rights on the basis of their ultimate objectives, presents a policy dilemma which offers no easy solution.

FOOTNOTES

1. see *Ethiopia and US Treaties*. "Amity and Economic Relations." Treaty, with Exchanges of Notes, between the United States of America and Ethiopia (Washington, DC : US Government Printing Office, 1954).

2. Refer n. 1 "Mutual Defense Assistance." The signing of the Mutual Defence Act Treaty between the US and Ethiopia helped the Imperial government to equip its army with tanks, machine-guns. supersonic jets and modern rifles and weapons. For details, see Robert A. Diamond and David Fouquet, "American Military Aid to Ethiopia and Eritrean Insurgency," *Africa Today*, Vol. 19, Winter 1972, pp. 39–40. US participation in the provision of the necessary arms and the training of military officers had contributed to the political stabilization of the Haile Selassie government until 1974 (For details of US military assistance and its impact on political stabilization see R.K. Baker, "The Ethiopian Army and Political Stability : Prospects and Potentials," *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 6, October 1970, p. 336.

3. For discussions of the initial agreement, see n. 1. "Utilization of Defence Installations within Empire of Ethiopia." Agreement between the United States of America and Ethiopia signed at Washington, May 22, 1953, entered into force May 22, 1953.

4. Robert D. Grey, "Ethiopian Foreign Policy : Internal Constraints and External Determinants." in *Conflict and Cooperation in Eastern Africa : Essays in Foreign Policy*. John Okumn, 1973, p. 20. Grey noted that between 1953 and 1968, over 2,500 military personnel were trained in Ethiopia.

5. Stanely Meisler, "US Forced to be Protective of Ethiopia," *The Los Angeles Times*. September 22, 1971, p. 9.

6. Joseph Kraft, "Letter from Addis Ababa," *The New Yorker*, July 31, 1978, p. 60. On the other hand, David Ottaway reported Ethiopia Rift Tests Washington's View of Africa Change, *The Washington Post*, April 25, 1977, p. A. 31.

7. See Gene Ellis, "Man or Machine, Beast or Burden : A Case Study of the Economics of Agricultural Mechanization in Ada District," unpublished

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Ph.D. dissertation, University of Tennessee, 1972.

    8. See Constance Holden, "Ethiopia : Did Aid Speed an Inevitable Upheaval ?" *Science*, Vol. 27, December 1974, No. 186, p. 1192

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    10. For details of the background causes of the Ethiopian revolution see Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC), *The Ethiopian Revolution* : *First Anniversary of the Ethiopian Revolution*. 1st ed. (Addis Ababa : September 1975), and Ethiopian Revolution Information Centre, *Ethiopia in Revolution* (Addis Ababa : July 1977),

    11. These are summarized in Peter Schwab, "Human Rights in Ethiopia", *Journal of Modern African Studies*, Vol. 14, 1975, pp. 155-60.

    12. *Ibid.* He noted that "the executions were not based on ethnicity or madness, but were a political attempt to neutralize the tremendous power of the landowning class that could be expected to try and destroy socialism as at its very birth. The executions were primitive in that they served as a limited example to those who might be tempted to hinder the socio-economic and political transformation beginning to take place in Ethiopia." (pp. 157-8).

    13. *Ibid*, p. 57.

    14. David B. Ottaway, "U.S. Assists Ethiopia's New Rulers," *The Washington Post*, April 26, 1975, p. A. 12.

    15. Henry Kamm, "U.S. Is Continuing Aid to Ethiopia : Economic and Military Help Go on Despite Concern over Repression and War," *The New York Times*, October 22, 1975. Kamm had noted that "a major American consideration is the effect that a discontinuation or reduction of assistance might have on the American image in other African nations," and "that an American withdrawal from Ethiopia would leave the Soviet Union and China free to vie for dominant influence." p. 11.

    16. See Provisional Military Administrative Council, "Programme of the National Democratic Revolution of Ethiopia," 1976. For a detailed analysis of this programme, refer John W. Harbeson, "Socialist Politics in Revolutionary Ethiopia", paper delivered at the 1976 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, September 1976.

    17. See also David B. Ottaway, "Ethiopia Moves Further Left, " *The Washington Post*, April 22, 1976, p. A. 40. The government also allowed the formation of political parties and promised to assist "all democratic parties who wish to carry on the struggle under the umbrella of the anti-feudal and anti-imperialist objectives." See "Political Parties Due for Ethiopia," *The New York Times*. April 22, 1976, p. 9. A Politbro composed of 15 members was established to facilitate this.

    18. Murrey Marder reported that the US was reluctant to provide an additional $22.6 million in military aid because of the human rights issue. See his "US Ethiopia View Over Past Years Held Shortsighted," *The Washington Post*, August 5, 1976, p. A. 2. Similar views were also expressed by Bernard Weintraub, "US Officials Split on Aid to Ethiopia," *The New York Times*, May 20, 1976, p. 13. Weintraub reported that the US concern at that time was the use of its arms in Eritrea and within Ethiopia against "rebels" and civilians.

    19. See Donald N. Levine, "Recent Developments in Ethiopian Domestic Politics and Their Implications for United States Policy Options," Testimony

prepared for the African Subcommittee on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate, August 4, 1976.

20. For details, refer to Bernard Givertzman. "US Cuts Foreign Aid in Rights Violations ; South Korea Exempt—Security Links Cited—Assistance is Reduced for Argentina, Uruguay, and Ethiopia, Vance Says," *The New York Times*, February 28, 1977, p. A. 2.

21. See Clyde E. Farnsworth, "Linking Aid Plans to Human Rights," *The New York Times*, June 19, 1977. Farnsworth reported that the Harkin Amendment incorporated "a human rights amendment" into a bill requiring the American Director of the Inter-American Development Bank to oppose any loan to countries that "engage in a consistent pattern of gross violation of inter-nationally recognized human rights unless such a loan directly benefits the needy," p. C 3. He also reported that the World Bank's decision to postpone the $24 million project proposal for improving the activities of the Agricultural and Marketing Corporation (which was approved in June 1978) was due to the Bank's disapproval of the human rights issue rather than economic considerations claimed due to the disruption of the Addis Ababa-Djibouti railroad.

22. See "Around the World : Ethiopian Plans to Obtain Arms in East for Peasants," *The Washington Post*. February 12, 1977, p. A. 9 ;

23. Refer to "Cubans and Russians' Involvement in Africa and US and China Roles," *The New York Times*, March 13, 1977, p. 3.

24. This issue had been discussed by Murrey Marder, "Reversal of Once-close Ties to Ethiopia Stirs Regret Here," *The Washington Post*. April 26, 1977, and later by John Darnton, "Shifting Alliances Increasing Tension in the Horn of Africa," *The New York Times*, June 21, 1977.

25. For details see David B. Ottaway, "Ethiopia Closes Four US Offices, Ousts Personnel." *The Washington Post*, April 24, 1977, p. A. 1. and p.A. 12 ; "Ethiopia Shut Down 6 Consulates : US Five Others Ordered to Leave Offices in Eritrea," *The Washington Post*. April, 25 1977 ; John Darnton, "Ethiopian Move Breaking Old Link With US," *The New York Times*, April 25, 1977, p. C. 3 ; and "American Ouster from Ethiopia May Be a Short-lived Soviet Success," *The New York Times*, April 26, 1977.

26. See his "Ethiopia Rift Tests Washington's View of African Change," *The Washington Post*, April 25, 1977, p.A. 21.

27. See USAID, "Ethiopia : Upper Didessa Development," Project No. 663-017-9. Addis Ababa : USAID, June 15, 1976 ; "Ethiopia : Southern Gemou Gofa Area Rehabilitation," Project No. 663-0913, Project. Review Paper, Washington, DC : USAID December 3, 1976; "Project Review Paper : Rural Roads," Project No. 66-0182, Washington, DC : July 14, 1977 ; and "Ethiopia : Institute of Management and Training : Project Review Paper'" Project No. 663-0188. Washington, DC : January 20, 1967.

28. For example, the USAID Mission in Ethiopia has been staffed by some of the best people and such appointments have been referred to as an indication of changes in the reason why the Mission survived from being closed down when other US facilities were terminated in April 1977. Its survival is mainly attributed to the favourable attitudes of officials working in the Addis Ababa office to the changes undertaken by the government.

29. "Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1978," Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House

of Representatives, Ninety-fifth Congress, First Session, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Related Agencies, Part 2, Agency for International Development, Washington, DC : Government Printing Office, 1977.

30. *Ibid.*

31. *Ibid.* p. 68.

32. *Ibid*, p. 62.

33. The most influential book on how aid could be used as a tool to maintain political stability and order and to contain the 'green uprising' has been documented by Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1968).

34. United States Agency for International Development, Ethiopia, "Assistance Strategy for Ethiopia FY 77-78 : Supplement to the Annual Budget Submission for FY 78" (Washington DC, October 15, 1976, p. 1).

35. *Ibid*, see also footnote 27.

36. For a detailed explanation of some of the socio-economic changes in Ethiopia, see Provisional Military Administrative Council, *Declaration on Economic Policy of Socialist Ethiopia* (Addis Ababa : Berhanena Selam Printing Press, 1974) ; "A Proclamation to Provide for the Public Ownership of Rural Lands," Negarit Gazeta, Proclamation No. 31, April 1975 ; "Government Ownership of Urban Lands and Extra Houses Proclamation," Negarit Gazeta, Proclamation No. 47, July 1975 ; "A Proclamation to Provide for the Organization and Consolidation of Peasant Association," Negarit Gazeta, Proclamation No. 71, December 1975 ; and the New Labour Proclamation No. 64 of 1975.

37. For discussion of US economic complicity in human rights violations, see Noam Chomsky and Edward S. Herman, "The United States versus Human Rights in the Third World", *Monthly Review*, Vol. 29, July-August 1977, pp. 22-45.

Evolution of Apartheid

Shanti Sadiq Ali

> *"It is enough that they show us what we have made of them for us to realise what we have made of ourselves".*
>
> —Jean Paul Sartre

R ELIGION, socio-economic and political considerations have greatly influenced the development of the ideology of apartheid in South Africa which has been further buttressed by the growing Western interests in the region—a thoroughly and widely documented fact. In this paper, however, the emphasis is on internal developments and particularly on the role of two major organizations which spurred the White supremacists on to a full-fledged doctrine of apartheid—the Church and the National Party.

From a very early period, a basic factor in the evolution of apartheid has been the 17th century Calvinism of the settlers who had emigrated from Holland. Calvinism has marked overtones of fundamentalism and authoritarianism and has been associated with a rigid concept of Christianity. John Calvin taught that every man is predestined to be saved or to be lost, that those who are saved are God's elect, and that man is regenerated through the influence of God's spirit. The Afrikaners thus came to believe they were divinely chosen, the elect of God, marked for a special destiny. This concept reinforced their sense of racial superiority and separateness and intensified their faith in their mission in South Africa. The medieval notion that the sons of Ham were cursed for being black and degenerate, and which had been preserved by the need for European imperialists to justify slavery and plantation economics, was found to be easily compatible with the South African version of the Calvinist doctrine. By 1857, the races had been separated in the Dutch Reformed Church.[1] With its strong and pervasive influence, the Dutch Reformed Church was however to play a vital role not only in providing the philosophical foundation of apartheid but in throwing up a leadership committed to legitimizing the difference between races and, what is more, the inferiority of non-Whites.

Early Calvinist Influence

Among the early extremists was President Paul Kruger of Transvaal (then the South African Republic), the Constitution of which declared that 'the people is determined to permit no equality between White and Black, in Church or State'. Similarly, the

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backing of the right-wing Afrikaner movement, the Afrikaner Bond, enabled Cecil Rhodes, one of the main advocates of White supremacy, to become Prime Minister of the Cape Colony in 1890. Rhodes, who dreamt of British Imperial domination, from the Cape of Good Hope to the Suez Canal, declared in 1877: "I contend that we (the British) are the first race in the world and that the more of the world we inhabit the better it is for the human race".[2] Among other prominent champions of religious orthodoxy to win positions of influence and authority was Dr. D.F. Malan, under whose leadership in May 1948 the National Party defeated the Union Party Government of Field Marshal J.C. Smuts, marking a watershed in South African history. Since then the alliance between the Nationalists and the Dutch Reformed Church has, if anything, become stronger and from then onwards race relations have also become a major preoccupation of the Nationalists.

Regarded as a focal point in Afrikaner aspirations, the Dutch Reformed Church has also stipulated the growth of several other interest groups and has been particularly responsible for a rigidly controlled educational system under which its influence from the early days had spread steadily. Members of the Church took over most of the primary schools, extending their control to the four Afrikaans-medium universities.[3] The two factors, which have motivated the Church in extending its patronage and support to all these groups, as will be seen, are : first, the Calvinist belief that only Afrikaners, as the elect of God, have the capacity and will to resist the challenge to White supremacy and, second, the Afrikaner desire to avenge their defeat in the Anglo-Boer war which had led to the ascendancy of the British over them.

Calvinist Interest Groups:

i) Broederbond

Perhaps the most significant of these groups is the *Broederbond*, a powerful right-wing Afrikaner secret society. Founded in 1918, it has formed the solid core of Afrikanerdom. In 1944 when the organization came under heavy attack (General J.C. Smuts accusing it of being a 'sort of Gestapo') the Secretary of *Broederbond*, I.M. Lombard, wrote a series of four articles in *Die Transvaler*[4] explaining at length its purpose and organisation for the furtherance of the 'interests' of the Afrikaner nation. On race relations one of the articles stated that there must be "separation of all non-White races in South Africa, leaving them free to independent development under the guardianship of the Whites".

The *Broederbond*, it is widely acknowledged, has contributed greatly to the building up of the power base of the National Party. By 1948 when the Party came to power some 80 per cent of Nationalist Party Members of Parliament were believed to be members of the *Broederbond*, including the leading theoreticians of apartheid, Dr. Malan and Verwoerd. Former Prime Minister Vorster is also known to have been an enthusiast of the *Broederbond*.

Apart from politics, the *Broederbond* has been most active in the field of education. In 1944, Lombard disclosed that approximately one-third of its members were teachers. Infiltration of the civil service by the *Broederbond* led General Smuts to stigmatize it as "a dangerous, cunning, political·fascist organisation of which no civil servant, if he is to retain his loyalty to the State—and the administration—can be allowed to be a member". Significantly, General Smuts was defeated in the 1948 elections by W.C. du Plessis, who resigned from the civil service rather than the *Broederbond*.

ii) *Federation of Afrikaner Cultural Organization*

As a result of the *Broederbond* initiative several other organisations flourished. Important among them was the Federation of Afrikaner Cultural Organization (FAK)[5] established in December 1929. By 1937 it claimed over 300 affiliated organisations, one-third of them language and cultural associations, the rest Church Councils and other Church organisations. Purists represented in FAK challenged the concept that culture 'falls outside politics' by asking, "Is the statesman not called upon to act precisely as the guardian of the nation's heritage ?" Its main pre-occupation however was. with the "economic struggle of the Afrikaner" at a time when the bulk of interests in finance, mining,. industry and commerce were in the hands of the British and Jewish magnates and it accepted that "the close association of cultural and economic development is unmistakable". By 1952, apart from "Afrikanization" FAK was exhorting the Afrikaner to 'fight Communism, and help our own factory workers in their fight against it'.

iii) *Christian National Education*

Another significant association was the Christian National Education, established originally to counteract the potential anglicizing of Afrikaner children, particularly after the Anglo-Boer War when there was a deliberate policy by the British administration to make English the medium of instruction in the State schools in the Transvaal and Orange Free State. As a reaction to this it began promoting

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a narrow sectional educational policy. The Calvinist emphasis on the superiority of the Christian doctrine was also maintained to differentiate between Blacks and Whites. The CNE's basic document in 1948 stressed that any system of education for the 'Native' should follow the three principles of "guardianship, no levelling, and segregation". In accordance with these principles, 'Native' education should be based on 'the life and worldview of the European, more particularly, that of the Boer nation as the senior European guardian of the Native'.[6] At the same time, the document declared that non-European education should not be financed at the cost of European education, When a controversy raged in 1949-50 over the CNE policy statement the Nationalist press and *Die Kerkbode*, organ of the Dutch Reformed Church, expressed their support for it.

South African Bureau of Racial Affairs

However, it was left to the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs, SABRA, set up in 1947, to study race questions in the light of Afrikaner thought and policy, to mount pressures on the Nationalist Government to accept the doctrine of total territorial apartheid as interpreted by it and endorsed by the Dutch Reformed Church. The genesis of the group was at Stellenbosch, the oldest Afrikaans medium university. Among its founders were H.F. Verwoerd and W.W. Eiselen,[7] Professor of Social Anthropology. The latter maintained that "White South Africa is numerically not strong enough to absorb and can therefore only choose between being absorbed or surviving by maintenance of separate communities". SABRA's main thesis was that total territorial separation between Europeans and non-Europeans must be systematically organized as quickly as possible. Realising the difficulties of persuading European farmers to sell 3 million morgen of their land (a morgen is equal to 2.1 acres) needed to complete the 18 million provided for by the Native Trust and Land Act 1936 to achieve geographical separation, SABRA advocated that the British High Commission Territories (Lesotho, Botswana and Swaziland) be incorporated into South Africa and joined with the 'Native' Reserves. This would enable the 9 to 10 million Africans to return to them and from there they could migrate, as and when necessary, to European areas to perform the tasks dictated by the latter's needs.[8] However, the findings of the Government-appointed Tomlinson Commission[9] in 1954, while favouring separate development, rejected the proposal for total apartheid as impractical. This conclusion was accepted by Malan, the then Prime Minister.

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From the above it is clear that the legitimizing organs of Calvinist thought in South Africa have been the Church, cultural bodies and educational institutions. Inherently authoritarian, the Dutch Reformed Church had equally clear-cut views about Government and politics. The Fundamental Principles of Calvinist political science issued by the NGK, the largest of the three churches, following its meeting in Bloemfontain in May 1951, emphasised that the authority of the government within the state is not only 'God-derived' but also 'indivisible'. No less significant is the access the National Party had to these interest groups.

Calvinist Influence in Economic Sphere

In the economic sphere the same 17th century Calvinist belief and outlook, embodied in the Dutch Reformed Church, reinforced the early Boers' conviction that the non-white inhabitants of South Africa had no natural rights or title to the land the Whites were progressively usurping.[10] Added to this outlook was the well-known fact that the early settlers were reluctant to do any hard work. All manual work was regarded as "Kaffir work" and socially degrading. The settlers thus laid the foundations of a society of White masters and Black servants in which the latter had no right to appeal against the former and which was the very essence of the slave system.[11] It was in the same spirit that the early Trek-Boers (frontiersmen) hunted down the Bushmen and overran the Hottentots.[12]

By 1836 had begun the Great Trek which was responsible for the establishment of the Transvaal (South African Republic) and Orange Free State Republics in both of which the constitutions declared that citizens should be "all White". The Trek was in itself a reaction partly to the abolition of salavery throughout the British Empire in 1833—Piet Retief's Manifesto of 1837 clearly stated that the Boers "should adopt such regulations as will maintain the proper relationship between master and servant"—and partly to the fact that the Cape Colony was no longer capable of providing 6,000-acre farms on a rent of 50 shillings as demanded by each individual. In brief, land was the first objective of the Boers and plentiful and cheap labour supply the second. As a result, the Bantu people were eventually left with less than 13 per cent or one-eighth of the Union's total area and with no option but to serve the European community virtually as serfs.

Indeed, once assured of cheap labour supply, the Whites immediately introduced social, economic and physical barriers to safeguard their interests. For instance, the *Plakkers Wet* or Squatters Law of

Natal and the Transvaal under which not more than five African
families were to be permitted on a farm was enacted.

Racial Issues in Cape Colony

Even in the Cape Colony, which came under British rule in
January 1806, conditions were hardly better. Here registration of
service contracts marked the beginning of the masters' and servants'
legislation of 1842, and in order to increase labour supply, the Hott-
entot Code of 1809 became in effect the first pass law. By insisting
that Africans should find "a fixed place of abode", their dependence
on White farmers was increased, while their right to land was with-
held and a certificate or 'pass' was necessary for their movement
under this law. Further, any infringement of it brought the Blacks
under the vagrancy laws. Both the vagrancy and pass laws put the
Blacks at the mercy of White farmers who generally administered
them as if the former were criminals.

Worse still was the law of 1812 which "apprenticed" for 10
years children of Blacks who had been maintained till the age of
eight by their parents' masters.[13] In effect it was intended, as was
the outrageous Natal Act No. 2 of 1902 which applied the indenture
rules to Indian minors[14], to establish hereditary serfdom. Indeed,
this deep-seated prejudice was obvious in Cecil Rhodes' "Native Bill
for Africa" on which the dream of separation was based and which
was meant to increasingly draw the Africans under the economic sub-
servience of the Whites.[15] In this way a landless class was delibera-
tely formed with no option but to sell their labour to the Whites, as
Rhodes had intended. And, in order to preserve the Cape fran-
chise position, individual holdings of Africans under this Act were
regarded as communal so that they were unable to qualify as voters.

Race Issues in Politics

It was no coincidence that Rhodes had by then acquired valua-
ble interests in diamond as well as gold mines and that the White
diggers had succeeded in getting exclusive licences to mine and deal
in these minerals. Indeed, the discovery of gold in 1866 in the Trans-
vaal,[16] even more than that of the considerable diamond deposits
found earlier in the Orange Free State, transformed not only the
South African economy but also its political future. With an eye on
gold, British interests sought in 1896 by force to overthrow Afrikaner
rule in the Transvaal.[17] This triggered off the second Anglo-Boer
War, 1899-1902, spelling ruin for thousands of Afrikaners and signi-
fying the ascendancy of the British. As a consequence the Afrikaners

found themselves competing with Africans for jobs in the lower rungs of industry, the mines and the civil services. They realized that the economic challenge to them no longer came only from the English; the African was also a factor to reckon with. None the less, the newly formed National Party underlined its ultimate goal by advocating that "the Afrikaners should be *baas* (boss) everywhere in South Africa". Already the Afrikaners under the leadership of General J.B.M. Hertzog had extracted their pound of flesh as the price for White unity; the old trekker principle that there should be no equality between Whites and Blacks had survived after the Union as a complete colour bar. This exclusion of Africans from all skilled or semi-skilled jobs was reinforced by the Mines and Works Act passed in 1911.[18] Moreover, under the South Africa Act of 1909, only a limited franchise was retained for the coloureds and Africans. Asians had no parliamentary representation. The South Africa Act had also vested the control and administration of 'Native' affairs in the Governor-General-in-Council. Thus, from the Union's very inception the administration of every aspect of the lives of what was then three-quarters of its population was reserved and separated from the ordinary processes of democratic government. And, by 1913, the Native Land Act had laid down the principle of land segregation for Africans throughout the Union.

It was however in the 1920s and 1930s that more rigorous racial policies were initiated. During the 15 years from 1924 to 1939 Hertzog as Prime Minister of South Africa worked, on the one hand, for the equality of the Afrikaner with the English-speaking South Africans[19] and, on the other, to recast the apartheid laws designed to protect White labour against African competition.

The Native Urban Areas Act of 1923 had already made urban Africans virtually perpetual migrants. They had been segregated in towns, their influx limited and their movement controlled. The following year, under the Industrial Conciliation Act, Africans were deprived of membership of recognised trade unions. Their own unions received no official recognition, while the Masters and Servants Act had made strikes by Africans a criminal offence.

These restrictive acts of legislation were followed by policies of even greater racial segregation—the forerunner of the current apartheid policies. Thus the Native Taxation and Development Act of 1925 was passed to pressurise the Africans to provide cheap labour in agriculture, mining and manufacture, by imposing a poll tax on all African males between the ages of 18 and 65 and a tax of 10 shillings

on every male occupier of a hut in the reserves, thus forcing them to leave the reserves. The 1926 Mines and Works Amendment Act, or the Colour Bar Act, tried to close the loopholes in the original Act of 1911 by specifically prohibiting Africans and Asians from obtaining certificates of competency. It thus extended the White monopoly already existing in the mines to new skilled and semi-skilled jobs then being created by the giant government-sponsored iron and steel industry. To curb African trade union activity further the Native Administration Act of 1927 authorized the Governor-General to govern all African areas by proclamation, gave sweeping powers of banning and punishment and of control of meetings. By 1936 African voting rights had been removed and by 1959 their limited right to elect White representatives was also taken away. The Native Trust and Land Act of 1936 also gave powers to eliminate squatters and to allow as labour tenants only those who would work at least half the year for the White farmer.

Nationalists Come to Power

The war in the meanwhile brought suffering on the Black workers who gave vent to their frustrations in a series of strikes in 1942-1944. It was against this background of widespread economic and social unrest and growing African militancy that the 1948 elections were fought. Dr. Malan's Government succeeded in capturing power by exploiting the "apartheid" slogan coined by its true apostles in the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (SABRA) and the most powerful Dutch Reformed Church, the NGK.[20]

The following principles were enunciated :

"In general terms our policy envisages segregating the most important ethnic groups and sub-groups in their own areas where every group will be enabled to develop into a self-sufficient unit.

"We endorse the general principle of territorial segregation of the Bantu and the Whites...

"The Bantu in the urban areas should be regarded as migratory citizens not entitled to political or social rights equal to those of the Whites. The process of detribalization should be arrested...

"The interests and employment prospects of the White workers in White Areas will be protected."[21]

The Nationalist appeal during this crucial campaign was directed towards the urban Afrikaner worker in mines, industry and commerce, who has always been aware of the potential pressure of non-European competition, and to the Afrikaner in rural areas where the influence of the local Dutch Reformed Church, indoctrinated school-teachers and other Church associations, has remained

dominant. The backbone of the Party since its inception has been the conservative Afrikaner—the teacher, worker, clergyman, farmer and professional man. The Nationalist success stemmed in equal measure from the single-mindedness of purpose the Party showed in its efforts to achieve its stated goal of apartheid. This impression of cohesion[22] was largely due to the fact that the same personalities belong to or control nearly all the key Afrikaner organisations—the most comprehensive being the Dutch Reformed Church and the National Party. Against this, the weakness of the less illiberal groups, such as the United Party, in the coalition of White interests which ruled, further ensured that there was no opposition to the implementation of apartheid. As in the past, on the question of race relations the English-speaking Whites and Afrikaners differed only slightly ; both were committed to the maintenance of White supremacy and advocated essentially segregationist policies ; neither disapproved of discrimination on grounds of colour. And, as far as the Africans were concerned, some hope had been kindled during the war years in the reactivisation of African political and trade union movements. But these were soon to be outlawed by scores of draconian judicial and administrative measures to make effective legal opposition impossible.

Theoretical Justification of Apartheid

After 1958, when Dr. Verwoerd, the leading theorist of apartheid, came to the helm of affairs, the Nationalist Government devoted its energies even more feverishly to the task of protecting White interests and Baaksap (domination). The traditional National Party doctrine which had so far been clear-cut, namely, to achieve total social and political separation between the Whites and non-Whites, became more devious under Verwoerd who sought to provide a theoretical justification for apartheid. This more sophisticated embellishment of Afrikaner doctrine was formulated as separate development, an euphemism for apartheid which has by now become a dirty word in international parlance, based on :

(1) African self-development in separate client-states, the Bantu 'homelands' or Bantustans, as they have been labelled.

(2) The establishment of White industries on the borders of the Bantustans to draw labour from them.

(3) The clearance of all the smaller African residential areas ('Black spots') within the White-designated areas and the consolidation of African populations in the Bantustans.

(4) Reduction of the numbers of Africans living in (White)

urban areas.

(5) Complete segregation—in all possible aspects—of Whites
and non-Whites wherever non-Whites are still required in White areas.

Apartheid in Practice

It is not possible to list the mass of racial and repressive legisla--
tion enacted in the last two decades by the Whites to strengthen their
own position and separate the races, as intended by Verwoerd and,.
later, by his protege, Vorster, but a few would suffice to illustrate how
hardly any aspect of social and economic life has been left out. The
main props of apartheid have been provided by the Group Areas
Act[23] which denies non-Europeans permanent residence rights in the
greater part of the country ; by restrictive legislation concerning land
tenure[24] ; by pass laws[25] ; by laws affecting marriage and other
relationships;[26] by laws ensuring the control of African development
by Whites and devising educational institutions for the African which
are as distinctively inferior as possible from those of Europeans ;[27] by
differential laws in industry prohibiting all parties and trade unions
from allowing members of different races to organize in one body,
denying to Africans the right to strike and reserving skilled jobs for
Whites ;[28] and by a host of measures radically curtailing the basic
human freedoms for non-Whites.[29] The meagre indirect representa-
tion of Africans by three Whites in the Central Parliament was ended
by the promulgation of the Bantu Self-Government Act of 1959. By
the 1970s the Nationalists were speeding up their Bantustan pro-
gramme insisting that South Africa was now ten nations, one White
and nine Black, and offering each of them a spurious and separate
independence. Thus the Bantu Homelands Citizenship Act of 1970,
amended in 1977, makes all Africans citizens of an ethnically
demarcated and fragmented reserve and deprives them of all civic and
political rights in White-designated areas. The Transkei and
Bophutswana have since been granted 'independence' but in the
former the entire leadership of the Transkei Democratic Party, which
opposed independence, is under detention. There is ample material
to prove that these client states will continue to be critically dependent
on White South Africa and that this "balkanisation of apartheid"
represents the most blatant form of neo-colonialism adopted to serve
the exclusive interests of the Whites and their overseas supporters.

It is thus clear that the White supremacists will not give up the
main heights they now command without an intense struggle especial-
ly when they have acquired an enormous stake in the vast wealth of
the country. For the same reason, more action can be expected from

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them to remove or alleviate racial humiliation at levels which are not indispensable to the functioning of the system. The regime perhaps hopes in this way to gain black collaboration or acquiescence inside and general support outside South Africa for its more fundamental purposes.

For the moment the National Party is in the hands of the "ultras"—the *Verkramptes*—led by the present Prime Minister, Botha, who ousted Vorster. This means that there is little hope in the near future of the yawning chasm between the two forces in South Africa being narrowed. And despite Pretoria's attempts to deceive the world, the growing black unemployment is likely to intensify the unrest in the country.[30] As for the impoverished homelands, they are not the oases of tranquility the ruling clique would make them out to be. The puppet leaders are already in conflict with the Whites over what they consider are the trappings of independence.[31] Indeed, current events in South Africa belie the earlier assumption that there may be a meaningful change in its racist policies. Today the speculation is whether or not the crisis looming on the horizon can be managed.

FOOTNOTES

1. Though it is common to speak of the Dutch Reformed Church, there are in fact three such churches, differentiated by their interpretation of Calvinism. The largest is the *Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk* (NGK) organised in 4 provincial, self-governing units coordinated by a federal council. Slightly less illiberal in approach is the *Nederuits Hervormde Kerk*, established in the Transvaal in 1858 to take care of the Trekkers with whom the parent church at the Cape had lost touch until 1866. The third and the smallest of the Dutch Reformed Churches—the *Gereformeerde Kerk*—is the most fundamentalist. It was formed in 1859 as a conscious breakaway from the parent church in the Cape, and is situated at Potchefstroom, the official centre for Christian National Education in the Transvaal. A high proportion of its members go into education.

2. K.L. Roskam, *Apartheid and Racial Discrimination*. A.W. Sythoff, Leyden, 1960, p. 84.

3. These are Stellenbosch, Pretoria, Orange Free State (Bloemfontein) and Potschefstroom. No non-Europeans are allowed as staff or students in these universities. Moreover, since 1933 the Afrikaner universities have disaffiliated themselves from the National Union of South African Students, NUSAS, to join a new and separate organisation, *Die Afrikaanse Studentebond* (the Afrikaner Student Bond), which refused to participate in conferences with the NUSAS, now banned, as long as the English-speaking universities chose non-Europeans as their representatives.

4. *Die Transvaler*, December 12, 20 and 30, 1944, and January 3, 1945. See, Gwendolen M. Carter, *The Politics of Inequality : South Africa Since 1948*. Praeger, New York, 1959.

5. *Federasie Van Afrikaanse Kultuurverenigs*

6. Dr. Hendrik Verwoerd, who was the main architect of the apartheid structure, went a step further when, during the debate on the Bantu Education Bill in 1963, he declared, "The Bantu must be guided to serve his own community in all respects. There is no place for him in the European community above the level of certain forms of labour".

7. Dr. W.W. Eiselen did the most significant early thinking on 'total apartheid'. Speaking at the Witwatersrand People's Forum in 1948 he argued that the non-European cannot develop fully as long as he has to conform to European South African standards and conditions. "Apartheid is necessary not because the Native is of lesser potential value than the White but because he is of another kind or sort (*Anderssortig*) and because, under a cooperative system, neither the one nor the other can follow his own nature and fully enjoy the wealth of his own culture". Gwendolen M. Carter, *The Politics of Inequality—South Africa Since 1948*. Praeger, New York, p. 267.

8. By advocating that the division of land between Europeans and Blacks be treated as a 'Southern African problem' SABRA obviously included Rhodesia and Zambia further north in its plans.

9. The report of a 1954 Government commission which called for the development of the Reserve in order to make apartheid workable. The Government has not spent the money the report called for, nor has it followed its recommendations to allow African freehold tenure and white entrepreneurship in the Reserves. See Freda Troup, *South Africa : An Historical Introduction.* Penguin Books. pp. 320-323.

10. Writing of the settlers in the 18th century, General Janssen said, "They describe themselves as human and Christians, and the Kaffirs and Hottentots as Heathens; and by behaving in this way they permit themselves everything". Quoted by Collin Legum in *Africa Handbook*. Penguin Books, 1969. p. 483.

11. The Masters and Servants Act was passed in 1842.

12. The descendants of slaves and Hottentots, with their admixture of European blood, merged to form the Cape Coloureds.

13. The same system in the Transvaal compelled the British High Commissioner in 1866 to lodge a complaint with President Pretorius. He wrote, "I am informed native children and youths, called orphans, or perhaps made so by the murder of their parents, can be resitered as apprentices for a term of 21 years, and can during that term be sold as a marketable commodity. I must plainly state that such arrangements, no matter under what name they may be disguised, can only be regarded as sanctioning practical slavery, and as being therefore the greatest violation of one of the most important stipulations of the convention between the Government and that of Her Majesty". Eugene P. Dvorin, *Racial Separation in South Africa*, University of Chicago Press.

14. The Act stated, "Every Indian child to whom the Act applies shall upon attaining the age of majority (13 for girls and 16 for boys) be obliged : (a) to go to India or (b) to remain in Natal under indenture similar to and renewable in the same manner as the reindenture referred to in Act No. 17, 1895, as amended by subsequent Act, or (c) to take out year by year, in terms of Section 6 of Act No. 17, 1895, a pass to a licence to remain in the colony". Life for Indian minors was made increasingly insecure by Act No. 39 of 1905 which increased the penalties on employers who hired unlicensed Indians. The attitude of Lord Curzon's Government in India was even less helpful. It stated

that "as the new legislation gave only an extended application they had no objection to offer".

15. The Glen Grey Act of 1894, or 'Native Bill for Africa', as Rhodes called it, was supposed to give Africans a possible "home" base on the land, by introducing a slogan of "one man, one lot". However the size of lots—a maximum of 4 morgen against the 55 morgen plot earlier recommended—was wholly inadequate for economic farming. The rigid prohibition on sales and transfers prevented the farmer from increasing his holding. Further a 10 shilling labour tax was imposed, but withdrawn 10 years later. K.L. Roskam, *Apartheid and Racial Discrimination.* A.W. Sythoff, Leydon, 1960.

16. The total area of gold-bearing deposits in South Africa is about 170 miles by 100 miles—greater in extent than any other gold field. The Transvaal, which had been almost bankrupt in 1877, had a revenue of £ 1½ million five years later and by 1896 gold formed 96 per cent of its exports. Freda Troup, *South Africa: An Historical Introduction.* Penguin Books, London, 1975, pp. 160-161.

17. The ill-fated Jameson Raid, an invasion of the Transvaal by a private British force.

18. The exclusion of Africans from all skilled or semi-skilled jobs had its origin in the gold fields of the Witwatersrand. A mining regulation was introduced by the Transvaal Government stipulating that blasting operations underground could only be performed by a qualified White person. As the power of the Miners Union increased, this prohibition was extended to other classes of skilled work as a protection for the employment of the more highly-paid White labour. This was the position at the time of the Union. During World War I when a large number of Whites enlisted for active service some latitude was permitted to enable non-Whites to do semi-skilled work but later the attempt of White miners to go back to the *status quo ante* was one of the contributory causes of the great upheaval of the Witwatersrand in 1922. When the legality of the colour bar regulation was declared *ultra vires*, the Government introduced the Colour Bar Bill in 1924 legalising the old Transvaal colour bar regulation. It was finally put on the Statute Book by a joint sitting of both Houses in accordance with the provisions of the South Africa Act, 1926.

19. According to Freda Troup, "In comparison to the well-to-do English-speaking Whites some 30 to 50 per cent of Afrikaners in the 1920s remained in, or close to, the category of 'poor' Whites and in the 1930s the problem had still not been solved. By 1945, it was pointed out, there was only one Afrikaner company with a capital of £ 1 million while on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange alone, 116 companies where quoted with at least that capitalization." Freda Troup, *South Africa : An Historical Introduction.* Penguin Books, London. 1975.

20. The Dutch Reformed Church issued a guideline on relations between the State and the Church soon after the Nationalists took office. It asserted : "The State had been created by God and exists independently of its citizens, its authority over the individual being ordained by God. It is distinguished from other creations by possessing a monopoly of might, and its duty is to organise this power by means of a police force and army".—Fundamental Principles of Calvinist Political Science NGK (1951) summarized by Leo Marguard in *The Peoples and Policies of South Africa* and quoted by Freda Troup in *South Africa: An Historical Introduction.* Penguin Books, p. 291.

21. The Race Relations policy of the National Party, issued. by its Head Office and quoted by D.W. Kruger, *South African Parties and Policies*. Bowes & Bowes, London, 1960.

22. Since then there have been differences between the *verligte* (enlightened) and the *verkrampte* (narrow-minded) groups within the Party on race matters and particularly on relations with independent African countries.

23. The Group Areas Act, No. 41 of 1950, as amended and consolidated by the Group Areas Act, 1957.

24. The Native Land Act, No. 27 of 1913; Native (Urban Areas Consolidation) Act, No. 25 of 1945, and Amendment Act, 1956.

25. The Natives (Abolition of Passes and Coordination of Documents) Act, No. 62 of 1952.

26. The Prohibition of Mixed Marriages Act, No. 55 of 1949; The Immorality Act, No. 23 of 1957, Sec. 16.

27. This refers to separate education through the vernacular medium for Africans at school level and separate higher education. The Bantu Education Act, 1953; the Extension of University Act, 1959.

28. The Prohibition of Improper Interference Act, 1968; Native Labour (Settlement of Disputes Act), No. 48 of 1953, Sec. 18; Native Building Workers Act, No. 27 of 1951, Sec. 15; Industrial Concilation Act, No. 28 of 1956, Sec. 77.

29. The Suppression of Communism Act (1950); Terrorism Act, General Laws Amendment Act or BOSS, 1969; Internal Security Act of 1976; Riotous Assemblies Act amended in 1974, as also Affected Organizations Act. These laws permit punishment without due judicial process in addition to extracting confessions of alleged criminal activity, especially membership of banned organisations or aiding and abetting suspected opponents. See *Political Imprisonment in South Africa*, An Amnesty International Report. Russell Press, England, 1978.

30. Black unemployment is now in the region of two million, or 20 per cent of the economically ac'ive African population, while the so-called homelands absorb only 10 per cent of the additional African labour force.

31. The Bantustan leaders have challenged the 1936 Bantu Trust and Land Act which provides them with only 13 per cent of the total land, and that too fragmented, and are demanding that economic viability and consolidation should be a criterion for the Bantustans. They are insisting that the Whites living there should owe allegiance to the Black government and that foreign financial assistance for the Bantustans must be made directly and not controlled by Pretoria. Moreover, they want to use the instrument of apartheid, the Bantu Councils, to abolish apartheid among themselves by forming a Federation of "One Black Nation".

Banking and Socialism in Tanzania
Chandra Pal Singh

TANZANIA is one of the 20 least developed countries of the world as defined by the UN General Assembly. A large part of the country is infertile, and a large majority of its people are still living below the subsistence level. Yet the progress Tanzania has made, especially the way it has made it, has attracted worldwide attention. The Tanzanian model of development has become a new paradigm which is unusual and unique in many ways.[1] Tanzania's genuine attempt to give effect to a mix of traditional and modern, socialist and democratic principles, accompanied by rare austerity and pragmatism, has set an example for other developing countries of the world. Within a span of 15 years of independence, Tanzania has firmly moved from an ex-colonial capitalist economy, with its attendant evils, towards self-reliance and socialism. Banking has played a key role in both the periods, as also other financial institutions, whether they served exploitation or development. The following discussion examines this institution in the Tanzanian context, tracing the historic processes of economic and political growth and the geographic extension of banking in the country.

I. The Inheritance

Tanzania came into existence with the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar on 24 April 1964. Tanganyika had attained independence of Britain in December 1961 and Zanzibar two years later. The new leaders of Tanzania inherited 886,229 square kilometres of an area with a very uneven geographical distribution of population. Its economy and financial institutions were geared to serve the metropolitan country, Britain, and international capitalism. The dual economy, subsistence economy in the vast rural areas and a capitalist economy in the urban centres, with its links with western capitalism, ensured Tanzania's dependence on the outside world. Internally, this system had underdeveloped the country and had "a deleterious psychological effect...including a lack of self-confidence, motivation and innovative consciousness as well as the destruction of the people's culture and history"[2].

The average density of population of 13.7 persons per square kilometre gives a misleading impression of sufficient land resources for all in Tanzania. But the fact is that two-thirds of the population of more than 12 million (according to the 1967 census) was concentrated in one-tenth of the area[3], indicating serious regional

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disparities. The population was concentrated along the coastal periphery, in the rainy highlands of the south, around Mount Kilimanjaro and Mount Meru, and along the shores of Lake Victoria. This was largely due to a lack of permanent water supply and presence of the tsetse fly, which had rendered large tracts of land inhospitable. Consequently, the cultivable land was small, only 5.3 per cent of the total land area, of which plantation agriculture (European and Asian owned) accounted for 0.7 per cent and African smallholder farming for 4.6 per cent.[4] Mineral production, mainly of diamonds, gold, mica and salt, contributed very little to the country's national wealth.

The Traditional Socio-economic System

Before its systematic European colonization, Tanzania had a typical African subsistence economy of various socio-cultural groupings, known frequently as 'tribes'. The main characteristic of the economy was the village community as a dominant productive system.[5] This system was disturbed during the colonial times. Reference to it is pertinent here in view of the fact that the post-independence policies of Tanzania are a mix of the traditional village community pattern and its system of production and modern technology and the financial systems. The members of these communities were small peasant cultivators whose independence was regulated by their mutual relationships as members of a community, by the need to safeguard common land for common needs. Membership of the community was a precondition for the appropriation of land, but in their capacity as members of the community, the individuals could consider the allotment of land to them as their own as long as they continued to occupy it beneficially. Security of tenure was, in this way, guaranteed.[6] This system enabled every individual to have land for livelihood in a given socio-cultural group, but at the same time the land belonged to the group of which he was a member. Thus the individual was strictly prohibited from individual alienation of land over which he had specific but never absolute rights. Owing to the unlimited supply of land he was given another piece of land to cultivate, leading to shifting cultivation in many parts of the country.

Under this system there was no labour class as the peasant himself worked on his farm. The traditional economy had no market for labour, consequently labour was not treated as a commodity or allocated on the basis of the highest bidder. There was also very little market exchange as there was generally little surplus

beyond the needs of the individual and his family. Even with this apparent simplicity, it was altogether a complicated society, in which land was available to all through kinship, chiefs, etc., and labour was appropriated through normal kinship and friendship reciprocity, for instance, at the time of harvest or clearing of land.

Within the village communities there were two modes co-existing with each other: (a) the pastoral in the drier areas of the country necessitating constant movements in search of water and grass; and (b) the banana culture of the present-day West Lake, Kilimanjaro and Usumbura regions where a more settled, perennial culture emerged, leading to social differentiation based on land-holding. There was still another mode of production, that of artisans and traders who traded in the exchange of regional economy.

The Colonial Economy

Colonization of Tanzania by Germany (1884-1918) and later by Britain (1919-1961) superimposed alien economic systems on the traditional economy of the country. Nevertheless, it was not strictly an intermixture of the two economic and social systems on equal terms. But the subjected people, their economy and social systems became subservient and peripheral to the colonial metropolis located thousands of miles away in Western Europe. A parallel, but much stronger economy, based on plantation farming and export of raw materials assisted by political power, came into existence.

Systematically the traditional economy was undermined and people in rural areas were forced to work on European plantations, providing the latter with cheap labour. The result was that the native population was interspersed, sometimes to distant parts of the country from their homelands. In places like Kilimanjaro and Meru, which have some of the most fertile land in the country, the land of the local people was alienated and they were displaced further up the mountains between the alienated land and the Forest Reserve.[7] The owners expected a great rush to the plantations soon after their establishment. But the security the 'tribal' system offered was more attractive for the Africans than the money income from the planta-tions. The administration, especially during the German period, resorted to forced labour to increase labour supply on the plantations. Other measures, like the hut tax to "oblige Africans to accept paid labour and accustom themselves to European administrative discip-line"[8] and preferential tariff for the benefit of European planters, were also employed. The overall effect was displacement of people from their village communities to plantations, giving rise to a system of migratory labour.

The benefits of working on plantations were very limited for the Africans. There was no development of native productive factors like African capital, entrepreneurship and management. Thus the resource-use was determined by and utilized for the foreigners and all investment opportunities complemented metropolitan economies. The foreign ownership of plantations ensured outflow of money in the form of interest payments to financiers in the metropolitan capitals and dividends to shareholders. African labour, on the other hand, was paid low wages due to the colonial concept of the inherent lack of capacity of the Africans to improve their well-being.

Then again, introduction of cash crops—sisal, coffee and tea—and a labour market in some traditional communities brought about profound changes in the African traditional economy and society. Commercial farming by peasants introduced class differences, disintegration of the communal system of land tenure, and created an embryonic African merchant class. Most of the businesses, however, continued to be owned and operated by Europeans and Asians. The African, "through a variety of laws and regulations, was relegated to the position of a very low turn-over retailer and itinerent trader."[9]

European colonization through the system of indirect rule also created an auxiliary class of privileged people who exploited the peasants. Chiefs occupied the best lands available to the African people. They were also given other privileges, such as high official salaries, more frequent agricultural assistance, and a preferential treatment in trade.

Thus emerged a social stratification in the country which did not cut across racial boundaries but coincided with them. The rural and urban European, engaged in plantations, trade and industry, and the British bureaucrats formed the top stratum of society. Next were the Asians because of their financial strength in commerce, industry and agriculture, The Africans, "stripped of power, prestige and status, debarred from acquiring wealth, remained at the bottom of the ladder, constantly serving the interests of the ruling elite and merchant class".[10] In this way, a complicated economic and social system had developed during the colonial period in which the 'tribal', plantations and associated class structure, native commercial farming with the more powerful and affluent chiefs, and commerce and industry in which the Africans participated as minor functionaries confined to inferior positions, and segregation on racial lines in housing in the cities, had all got enmeshed. The loser always was the African.

Banking in the Colonial Period

The plantations and associated export-import trade, mainly with

Britain, could not be carried out without financial institutions like banking, insurance and transport companies etc. It was in the early part of the 19th century that development of export crops began the process of linking the previously subsistence economy of the country with international markets in primary commodities. To assist in the operations of external trade banks were established in East Africa. These banks provided credit, on the basis of funds derived from their London connections, to finance the collection and distribution of imports of consumer goods.[11] The banks and the financial intermediaries ensured a long chain of financial activities ranging from the purchase of raw materials from the cultivators to their sale in the international markets.

The origins of commercial banking in Tanzania lie in the trade between India and East Africa.[12] Some of the banks even adopted Indian names, such as the National Bank of India, but they were in fact British banks based in London which operated in India and East Africa concentrating on financing external trade. Similar was the role of the Standard Bank of South Africa, now Standard Bank, which, in spite of its name, was a British bank based in London. It had developed considerable banking business in what is now the Republic of South Africa, before extending its business activities in the East African countries. Another major British bank to extend operations in present-day Tanzania is the Barclays Bank. It was only in the 1950's that other banks, operating from bases other than London, came into existence, coupling the Tanzanian and East African economies with international capitalism.[13]

While financing the external trade, the colonial banks in Tanzania started underdeveloping the country. With the increase in commerce and trade in raw materials, they extended their operations to deposit banking. The outstanding "characteristic of this phase of their development was that they were soon able to collect deposits locally in excess of what they could utilize in the East African countries and these *surplus funds they invested in London*. The result was that, for a long period of their history, these banks were *actually involved in a process of exporting capital from the underdeveloped countries of East Africa for use in a developed country*."[14] With the "standards of absolute integrity and incorruptibility"[15] prevailing in these banks the colonialists systematically plundered and impoverished the country. The banks were "extensions of the financial system in the United Kingdom and the credit base of the system is in the London market just as the credit base of the United Kingdom banking system is in the London market".[16]

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The Currency Board mechanism, in which the banks were also involved, was yet another way of dominating the country. The Tanzanian currency supply, together with those of Kenya and Uganda, was under the control of the central monetary authority, the East African Currency Board.[17] Under this system, the *shilling* used by the Board was freely convertible at a fixed rate of exchange with Sterling. The Board itself was based in London and the issue was generally by 100 per cent (or over) Sterling reserves, contributed largely out of the country's export earnings In this system the colony was a loser as it could control neither its external resources nor the credit policies of its commercial banks and other financial institutions.

II. Independence, Social Objectives And Banking

It was against this background that the independence struggle of Tanzania was waged, resulting in the independence of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, and later their merger in Tanzania. Nevertheless, political independence did not necessarily mean economic independence. The 'independent' nation was still the periphery of international capitalism, and of Britain in particular. The foremost objective before the leaders of the new nation was therefore to restructure the inherited economy and to redress its rigid dependence upon the outside world. A national debate followed on how to bring about economic development and an equitable distribution of wealth among the people. The result was a novel package of policies and a plan of action; stress was laid on rural development, *ujamma* villages and co-operative farming, and self-reliance. The intent of these policies was expressed in the Arusha Declaration,[18] and later in the Second Five-Year Plan.

The importance of the Arusha Declaration lies in its offering an ideology to build a socialist society in Tanzania, and in its expression of the realization that a nation not having money resources of its own for development and borrowing money from abroad would jeopardize its economic independence. More often than not, newly independent countries opt for industrialization as a panacea for all their problems. But Tanzania abandoned industrialization in the initial stage of development. The Declaration criticized industrialization:

> The mistake we are making is to think that development begins with industries. It is a mistake as we do not have the means to establish many modern industries in our country. We do not either have necessary finances or the technical know-how...even if we could get the necessary assistance, dependence on it could interfere with our Socialism[19].

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The Declaration further highlighted the inadequacy of urban development. A new plan for rural development was put forward. Under the title "Let Us Pay Heed to the Peasant" the rural-urban imbalances were outlined:

> We must not forget that people who live in towns can possibly become exploiters of those who live in rural areas. All our big hospitals are in the towns and they benefit only a small section (of population)...Tarmac roads, too, are mostly found in towns and are of special value to motor-car owners...Again, electric lights, water pipes, hotels and other aspects of modern development are mostly found in towns. Most of them have been built with loans, and most of them do not benefit the farmer directly, although they will be paid for by the foreign exchange earned by the sale of his produce .[20]

The Arusha Declaration, thus, minced no words and examined candidly the problems of the country—rural under-development, reliance on foreign capital, unequal distribution of wealth, and hold of foreigners on the country's financial institutions. After formulating policies to deal with these problems the next logical step was to take remedial action.

Nationalization of Banks and other Financial Enterprises

Nationalization was adopted as the *modus operandi* to bring about a structural transformation. The State was to have control over different sectors of the economy—banks, insurance companies, export and import organizations, wholesale trade enterprises, as well as "any other big industry on which a large section of the people depend for living, or which provides an essential component of other industries." Consequently, a number of enterprises were nationalized within a few days of the Arusha Declaration.[21] Foremost among the financial enterprises to be nationalized were the commercial banks. On 6 February 1967, a day after the adoption of the Declaration, an order was issued. In each case full and fair compensation was guaranteed.

Growth of Post-nationalization Banking

Before nationalization, the major foreign banks operating in Tanzania were Barclays, National and Grindlays, Bank of Baroda, Bank of India, Ottoman Bank and Bank of Pakistan. These banks were maintaining links with the countries in which they were registered. With nationalization, the National Bank of Commerce (NBC) took over the assets, liabilities and business of the nationalized banks. The settlement of compensation took nearly two years, but the switch-over, apart from the uncooperative attitude of some banks in the beginning, was more or less smooth.[22] By June 1969, the last of foreign banks, the Bank of Pakistan, had closed down its operations

in Tanzania.

The change from colonial and foreign to national ownership also brought about changes in the policies of the banks in line with the national policies and objectives. The attempt of the Government to rationalize the financial institutions, in order to ensure the most efficient adaptation of the financial sector to the specialized needs of the economy, resulted in the creation of new banks and the opening of more branches of the NBC. According to Government measures, the NBC was to specialize in commercial banking, the Tanzania Rural Development Bank (TRDB) in medium and long-term credit to the rural sector, the Tanzania Investment Bank (TIB) in the provision of medium and long-term credit for large-scale commercial, and other industries, the Tanzania Housing Bank (THB) in encouraging construction activity in the rural and urban areas, while the Bank of Tanzania was to be the central bank of the country. We shall now take the development of indigenous banking in Tanzania in chronological order.

Before the establishment of the Bank of Tanzania (BT) as the central bank, the country was under the jurisdiction of the East African Currency Board. With freedom, the need for a central bank for Tanzania, to secure independence in financial policies and to conform its activities to the national monetary policy, was felt. The Bank of Tanzania was charged with the "promotion of credit and exchange conditions conducive to the rapid growth of the national economy of Tanzania, due regard being had to the desirability of fostering monetary stability" (Bank of Tanzania Act, 1965, Section 5(2)).

After nationalization the NBC was assigned commercial activities throughout the country. The foreign banks had existed only in the towns. The NBC inherited 34 bank branches located at 22 places in the country[23]. These were generally concentrated, in the capital city and in towns near commercial plantations mostly in the north, like Tanga, Arusha and Mwanza. But gradually the distribution of the Bank's services and resources was rationalised by closing branches and deploying the released resources to extend commercial banking to the rural areas. Consequently, within eight years of the establishment of the NBC it had as many as 76 branches at 61 places, 24 indicating growth in banking as well as a spatial diffusion of banking services. The mean deposits in the country during this period (1967-75) more than trebled from 1013.8 million shillings in 1967 to 3643.9 million shillings in 1975.[25] The share of the NBC was overwhelming. Major considerations in the opening and location of new branches have been to assist

crop production, create employment opportunities, develop infrastructure like schools, *ujamma* villages, dispensaries, missions, trading centres, post offices, etc., apart from promoting commerce and trade in the country.

Since the NBC was a commercial bank it could not fully assist in rural development, which was one of the priority areas of the Government. However, it made a modest start by establishing a term credit programme under its Development Credit Department, till the creation of a full-fledged lending bank, Tanzania Investment Bank (TIB) in November 1970. The TIB financed projects in large-scale agriculture, industries, transport, construction, mining and tourism. The bank did not expand in terms of branches and agencies. It operated from Dar-es-Salaam, disbursing loans to all parts of the country. By June 1974 the TIB had advanced loans to the tune of 174,577,000 shillings.[26]

The TIB financed only capital intensive projects in the rural areas, but it only met partially the policy of rural development covering the masses of Tanzania. In fact, the long-term aim of Tanzania's rural development policy was the creation of co-operative agriculture in which *ujamma* villages were the basic units. For them, the establishment of the Tanzania Rural Development Bank (TRDB) in January 1971 was more important. It was instituted as a means of providing a comprehensive credit system for the small peasants and for "transforming the subsistence living into a modern cash economy, with its attendant increased employment opportunities and income distribution".[27] For investment, priority was given to small-scale, low-cost projects by local communities, demanding a minimum of technical and financial assistance. This was to be realised through the policy of indirect dealing with the peasants and encouraging them to join the co-operative movement on the lines of traditional community living. Only those *ujamma* villages which had registered themselves as multi-purpose co-operative societies were eligible for loans from the TRDB. Some of the loans were given in the form of pesticides, farm implements, fertilizers. seeds, etc. The loans were however to be given to the co-operative societies. Each co-operative society was affiliated to a co-operative union at the national level. The TRDB was also to support other existing rural institutions such as the District Development Corporations. Since there was no direct dealing involved with the peasant, the TRDB did not have offices below the regional level. By October 1974, the Bank had offered loans worth 160,694,756 T. shillings to various co-operative societies in all regions of the country for annual input requirements, grain

mills and livestock development.

During the colonial period, there was yet another sector of the national economy which lacked proper attention: rural and urban housing. It was realized that there was no bank which provided sufficient financial support for construction, especially in the rural areas. The Permanent Housing Finance Company of Tanzania (PHFCT) did give loans for housing, but its lending was mainly for medium and high-cost residential buildings in only a few urban areas. To fill this gap, the Tanzania Housing Bank (THB) was established in November 1972. It had taken over the assets and liabilities of the PHFCT by the end of the year. The THB financed "virtually every type of building activity which is economically viable, socially desirable and technically feasible in urban and rural areas alike."[28] The bank was also assigned the task of promoting use of local building materials and encouraging construction of houses which were best suited to local conditions and would minimize building costs, house prices and rents. The Bank's policy is to place emphasis on lending to the "low income Tanzanians who are not only the majority of population but also the ones who need the Bank's assistance most."[29] In pursuance of these policies and in order to diversify its activities the THB had financed at least a large housing project in each region, nearly 20 per cent of 1,811 housing units till 1974 in the rural areas, and five burnt and clay-tile factories, apart from offering loans for guest-houses, hotels and offices in various parts of the country.

The overall growth of bank branches throughout the country has been remarkable. By 1975 the total number of branches, including the headquarters of these banks which operated only from Dar-es-Salaam, had attained the record figure of 109 at 61 places located in different parts of the country.[30] There were only seven districts in the entire country which had no bank branch, namely, Kisarawe, Kibonde, Kilimanjaro, Rungwe, Mbeya, Baridi and Handeni. These districts, however, were extended facilities of agencies, and were soon expected to have branches of the NBC. The policy of rural development and providing each district with a bank branch helped in the geographical spread of branches away from the capital. In fact, bank branches were established earlier at places which were very far from the capital. For instance, all those places where branches were opened in 1972 were more than 400 kilometres away, and those which came into existence in 1973 were more than 600 kilometres away from Dar-es-Salaam.

The post-independence pattern of banking in Tanzania till 1975

indicates that development of banking was not always in the more densely populated areas of northern Tanzania around Lake Victoria, in the Moshi-Arusha complex and in and around the capital. Five clusters of banking can be identified in Tanzania: the area around Lake Victoria; Mount Kilimanjaro and its surrounding area; the south-western highlands; along the Indian coast from Tanga to Mtwara; and in the extreme south. The other minor banking regions can be identified in the central parts of the country: along the railway up to Kigoma and, secondly, along the highway connecting Dar-es-Salaam with the Zambian border. The areas deficient in banking facilities are the very areas which are infertile, semi-arid, sparsely populated, and have poor transport networks.

III. Conclusions

Tanzania inherited with independence the colonial economic structure and classes of the colonial era.[1] Political independence and the subsequent indigenous control over financial institutions has brought about a rapid transformation of these structures and classes. The Arusha Declaration initiated the penetration of the State into export and import and wholesale trade and foreign-owned industries. Banking, the backbone of all financial and economic activities, has also been brought under the control of the State and a new direction given to it.

The task of restructuring the entire economy of the country and extricating it from its long association with international capitalism is a difficult one indeed. Nationalization of banks and other financial enterprises has only helped to arrest the outflow of capital and to place control of investment decisions in the hands of Tanzanians rather than expatriate corporations. But Tanzania is still very much linked with international capitalism, and the objective of self-reliance is a distant one. There have been some disappointments,[32] political and economic, but it is certain that a major portion of national resources now remains within the country. The social and economic classes of pre-independence Tanzania are disintegrating, the rural areas and thereby a large majority of the population are receiving better attention through *ujamma* living.[33] The collectivization of rural population in Tanzania is unique in Africa, and serves as an alternative to agrarian capitalism, which is entrenched in many other newly developed countries of Africa.

Among the financial institutions, banking can serve as a double-edged weapon: to promote development as well as under-development of a country. In Tanzania, banks during the colonial

period were instruments of exploitation, underdevelopment and a perverted economic growth, because they were not leading the country to a self-generating and self-sustaining stage of the economy. But since independence, and especially since nationalization, they have not only reoriented themselves internally and aligned themselves with national policies but also effected parallel changes in other sectors, such as industry, plantations and agricultural processing.

The spatial diffusion of banking is generally associated with regional development or underdevelopment in a country, as has been demonstrated in the case of Tanzania. The number of banks and their branches, the direction of their growth and distance from the major towns is revealing. Banking has so far been excluded from the indicators of growth by studies on development and modernization.[34] It is argued that growth of banking should be taken as an attribute of development.[35] Its policies, however, should be carefully studied as the objective of its operations, development or underdevelopment, would become clear by paying attention to this aspect.

FOOTNOTES

1. See, for example, G.A. Maguire. *Towards 'Uhuru' in Tanzania: The Politics of Participation*, Cambridge University Press, 1969, pp. XVII; H. Arrighi and J.S. Saul, *Essays on the Political Economy of Africa*, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1973, pp. 34-38.

2. For further details of the psychological effects on the Tanzanian people see J.K. Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity*, Oxford University Press, Dar-es-Salaam, 1966. p. 3; also see F. Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, Grover Press, Inc., New York, 1966, for a general statement of the subject.

3. J. Rweyemamu, *Underdevelopment and Industrialization in Tanzania*, Oxford University Press, Nairobi, 1973, pp. 1-3.

4. L. and E. Berry, "Land Utilization and Land Use in Tanzania", *BRALUP Research Notes*, No. 6, University College, Dar-es-Salaam, 1969, *passim*.

5. For a detailed treatment of the subject see J. Rweyemamu, n. 3, p. 4.

6. J.K. Nyerere, *Freedom and Unity*. Oxford University Press, Dar-es-Salaam, 1966, pp 161-71.

7. J. Rweyemamu, n. 3, p. 16.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 21.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 28.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 30.

11. W.T. Newlyn, *Money in African Context*, Oxford University Press, Nairobi, 1972, p. 42.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 41. It may be noted here that the origins of the supply of East African currency also lie in the Indian connection prior to 1919. Owing to the influence of Indian trade and settlement in East Africa the currency most used in the three territories was the rupee. In German East Africa (mostly mainland Tanzania today), it was in the form of a silver coinage of similar weight and fineness as the old Indian rupee.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 54. The following banks were established in East Africa since 1951: The Nederlandische Handel-Mastschappij (1951); Bank of India (1953); Bank of Baroda (1953); Habib Bank (Overseas) (1956); Ottoman Bank (1958). The Commercial Bank of Africa (1962) and Uganda Commercial Bank (1965) can claim to be indigenous banks.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 43.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 43

16. *Ibid.*, p. 46.

17. See J. Rweyemamu, n. 3, pp. 35-36; Arthur Hazlewood, "Economics of Colonial Monetary Arrangements", *Social and Economic Studies*, Vols. III and IV, December 1954, pp. 291-315; and W.T. Newlyn, n. 11, pp. 29-55.

18. For Arusha Declaration see J.K. Nyerere, *Ujamma: Essays on Socialism*, Oxford University Press, Dar-es-Salaam, 1970, pp. 13-37.

19. J.K. Nyerere, *Ujamma: Essays on Socialism*, pp. 26-28.

20. *Ibid.*, pp. 27-28.

21. Apart from the banks, the government nationalized eight major export-import firms, and eight milling firms. The National Insurance Corporation was brought wholly under public ownership and was to acquire a monopoly of insurance in the Republic The government also acquired compulsorily up to 60 per cent of the shares in seven industrial firms. Later, in October 1967, the government nationalized 60 per cent of the sisal industry.

22. "The three main banking firms, Barclays, Standard Bank, and National Grindlays, withdrew all the European personnel within a period of two months, and also destroyed the instruction manuals with description of banking procedure". Aart Van de Laar, "Foreign Business and Capital Export from Developing Countries: The Tanzanian Experience", in L. Cliffe and J.S. Saul, *Socialism in Tanzania*, Vol. 1, East African Publishing House, Dar-es-Salaam, 1972, p. 84.

23. For development of bank branches in Tanzania see C.P. Singh, "Spatial Consequences of a Policy: The Case of Bank Nationalisation in Tanzania", Department of Human Geography, University of Delhi, 1975, mimeo,

24. *Ibid.*, computed from NBC records. Among the criteria for opening new bank branches was the 'break-even' point of 2.5 million shillings deposits for a branch and 1.3 million shillings deposits for an agency. (Personal communication with Ndugu F.J. Kibonde, Research and Statistics Department, NBC, Dar-es-Salaam, 27 May 1975). It has not, however, been possible for the banks to follow the 'break-even' point strictly, and it was sometimes waived for social, economic, political and geographical considerations.

25. *Economic Survey*, Government Printers, Dar-es-Salaam, 1975, p. 38.

26. Tanzania Investment Bank, *Annual Report July 1973-June 1974*, Dar-es-Salaam, p. 35.

27. Tanzania Rural Development Bank, *Annual Report and Accounts*, January 1973, p. 7.

28. Tanzania Housing Bank, *Reports and Accounts*, 1973, p. 13.

29. *Ibid.*, *Reports and Accounts*, 1974, p. 18.

30. C.P. Singh, n. 23. Computed from records of all the five banks of Tanzania.

31. For a comprehensive statement on class structure and struggle therein see Issa G. Shivji, *Class Struggle in Tanzania*, Heinemann, London, 1976.

32. Read Michael F. Lofchie, "Agrarian Socialism in the Third World: The Tanzanian Case", *Comparàtive Politics*, Vol. 8, No. 3, April 1976, pp. 480-82; for failures in agriculture in Tanzania in recent years.

33. "By the end of 1974, there were app. 7,500 *ujamma* villages with a total population of about 3,000,000, or, about one-fifth of the total population of the country. This reflects an increase of nearly 1,500 villages during 1974 alone, and if correct the *ujamma* villages are still being formed at the rate of about 4 per day". Michael F. Lofchie, n. 32, p. 483.

34. For instance see A.R. DeSouza and P.W. Porter, *The Underdevelopment and Modernization of the Third World*, Association of American Geographers, Washington, 1974; E.W. Soja, *The Geography of Modernization in Kenya*, Syracuse University Press, New York, 1968; M. Safier, "Towards the Definition of Patterns in the Distribution of Economic Development Over East Africa", *East African Geographical Review*, No. 7, April 1969, pp. 1-13.

35. With the establishment of a bank the surrounding area is immediately linked with that point in space where the bank is located. The bank develops a field of its operation, with which it is linked with the number of accounts and its strength lies in the amount deposited with it, or on its lendings.

Asian Settlement in Zambia

Prithvish Nag[*]

THERE is an urgent need to evaluate the role of Asians in develop-
ing and integrating the settlements of Zambia. Historians,
sociologists and others have studied Zambia and made casual referen-
ces to Asians—their population, settlement and changing economic
activities. During the colonial period, the *Northern Rhodesia Journal* of
the then *Rhodes-Livingstone Institute*[1] hardly mentioned any literature
on Asians. This naturally leaves very limited scope to re-construct
the study of Asians in Zambia. However, the work of Dotson and
Dotson,[2] both sociologists, may be acknowledged in this context.
They preferred to name this community as 'Indians' as most of the
Asians during their study (1959-1961) were of Indian origin.

The Asian population in Africa however owes its presence to
the historical accident of a common colonial era. The inter-continen-
tal Crown Administration sought solutions for inter-related problems
involving the land and peoples of Asia and Africa. In the case of
relatively populous Asia, it was their people who were made to emi-
grate and settle on lands in different parts of the colonial world, in-
cluding Africa and particularly in Zambia.

Further, links with Asia in general and India in particular are
not of recent origin, arising out of political equations of the struggle
against oppressive, racial and minority governments, but also because
of its historical links with southern Africa. Such links intensified
over the years following the migration of Asian populations, especial-
ly from South Asia,[3] now comprising India, Pakistan, Bangladesh,
Nepal and Sri Lanka. Their settlement process, in the interior of
southern Africa, including Zambia, has a role in the development of
the region. However, 'Asian' in Zambia generally denotes the popu-
lation of Asian origin. Hence, such a population would be one that
has migrated not only from South Asia but also from other pockets
of Asian population, such as the United Kingdom, Kenya, Malawi,
Rhodesia, Uganda, South Africa and Tanzania. In the present article,
the terms 'Asians' and 'Indian' have otherwise been used synony-
mously.

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The role of Asians has changed from soldier in the British Army to clerk in the British South African Company (BSAC), to petty trader in the rural areas. Later they came to hold a number of big shops in the urban areas. After independence, there was an acute shortage of trained personnel, such as doctors, nurses, engineers, teachers, economists, accountants, railway technicians, agricultural experts, etc., for overall social and economic development. At present, the number of such personnel is continuously increasing and it is hard to find a district without an Asian doctor or teacher.

Keeping in view these trends, the process of Asian settlements in Zambia can conveniently be divided into three periods : (1) Pre-colonial Period (prior to 1900) ; (2) Colonial Period (1900-1964) ; and (3) Post-Independence Period (1964 onwards). These periods indicate the different nature and pattern of proliferation of settlements over the Zambian landscape.

Pre-colonial Period

Records and evidences of the pre-colonial period are extremely rare, especially because Asian influence and settlements were hardly effective in the interior parts of Africa. Secondary sources and evidences however indicate some influence of Asians during this period in the extra-Zambian territories.

The earliest evidence of possible Indian influence or settlement can be seen during the Iron Age (100 BC to 1500 AD). Porcelain and china potteries discovered in the *Zimbabwe* and *Khami* ruins and also in *Fiera* in Zambia (at the confluence of the *Zambezi* and *Luangwa* rivers) have proved valuable for dating. Probably, in that period Zambia was occupied by the pre-Bantu societies, such as *Bushmen, Batwa* and even *Tonga* and their culture is often referred to as *Nachikufu Culture,* based on a Stone Age site in the west of *Muchinga Escarpment.* This was the period when the diffusion of centralized states from *Luba* and *Lunda* empires from *Katanga* (Zaire) did not appear over the present Zambian territory. However, the Iron Age was experienced much earlier in the surrounding regions of Zambia and also in India and on the East African Coast.[4] Moreover, it is likely that iron-working[5] reached the East African coastal areas from Asian sources.

During this period, copper and gold were discovered in the head waters of the *River Kafue* and north of the present *Kariba Lake* respectively. At *Ingombe Ilede,*[6] an Iron Age site near the *Kariba Lake* and south of the confluence of the *River Kafue* and the *River Zambezi,* glass beads (and probably fine cloth) from India were un-

earthed. Glass beads were also found further such at the Kalamo Iron Age site. The discovery of these goods in south large quantities presupposes the existence of an extensive network of trading contacts reaching far into the interior.[7] Interestingly, mention of potential trading centres, such as *Zumbo, Tete* and *Sena*, from *Ingombe Ilede* to *Sofala Coast* on the *River Zambezi*, occurs repeatedly in the history of Iron Age Zambia.

It is believed that "the Iron Age was introduced into the *Rhodesian Plateau* from the north of the Zambezi."[8] Roberts tries to discover the the trade links between the two important ancient economic regions on both sides of the *River Zambezi* and finds good reasons to suppose that the later occupation of *Ingombe Ilede* was simultaneous with the development of *Zimbabwe's* importance as a commercial and potential centre.[9] The well-known *Zimbabwe Ruins*,[10] between the *River Zambezi* and the *River Lundi* (tributary of the *River Sabi* in Southern Rhodesia, had outcrops of gold on the west of this deserted site (Fig. 1). This ancient settlement has similar locational conditions

ZAMBEZI HINTERLAND & INDIAN OCEAN

Figure 1

to *Ingombe Ilede* and raises an important question : *Who built Zimbabwe?* Davidson rightly mentions, "If Zimbabwe and its kind are the culmination of Iron Age growth in central and southern Africa, they have their beginnings elsewhere. They grew imposing at the same

time as the coastal trade of the twelfth to fifteenth centuries, and partly, no doubt, because of it ; but their early history must be seen against a wider background."[11]   Other scholars have also endorsed Davidson's conclusion of the existence of external links of the erstwhile flourishing culture of *Zimbabwe*. It was probably such evidences as the architecture of the ruins, names of territories such as *Mashonaland* (likely to have been derived from *Shona*, meaning gold in India), *Monikaland* (derived from *Monika*, meaning precious stone) and *Sheba* (misnomer of *Shiva*, a great Hindu god of destruction whose *linga* is believed to be an important feature in the *Zimbabwe Ruins*), the presence and domination of the caste system instead of tribes and similar links, which raise possibilities of links of the areas lying on both sides of the *River Zambezi* with India. Van Oordt is convinced that "the builders of *Zimbabwe* and other ancient ruins in Rhodesia were *Dravidians* from the west coast of India".[12] Probably *Zimbabwe* culture at its height coincides with the period of intense relations with the West Indian coast.   The descriptions given by Father Francisque Marconnes in the following paragraph written in 1935 indicate some permanency of Indian settlement in Tongaland near the *River Zambezi* :[13]

> There is a tradition amongst the *Masikesi* natives that there was once amongst them a race of miners with a brown complexion and long hair. These must have come from *Siyouna* (*Syuna*), the great emporium of the Zambezi 'inhabited by *Zendj*' (*Tongas*) and Indians not *Hindus*, but *Dravidians* from the *Malabar coast*, or *Malays* from further India. Those 'Indians' or their brothers are most probably responsible for the contour terraces and irrigation furrows on the *Inyanga Mountains* close by.

Further, Alper discovered the links of *Cisi* (*Tonga* settlement groups or neighbourhoods) with the traders of the East African coast, more especially for forging tools from iron.[14] The links between the East African coast with the *Cambay* and *Malabar* coasts of India are an established fact. Trade between these regions and their hinterlands was a part of the medieval Indian Ocean culture and societies developed after fusion and exchange among the littoral states.   However, in southern Africa, the "products of the lands on both sides of the Zambezi have been traded to the coast and thence across the Indian Ocean for thousands of years or more"[15] It was probably during this period (some time in the past three centuries, more likely in the year 110) that *Periplus of the Erythian Sea* was written by a Greak-Egyptian sailor.   The book gives an account of the Indian Ocean, monsoon winds, route to India and other navigational details.

During this time, cloth, glass beads, porcelain, Indian hemp and the like reached deep into Africa. Against these imports "the products of the African hinterland and the *Zambezi* region—gold, copper and ivory—had always an exchange value besides an ornamental or utilitarian one".[16]

It is a historical coincidence that the need for lebensraum and expansion of the *Katangan* kingdoms corresponded with the journey of *Vasco Da Gama* to East Africa and India in the fifteenth century.[17] Subsequently, *Goa* (in India) was made the headquarters of Portuguese East Africa. Though, as evident from above, Indian settlement and influence penetrated before the establishment of the pre-colonial Zambian kingdoms, there is also some evidence of continuation of such influences during the early *Age of Tradition*[18]. The colonisation from the north and participation in trade by the Portuguese and Arabs along the East African coast had not only checked the process of Asian settlement but also dissociated India and Zambia. Unfortunately, later, the links between these two regions were superimposed on the trade and commerce equations cultivated by the local chiefs, *Swahilis, Chikundus, Chewas, Yekes, Mambaris,* Portuguese and *Bisas* whose commercial activities were primarily based on slave-trade.[19] Probably during the later part of this period (1500-1900), the links between the West Indian coast and East Africa were strengthened and the navigators were able to find direct routes, but the earlier links that India had with the interior of the Continent fizzled out for all practical purposes.[21]

Colonial Period—1900-1964

With the beginning of the Colonial Period, the Asian community slowly expanded on the European patterns similar to those available in eastern and southern Africa. These were, however, not akin to those of the English and the Boers, but rather to those of the Portuguese. Since the Asian settlement patterns and processes were very similar to those of its European counterparts, the land and settlement policies of the latter cannot be neglected. It would also not be out of place to analyze here the settlement patterns of Zambia in general.

Before the Colonial Period, this territory was occupied by tribes of different political orders, varying from amorphous to highly centralised states. The territorial functions were ordered through chiefs, sub-chiefs, *indunas* and headmen. They had political authority over the land, population and settlements within their jurisdiction. During this period, however, the natural proliferation process was

restricted, modified and transformed. The land of the erstwhile Northern Rhodesia was divided into three types—*Native Reserves*, *Native Trust Lands* and *Crown Lands*. The *Native Reserves* were for the Africans; the *Native Trust Lands* were also for Africans unless they were in-the interest of all races; [22] and the *Crown Lands* were assigned only to the E ropeans. The latter were given those areas which had a good communication network[23]. The distribution of Asian settlements, moreover, followed the same pattern as that of their European counterparts; the former also had settlements at the potential centres of the territory, such as chiefs' headquarters, marketing centres and rural towns. The Asian community also made periodic visits to the *Reserves* and *Trust Lands* because of the small numbers of Africans in these areas and because of their limited purchasing power. Their role in unifying the settlements of the different orders should not be under-estimated. It was not their so-called exploitative nature which compelled them to opt for the trading sector in these areas, but rather they had no choice. It was only in the sector of trade that they were allowed to function.

European settlements were mostly in the urban areas while Asian settlements were rural-based. An Asian shop formed the nucleus in the rural settlement and the Asian gained weight in the hierarchy.[24] Nevertheless, Asians never opened shops in new areas ; they superimposed on the existing patterns, first on urban and later on rural potential sites. The Census of Zambia (1963) records a number of settlements as 'Indian shops', mostly in the Eastern province; there is no evidence of settlements started by Asians or even named after them. Hence, Asians never formed a region, or a district, or a town, or even a village of their own population. Moreover, their settlement was never with an aim to colonise Zambia. The present paper would study the Asian population settlement and migration trends in the country.

Two examples are cited here to comprehend the spread of Asian settlement during this period. *Chipata* (*Fort Jameson*) was the entry point settlement for Asian migration from the east, while *Livingstone*, located in the north of the *River Zambezi*, was from the south. Both these settlements, now provincial headquarters, diffused Asians in the erstwhile Northern Rhodesia. These processes, which had their origin in Gujarat (India), evolved out of these two entry point settlements, united again in this interior of Africa and the combined pattern became responsible for the present distribution of Asians in Zambia.

Chipata, formerly known as *Fort Jameson*, was founded in

October 1898, This old town is the third site with this name; its first plan was prepared in 1902 (Fig. 2). In this plan provision was

ASIAN SETTLEMENTS IN CHIPATA (Fort Jameson) AND ITS SURROUNDINGS

FIGURE -2

made by the *British South African Company*, which ruled the territory during the early colonial period, to include *'Baniyan Quarters'*[25] for the Asian population. Sir Harry Johnston, a European administrator of the Company at *Fort Jameson*, having noted the experience of the surrounding countries, encouraged the migration of Asians, though not always for trade.[26] Vyas describes the glorious welcome of Asian traders to this town.[27] These traders were mostly Muslims and they were more rural-based[28]. The Asian settlements were not always on the main transport routes. *Merwe, Petauke, Katete, Kazimule, Chandiza, Sinde, Misale, Kalichero* and *Jumbe* are a few examples of the settlements where Asian population was responsible for acquiring weightage in the settlement hierarchy. These settlements have developed either as towns or as rural service centres. Nevertheless, the

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Chipata town has a substantial Asian community, as also a sizable African population.   The so-called *'second class trading area'* is more imposing than the European *'first class trading area'*, with an Asian housing sector occupying the north-western portion of the town.   An Indian mosque, school and crematory are located here.   Small irregular streets, houses with courtyards and the like, still show their previous occupation.   This area had 75 commercial shops in 1972[29] and 95 in 1974, out of which eleven are for sale.   They are mostly run by Asians.


FIGURE – 3

Livingstone, another old town of Zambia, was the entry point of Asians from the south, from Rhodesia, South Africa and Mozambique. In comparison with the *Chipata* Asians, they were more educated, more urban-oriented, mostly Hindus. They faced resistance from the Europeans even in the pioneering phase. These factors have left their mark on their settlement patterns. The *Livingstone* Asian settlement process, more effective in the urban centres along the communication network, also indicated the sophistication of the community in the business activities of the area. The *Livingstone Plan* (1905) did not make any provision for Asians, though they occupied the eastern portion of this region (Fig. 3). They had shops along the *Mainway* (now *Mosi-oa-Tunya Road*). The Indians thus have two Indian shopping areas. Both these have successfully competed with their European counterparts despite much local resistance.

Dotson and Dotson rightly mentioned the affined relationship of these two migrations extending into Malawi and Rhodesia, including South Africa. It was not only the blood or marriage relationships which developed as a part of the migration network but there was also a sense of allegiance to the promoters in their original names in Asia. One can trace such affined sequences of migrations, cutting across international boundaries, in the southern, eastern and central regions of Africa[30]. Both these patterns conglomerated at the territorial headquarters in Lusaka. The pattern further north is the outcome of such fusion. *Second class trading areas* are common in *Lusaka*, *Kabwe* and in other *Copperbelt* towns. In the larger towns, such as *Lusaka* and *Ndola*, Asians have their own residential areas with temples, *Hindu Halls* and mosques. The number of Asians increased from 39 in 1911 to 7,790 in 1961. Their numbers however were insignificant compared to the country's total population.[31] The Table on next page shows the number of Asians since 1911 to the last Census. A significant increase can be noted during 1951-56, just after the independence of most of the countries in South Asia. Probably then the laws relating to migration became more liberal in these countries[32].

By the end of the Colonial Period, *Kabwe*, *Livingstone*, *Lusaka* and *Ndola* had more than 500 Asian population each.[36] They also concentrated in the small towns along the railway line and around *Chipata*. However, except *Barotseland* (now *Western Province*), Asians had shops at *Bomas* (district headquarters) and further deep in the rural areas, such as *Mwinilunga* and *Kalene Hill* The common struggle for independence was achieved in October 1964. With this

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was ushered in another pattern of Asian settlements in free Zambia.

TABLE

Year	No. of Asians
1911	39
1921	56
1931	176
1946	1,117
1951	2,524
1956	5,450
1961	7,790[33]
1965	9,500[34]
1969	10,785[35]

Post-Independence Period

Independence added a new order of Asians which was different from that of the Colonial Period. Even though the new patterns introduced were to some extent a continuation of the previous period, patterns of a time-bound technical personnel commonly known as expatriate-Asians were emerging. This was largely due to the aim of the independent government to effect socio-economic development of the country. As in the Iron Age Zambia, Asians once again came forward to share the responsibilities of the people of Zambia. This time the migration was of experts in the various fields of development. Migrations were of a temporal nature. Nevertheless their continuously increasing numbers over-shadowed those who were engaged in trading activities. At present, Asians can be identified as resident-Asians and expatriate-Asians. But it must be noted that the substantial numbers of the latter hardly affected the nature of the former's trade and business.

The distribution of both these groups indicates different trends. Owing to the restrictions of trade of only prescribed goods in prescribed areas, the non-Zambians have to limit their spheres of activity ; in general, the resident-Asians are concentrated only in the larger towns.[37] On the other hand, the expatriate-Asian community can be found working even in the rural interior areas for the promotion of medical, educational and transportational services. Nevertheless, the larger towns do have pockets of expatriate-Asian settlements. Since the migration of these groups is of a temporal nature, their residential pockets are ephemeral.

Further, it must be pointed out that the expatriate-Asian community is not only from South Asia but also from China, Japan and

West Asia. The total distribution of this community in Zambia has increased on the existing patterns. In the railway line provinces of the *South, Central Copperbelt* regions reside ninety per cent of the Asians in Zambia *(Appendix I)*. They are concentrated in the towns of these provinces. *Livingstone, Lusaka, Kabwe, Ndola, Kitwe* and *Luanshya* have considerable numbers of Asians. In the rest of the country, Eastern Province has about eight per cent of the country's total Asian population of which *Chipata Town* has the largest community. Fig. 4 indicates the distribution of the Asian population


DISTRIBUTION OF ASIANS IN ZAMBIA

FIGURE - 4

recorded during the last Census (1969).

The study of sex, age-group and marital status of the Asians shows some interesting trends *(Appendix II)*. 1969 Census records show 5,643 males against 5,142 females, contributing to 1,097

males per 1,000 females. The female population is more in the age-group of 15-24. However, within the same age-group there are only 65 married males for 281 married females. This is probably due to early marriages of females. Moreover, the most unbalanced sex-ratio amongst the married Asians is in the next higher age-group (25-49), showing a preponderance of males which also specifies the tendency of marriage unions of males from the latter with females from the former (15-24) age-group. In the age-group of sixty and above, there are married males twice in number to their counterparts. Since they are not widowers or divorced, this denotes that females in the said age-group are either left behind in the country of origin or elsewhere. It is alarming to note that the numbers of widows are about four times compared to those of widowers and their largest number is in the age-group of 25-49. Conversely, for divorced members of the community the males are six times more than the females. This imbalance indicates that either there is a tendency of divorced Asian males to emigrate to Zambia or the divorced females to return to their country of origin. Since the numbers of divorces (which obviously is insignificant) is not recorded in the Census, a clear picture cannot be drawn and no conclusions arrived at. The children (0-14), of both the sexes, are about forty per cent of the total population in Zambia. From the above discussion it appears that since the Asian community has not secured stability in the country their settlement processes may also ultimately prove to be transient in nature.

It would also be worthwhile to analyse the occupational nature of the Asian population in Zambia. The ratio of workers to the total Asian population is only 31.97 per cent, as a number of dependants of Asian families remain outside Zambia due to various socio-economic compulsions. However, the working population consists only of 55.19 per cent of the population above the age of fifteen years. Substantial numbers of female Asian population also form a part of the working population of Zambia. Out of 3,437 Asian working population in different industrial groups, the largest number (31.37 per cent) is in the electricity, gas and water supply works. (*Appendix III*). The second group is in agriculture, forestry and allied industries. Their role in the latter group is as advisers, extension and veterinary experts and landuse planners. However, there are quite a large number of persons who are not adequately defined. The distribution of Asian working population is similar to the pattern shown in Fig. 4. About ninety-two per cent of the working population is concentrated along the railway line.[38]

In 1969, Zambia's 7.26 per cent population was born outside the country while 4.6 per cent (185,921 persons) were non-citizens. "Assuming that persons born in Zambia were eligible for Zambian citizenship and have taken up Zambian citizenship, one can estimate the number of persons who were not born in Zambia but have declared themselves to be Zambian citizens. This works out at 107,706"[39]. Out of the four million people of Zambia only about six thousand are born in Asia. Of these the Indian-born are largest in number.[40] Their yearly flow to Zambia could be estimated by the change of residence twelve months prior to Census—1969 (September). During this period, 892 persons (62 per cent male and 38 per cent female) who had migrated to Zambia were born in Asia and the Far East. This immigration figure, during the calendar year 1971, increased to 1,261 (8.56 per cent of the total migrants) by nationality and to 1,057 (7.18 per cent) by the country of last residence in an Asian country (*Appendix IV*). The figures of migration from South Asian countries indicate larger numbers by nationality than by the country of last residence. This clearly signifies the trend of migration from the countries other than the nationality.

About 75 per cent of Asian migrants were in the age-group of 20-59 during 1971. In the age-group of 20-24, females were more than double the number of male immigrants. However, there were 150 more males than female migrants during that year. This indicates that further immigration of Asians into Zambia is still contributing to the unbalanced population structure which is similar neither to their country of origin nor to Zambia.

Conclusion

By 1973-74 the expatriate-Asian community were able to win over the confidence of the Zambian Government. Doctors, teachers and engineers are now entrusted with great responsibilities of individual districts. The para-statal bodies also prefer to employ Asians in technical, managerial and accountancy services. The increasing volume of migration testifies to their economic viability. However, these Asians are unable to make any impression on the settlement process of Zambia. They are successful only in developing a temporary social complex in some part of a big town. On the other hand, the resident-Asians have not only settled in the areas meant for them but even outside such areas. Around the larger towns they have also settled on the neighbouring small holdings. In Mufulira (Copperbelt), where out-migration of Europeans was high, the resident-Asians have re-occupied the Europeans' residential quarters.

In *Lusaka*, Asians have built *Gurdwaras* (Sikh temples) but this has not attracted substantial Asian settlements in its neighbourhood.

The present youth population is either third or fourth generation of first Asian migrants in Zambia. Their links with the home country are gradually fading away with every new genealogical order. Quite a number of youth have not yet visited South Asia. They are diversifying from their hereditary occupation of trade. This brings in a physiological attachment with the land which was somewhat lacking in the preceding generations. Nevertheless, a compromise of the two cultures, Asian and African, is yet to be cultivated in Zambia. This cultural synthesis depends on how soon the Asians attach themselves with this land, how and in what ways the Africans would develop a more homely atmosphere for the Asians and how far the *Zambian Government* would safeguard the process of Asian settlement in Zambia.

FOOTNOTES

1. Now this organisation is known as *Institute for Social Research*, University of Zambia, Lusaka.

2. Dotson, F. and Dotson, F.O., *The Indian Minority of Zambia, Rhodesia and Malawi*. Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1968.

3. Singh, R.L. and *et al* (Eds.), *India : A Regional Geography*, National Geographical Society of India Publication, Varanasi, 1971, p.1.

4. "No doubt the coastal trade helped to bring iron technology southwards; yet by AD 60, we may note, the iron age culture of the *Kalamo Falls* in the north-western Rhodesia, was already in its infancy", *vide* Davidson, Basil, *Old Africa Rediscovered*, Longman, London, 1970. p. 151.

5. Fagan, B.M., *Iron Age Culture in Zambia*, Vol. 2, National Museum of Zambia. The Robin Series-6, Chatto and Windus, 1969, p. 145.

6. It is believed that *Ingombe Ilede* in the *Gwembe Valley*. dating from late 7th to the early 10th centuries, had regular trading links with the coast even up to 17th century. The local peoples were probably enslaved by a group of traders who settled on the site. *Vide* Fagan, *op. cit.*, 1969, pp. 46-57. Fagan mentions that clothes were found in burials Nos. 11/1, 11/2, 11/3 and 11/8, including khaki satin. The photo 15(a) shows very common Indian designs of clothes. See also Roberts, Andrew D, "Precolonial Trade in Zambia", *Journal of African Social Research*, Institute for Social Research, University of Zambia, Lusaka, No. 10, Dec. 1970, p. 722.

7. Fagan, B.M., "Early Trade in Zambia", in Fagan, B.M. (Ed.), *A Short History of Zambia*, Oxford University Press ; Nairobi, Lusaka and Addis Ababa, 1969, p. 97.

8. Alper, E., "The Mutupa and Malawi Political Systems to Ngoni Invasions" in Ranger, T.O. (Ed). *Aspects of Central African History*, Heinemann ; London, Ibadan and Nairobi, 1968, p. 2.

9. Roberts, Andrew D., "Precolonial Trade in Zambia", *Journal of African Social Research*, Institute for Social Research, University of Zambia, Lusaka, No. 10, Dec. 1970. p. 723.

10. The African name for Rhodesia is based on this famous ruin.

11. Davidson, n. 4., p. 178.

12. Van Oordt, T.F., *Who Were the Builders of Great Zimbabwe?* Central African News Agency, Cape Town, Quoted in Paver. B.C., *Zimbabwe Cavalcade—Rhodesia's Romance,* Cassell & Company Ltd., London, 1957, p. 70. Van Oordt further believes that the names *Zambezi* and *Zimbabwe* are derived from an Indian language. The *Shangani River* is, according to him, a component of *Zan—*copper—and *ghan—*a river bank. meaning the river along whose banks copper is found.

13. Quoted by Van Oordt, *op. cit.,* pp. 69-70

14. Alper, E.A., *The East African Slave Trade,* Historical Association of Tanzania, Paper No. 3, Nairobi, 1967, pp. 13-14. According to Colson, the ancient local political order based on homesteads and neighbourhoods is called *cisi* among the *Gwembe Tongas. Vide* Colson, E., *The Social Consequences of Resettlement,* Kariba Studies IV, Manchester University Press, 1971, p. 206. Also see "Plateau Tonga" in Schneider, D.M., *Matrilineal Kinship,* Wheeler & Co., Allahabad, 1972, p. 42.

15. Sutton, J.E.G., *The East African Coast* : *An Historical and Archaeological Review,* Historical Association of Tanzania, Paper No. 1, East African Publishing House, Nairobi, 1970. p. 4.

16. *Ibid* p. 13. Later, ivory was used "not just for bangles in India, but also in Europe and America for piano keys, billiard balls and ornaments. The greatly increased demand along the coast pushed the slave-trade frontiers further inland affecting Zambia, Malawi and Congo." *Vide* Langworthy, H.W., *Zambia Before 1890,* Longman, London, 1972, p, 100.

17. "It is true that the rulers of the coast, especially the *Zamorins* of Calicut, fought hard for over a hundred years to keep their coast clear of the Portuguese but India's authority over waters of the Indian Ocean vanished from 1503, when in the battle of *Cochin* the Portuguese gained what in effect became a decisive victory—a victory more important in its historical consequences than the battle of Trafalgar." *Vide* Pannikar, K.M., *Geographical Factors in Indian History,* Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1959, p. 82.

18. Roberts, Andrew, "The Age of Tradition" in Fagan, B.M. (Ed.), *op. cit. n.* 7, 1969, pp. 103-122.

19. Wilson, D.A., *A Student Atlas of African History,* University of London Press Ltd., 1971, Fig. 43 (p. 51), 'Trade in Central Africa in the Nineteenth Century'.

20. Gamitto, A.C.P., *King Kazembe and the Marve, Chewa, Bisa, Bemba Luanda and other Peoples of Southern Africa,* Translated by Ian Cunnion, Vol. 2, Lisboa, 1960, This book contains the description of Portuguese expeditions during 1831-32. It also mentions that clothes for *Kazembe's court* were secured from *Poane* in East Africa. However, it may be mentioned here that *Poona (Pune),* near *Bombay,* falls in the cotton producing area of Western India. Moreover, Portuguese traders from Mozambique reached *Kazemba's court* on the *Luapula* river as early as 1798. *Vide* Phillipson, D.W,, *National Monuments of Zambia,* Zambia Information Service, Lusaka, 1972, p. 14.

21. Though there is hardly any evidence of Indians in Zambia during this period, Indians settled in good numbers on the East African coast, especially in *Zanzibar.*

22. Siddle, D.J., "Colonial Land Rights", in Davies, D.H. (Ed.), *Zambia in Maps*, University of London Press Ltd., 1977, p. 48.

23. Nag, P., "Basis of Zambian Settlement", *Africa Quarterly*, Indian Centre for Africa, New Delhi, Vol. XVII, No. 1, July 1977, pp. 59-73. Also Jauhari, A.S. and Nag, P., "Rural Development in an Under-populated Developing Country 'of Africa: Zambia" in Singh, R.L. and *et al* (Eds.). *Geographic Dimensions of Rural Settlements*, National Geographical Society of India, Varanasi, 1976, pp. 248-261.

24. Gann, L.H., *The Birth of a Plural Society*, Manchester University Press, 1968, p. 155. The book is dedicated to Sir Roy Welensky, Ex-Prime Minister of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (September 1953—December 1963).

25. The word *Baniyan* was a misnomer of *Bania* meaning trader. This term is frequently used in the Gulf countries, North and East Africa. However, in Zambia, *Patel* is used for traders.

26. "From the very beginning Sir H. Johnston had welcomed Indians. He liked them as brave soldiers, efficient and cheap government employees, and as traders, who would develop the country's resources".

27. Vyas, C.L., *I Have a Point* : A *Collection of Essays*, The United African Press Ltd., Nairobi, 1971, pp. 88-95, The author of the book, an Indian-born (*Navasari, Gujarat*) British national died on September 11, 1973, in a parcel-bomb blast in *Lusaka*. He pleaded for humanism and wrote a number of books on Zambia. *Vide, Zambia Magazine* October, 1973, No. 53 pp. 13-15.

28. It is interesting to note that during the 1961 Census there were 320 Asians in the *Fort Jameson* District in addition to 470 in the township, *Vide*, Kay, G., *A Social Geography of Zambia*, University of London Press Ltd., 1967, p. 40.

29. *Chipate Development Plan* : *1971-2000*, Department of Town and Country Planning, Lusaka, 1972, p. 15.

30. n. 2. For migration and settlement patterns, refer to chapter : "History and Settlement", pp. 18-54.

31. Gann describes the position of Indians during 1914 : "Indians did not achieve any importance in the country before 1914. In the main, Indians were petty traders and occasionally market gardeners ; they were not employed as civil servants as in East Africa. Their community was too small, too scattered and too ignorant of European ways to make any political demands". n. 24, p. 179.

32. n. 2, pp. 51-54. This was the period in which the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was launched. The white settlers were governing the affairs of the Federation and made laws which restricted further immigration of Asians. It may be understood that the then Northern Rhodesia would have attracted more Asians with comparatively liberal laws of the pre-Federation colonial period.

33. n. 2, p. 51.

34. Kay, n. 28., p. 51.

35. Central Statistical Office, Lusaka.

36. *Final Report of May/June Census of Africans*, Central Statistical Office, Lusaka, 1968. However, these figures are of 1961.

37. Soremekun, Fola, "The Challenge of Nation-building : Neo-Humanism and Politics in Zambia 1967-1969", *Africa Quarterly*, Indian Council for

Africa, New Delhi, Vol. XIII No. 3, 1972, pp. 175-6. *Vide,* "Zambia's Economic Revolution, address by President K.D. Kaunda, April 19, 1968, Zambia Information Services, Government Printers, pp. 26-31. Also "This Completes Economic Reforms—Now Zambia Is Ours", address by President K.D. Kaunda, November 10, 1970, Zambia Information Service, Government Printers, Lusaka.

38. Based on *Census of Population and Housing, 1969,* Central Statistical Office. Lusaka.

39. *Census of Population and Housing, 1969 (First Report),* Central Statistical Office, Lusaka. *Vide* Chapter 1.4 for Citizenship. In 1969 there were 2,819 persons in Zambia having Indian citizenship. This constitutes 0.07% of the country's population. However, it is interesting to note that twice the number (5,574 persons i.e 0.14%) of persons were born in India which indicates that substantial numbers of persons of Indian origin have accepted a nationality other than that of India.

40. The figure from other sources about Asians in Zambia is 11,450 in 1970. The break-up is not in coherence with the Zambian Census of 1969. The former reports that there were 1,200 persons with Indian citizenship; 250 have taken Zambian citizenship; and 10,000 are British protected persons. *Vide,* Vohra, Bikram, "Blood, the Black and the British", *For You,* July 11-24, 1976, p. 7. The source of the figures is not mentioned.

41. *Migration Statistics (Immigrants and Visitors) 1971.* Central Statistical Office, Lusaka, Vol. 5. 2000, August, 1973,

APPENDIX I

Distribution of Asian Population in Zambia

Age-Group	Central	Western	Eastern	Luapula	Northern	North Western	Southern	Copper-belt
M 0-14	823	14	215	26	26	2	262	833
F	743	15	215	4	31	1	262	783
M 15-24	349	1	72	1	5	1	74	290
F	373	5	59	5	8	1	82	302
M 25-59	1002	18	143	22	46	4	289	894
F	842	13	126	21	24	5	230	776
M 60	32	—	6	—	—	—	11	23
F	29	—	3	—	—	—	9	30
M N.S.	77	—	12	—	2	2	25	41
F	65	—	19	—	4	—	21	36
M Total	2283	33	448	49	79	9	661	2081
F	2052	33	422	30	67	7	604	1927
Total Asians	4335	66	870	79	146	16	1265	4008
%	40.19	0.61	8.07	0.73	1.35	0.15	11.73	37.17

N.S.—Not Stated.
Source—Central Statistical Office, Lusaka.

APPENDIX II

Asian Population : Classified by Sex, Age-Group and Marital Status (Census-1969)

Age-Group	Sex	Total	Never Married	Married	Widowed	Divorced	Not Stated
0-14	M	2201	2201	—	—	—	—
	F	2054	2052	2	—	—	—
15-24	M	793	709	65	—	4	15
	F	835	531	281	1	—	22
25-59	M	2418	162	2183	13	30	30
	F	2037	55	1919	45	4	14
60	M	72	8	49	9	4	2
	F	71	10	23	35	2	1
N.S.	M	159	125	25	—	1	8
	F	145	104	33	1	—	7
Total		10785	5957	4580	104	45	99

N.S.—Not Stated.
Source—Central Statistical Office, Lusaka.

APPENDIX III

Distribution of Asian Working Population in Zambia

Workers in different Industrial Groups	Total %	C	W	E	L	N	NW	S	CB
Not adequately defined	817 23.77	344	42	33	6	11	4	190	187
Agriculture and Allied	520 15.13	234	10	21	16	11	3	34	191
Mining and Quarying	250 7.27	98	1	—	—	3	—	37	111
Manufacturing	289 8.41	126	1	1	1	—	—	57	103
Electricity, Gas and Water	1078 31.37	428	—	78	1	24	—	126	421
Construction	92 2.68	34	—	5	—	—	—	11	42
Distribution	32 0.93	19	—	—	—	—	—	4	9
Transport	97 2.82	28	—	1	—	—	—	11	57
Financial and Insurance	112 3.26	46	—	1	—	—	—	24	41
Community, Social and Personal	150 4.36	57	—	—	1	—	1	24	61
Total	3437 100.00	1414	54	140	25	49	8	518	1229

C—Central; W—Western; E—Eastern; L—Luapula; N—Northern; NW—North-Western; S—Southern; and CB- Copperbelt.

Source : Unpublished data. Central Statistical Office, Lusaka.

APPENDIX IV

Zambia : Immigration by Nationality and Country of Last Permanent Residence, 1971

Country	By Nationality		By Last Permanent Residence	
	Persons	%	Persons	%
Burma	31	0.21	?	?
China	188	1.28	158	1.07
Cyprus	32	0.22	22	0.15
India	827	5.62	741	5.03
Japan	36	0.24	25	0.17
Pakistan	58	0.39	50	0.34
Sri Lanka	42	0.29	29	0.20
Others (Asia)	47	0.05	32	0.22
TOTAL ASIA	1261	8.56	1057	7.18
Africa	4986	33.87	7008	47.60
America	672	4.56	348	2.36
Europe	7648	51.95	6192	42.06
Oceania	144	0.98	105	0.71
Not Stated	12	0.08	13	0.09
Total	14723	100.00	14723	100.00

Source: Migration Statistics (Immigrants and Visitors), Central Statistical Office. Lusaka, 1971.

International Seminar on Apartheid

> We publish below the text of the Indian Foreign Minister,
> Atal Bihari Vajpayee's inaugural speech at the International
> Seminar on Apartheid held in New Delhi on March 16-17 this
> year and excerpts from the papers presented by the South African
> National Congress representatives, Stephen Dhlamini and
> Mohammed Timol—*Editor*

1. Inaugural Address by Indian Foreign Minister

WE live in an era of growing opposition throughout the world to all forms of discrimination, and exploitation of man by man. The practice of apartheid in South Africa, and its wilful extension to Namibia and Zimbabwe, represent a clear violation of the UN Charter, a denial of fundamental human rights, and a major impediment to international peace. Racial discrimination, segregation, and exploitation by a racist minority, institutionalised as apartheid, comprise a total affront to our values of human liberty, equality of man, the dignity of the individual, and the unity of mankind.

WE have assembled here in this Seminar at a time when the UN International Anti-Apartheid Year is being observed to reinforce the struggle against this evil. A world mobilization against apartheid is essential since its inhuman laws pose a clear threat to international peace and security. While commemorating the courage and valour of the freedom fighters whose struggle against this pernicious doctrine has been long and arduous, the internationl community must realize that their struggle requires concrete assistance, and not merely verbal support. It is also imperative that all countries must forthwith terminate all contact with Pretoria and Salisbury, and impose an effective embargo on arms supplies and trade.

The fountainhead of oppression in Southern Africa is the racist regime of South Africa. They have maintained an illegal minority regime in Salisbury through subterfuge, treachery and defiance of world opinion. They have retained their illegal control over Namibia through betrayal of a sacred trust and through repression.

The exploitation of the peoples of Southern Africa by the White racist regimes has ensured the plunder and expropriation of the rich and vast natural resources of these countries. Millions of people toil in abject misery and deprivation in subservience to the ethos of 'settler-colonialism'. However, the brave peoples of Namibia,

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Zimbabwe and South Africa have with courage and fortitude risen against the tyranny of their self-appointed 'Masters'. Their rising tide of anger can no longer be frustrated. They have the unflinching support of the peoples of the world. They have, on their side, the lessons of history.

The sanctions on the illegal Ian Smith regime imposed by the Security Council Resolution 253(1968) have been broken by an illicit alliance of the South African regime and vested interests with enormous economic stakes in Southern Africa. They have abetted and assisted Salisbury in increasing its offensive capabilities.

In Namibia, South Africa has converted the territory into a theatre of repression and brutality, suppressing the spirit of black consciousness. The extension of apartheid to the territory has resulted in economic exploitation, asphyxiation of the rich and variegated culture of the black community, denial of opportunities for education, and denudation of natural resources.

The termination of the illegal Internal Settlement Government in Salisbury is a matter of the highest priority. There must be an immediate international effort, spearheaded by the UN through effective sanctions under Article 41 of the UN Charter. These must be applied stringently and equally to both Salisbury and Pretoria, in order to take care of the apartheid connection. These efforts must also be made concertedly by the colonial power responsible for Southern Rhodesia. All possible political and material support must be afforded to the courageous fighters of the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe, and to the indomitable frontline states who have borne with fortitude the senseless violence inflicted upon them by Rhodesian and South African forces.

India has long supported the liberation struggle of the Namibian people. Our support for SWAPO, both political and material, requires no elaboration. Today as events gain momentum towards the establishment of majority rule under UN supervision and control, the intentions of the South African Government are not clear, but suspect. It is evident that they have deliberately sought to create difficulties by making unreasonable demands such as the monitoring of SWAPO bases outside Namibia. That those moves are only a cover for their real motives, i.e. to legitimize the puppet DTA regime, the so-called 'Democratic Turnhalle Alliance' illegally installed last December, none can doubt. Should South Africa thus frustrate the Security Council sponsored effort to bring majority rule to Namibia? The General Assembly, with its near universal membership, must act. In keeping with the UN Charter and its various resolutions, it

must unite to terminate South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia.

The situation in Zimbabwe and Namibia has direct relevance to the struggle against apartheid in South Africa. The establishment of majority rule and the death throes of racism in these two countries would inevitably quicken the international campaign against this evil doctrine.

India has long opposed and unequivocally condemned the practice of apartheid in South Africa.

It was at India's insistence that the policies of racial discrimination in South Africa were inscribed on the agenda of the UN General Assembly. We have broken all trade contacts with the apartheid regime since our independence and boycotted it in all fields. We severed diplomatic relations in 1954. On numerous occasions, in concert with like-minded Afro-Asian countries, we have sponsored and supported resolutions in the UN and other forums calling for the complete isolation of the Pretoria Government.

It is in pursuit of this approach that we have sought the urgent enforcement of an international boycott of South Africa, the cessation of all forms of military and technological collaboration, and the stringent application of the mandatory embargo enforced by the Security Council Resolution No. 418(1977). We have called for withdrawal of all existing licences for arms manufacture, the cessation of activity by trans-national corporations and the stoppage of all investments in and financial loans to South Africa. No sanction would be complete without a mandatory embargo on petroleum supplies, and we have stressed this aspect also forcefully. As a member of the Special Committee against Apartheid, we have called for a better and more humane treatment of political prisoners in South Africa.

Within the limits of our capacity, we have tried to render all possible assistance to the victims of apartheid in South Africa, to South African students and refugees exiled from their country and to the cause of the African National Congress of South Africa.

The current commemoration of 1978-79 as International Anti-Apartheid Year has, I am happy to say, made our countrymen even more aware of the evils of apartheid. The National Committee of eminent public personalities which has been set up to implement the programme for the Year has done commendable work in this direction.

We welcome the presence in this Seminar of a distinguished South African freedom fighter of the African National Congress of South Africa, Stephen Dhlamini. His presence here lends more

immediacy and validity to the issues this International Seminar on Apartheid will consider.

It is my fervent hope that the Seminar will through its deliberations suggest even more effective means of strengthening the international campaign against apartheid and reinforcing our support for the victims of apartheid and those who fight it. I would like to conclude by expressing the hope that this Seminar will make a seminal contribution to the international struggle against apartheid in South Africa in particular, and against domination and subjugation everywhere.

2. South Africa and the Frontline States

Excerpts from Paper Presented by Stephen Dhlamini

RELATIONS between India and the oppressed and exploited peoples of South Africa date back to the days of the Father of the Indian Nation — Mahatma Gandhi. His satyagraha and non-violent campaigns in the struggle for human freedom first took shape and were applied in South African conditions during the early part of this century. Having himself undergone the humiliating experience of racism, Gandhi dedicated his life from then on to the pursuit of human dignity and the liberation of man from all forms of tyranny and oppression.

India's connection with Africa, and South Africa in particular, however, does not begin or end with Gandhiji. The leaders of India, particularly Nehru, emphasized time and again their belief that Indian freedom would be meaningless so long as other countries of Africa, Asia and the rest of the world remained under the iron heel of foreign domination. To be more precise, it should be mentioned here that even before their own freedom and independence from British rule, the people of India had fully identified themselves with the struggles of oppressed mankind the world over.

After attaining independence in 1947, India not only severed all links — diplomatic, economic, trade and cultural—with the racist Pretoria regime but also launched an international crusade against the evil system of apartheid and pledged her unqualified support for and solidarity with our liberation struggle. Today, we can confidently state that India's traditional support to our just cause has been very generous and consistent. Be it at the United Nations, amongst the non-aligned countries, or any other international forum,

the world has always witnessed India playing a leading role in mobilizing support for our cause. This great country's support to the struggle of the oppressed and struggling millions of our country is not confined to resolutions and speeches. Our Mission, ever since its establishment in 1967 in Delhi, has regularly received financial and other assistance from the Government of India. There are hundreds of South African students studying in this country on Indian Government scholarships. This aid and assistance is highly appreciated by the African National Congress and the struggling masses of our country.

In this paper, I intend to examine the political, economic and social relationship between the Republic of South Africa and those members of the Organization of African Unity which are now generally referred to as the "Frontline States". As is well known, the geographical border between the former and the latter states also maps out a line of political and ideological differences between the white-minority regime in Salisbury, the racist apartheid state of South Africa and the peoples of independent Africa.

Apartheid, as it is commonly known, is the system of government in the Republic of South Africa which is based upon the political subjugation and economic exploitation of the majority of the citizens of South Africa, the Blacks, for the benefit of the minority of its citizens who are the Whites. From this observation alone, it becomes abundantly clear that the policy of apartheid is undemocratic, dictatorial and despotic, because a parliament which has been elected by the numerically fewer Whites wields absolute control over the lives of three-quarters of its citizens, namely, the indigenous Africans, South Africans of Asian descent and the Coloureds. These latter are the progeny of miscegenation between Black and White, including the Cape Malays, who were first brought to South Africa as slaves during the era of the Dutch East India Company.

The apartheid system of government violates the basic tenets of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 1 of which states that "all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood".

In South Africa, not only are apartheid practices the norm, but they have been entrenched into the legal system of the country. For example, the Statute Book of South Africa contains repressive Acts of Parliament. These are the Suppression of Communism Act of 1950, the Criminal Law And Procedure Act of 1955, the General Law Amendment Act of 1962 and the Terrorism Act of 1967. Under

this barrage of legislation, South Africa has been effectively trans-
formed into a police state with definite fascist tendencies, where
the rule of law has literally been abandoned for rule
by legal violence, intimidation, police terror, and brutality.
Anyone who opposes the apartheid regime is considered
a "Communist". "Communism" is regarded as "any doctrine
or scheme which aims at the encouragement of feelings of hostility
between the European and non-European races of the Republic, the
consequences of which are calculated to further the achievement of
the object of bringing about any social change in the Republic by
threat of unlawful acts".

The economic exploitation of the Black people, especially the
Africans, takes the form of racial discrimination in labour relations.
According to the 1924 Industrial Conciliation Act, amended in 1956,
there shall be registered trade unions and employers organisations
for the prevention and settlement of labour disputes. "Employee"
under this Act is defined as "any person employed by an employer
but shall not include a person whose contract of service or labour is
regulated by Native (African) pass laws and regulations". This
means that under South African law, African trade unions are not
recognized by the Government and the employers. As a result,
African workers are the most exploited in the labour market in terms
of choice of work, conditions of employment and the wages they
receive. In fact, African wages, even for the same type of job, can
be 20 times lower than those of White workers, notwithstanding the
fact that under the Job Reservation Act African workers, at the dis-
cretion of the Minister of Labour, may not compete with Whites for
certain categories of employment reserved exclusively for White
workers. Apartheid legislation ensures that African labour is abun-
dant, cheap and can be moved about at will according to the political
dictates of the Pretoria White minority regime. It is also this state
of affairs which has enabled a high standard of living for the Whites
and there is virtually no unemployment for them. But more than
that, this situation has encouraged foreign investors because of high
profits, sometimes more than 19 times what they would get for
similar investments elsewhere.

Today the beneficiaries of this exploitative system are the
manipulators of finance capital in the West, to wit, the Western
multinational corporations that have a stake in the South African
economy, and therefore the *status quo*, which is referred to as "poli-
tical stability", "law and order" and "peace and tranquility".

The geographical border between the apartheid State of South

Africa and the politically independent African states in fact represents a line of demarcation and of conflict, between the racist White mino- rity regime in Pretoria, the forces of reaction and the African peoples who are marching towards progress, peace and security under their respective governments.

It is now a matter of history that the Oganization of African Unity (OAU), representing as it does the united voice of all the inde- pendent African states, has resolved, time and again, to aid the opp- ressed people of South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe in their just struggle for the attainment of freedom from racism, apartheid and colonialism. Not only that. The OAU has also established a Libera- tion Committee based in Dar-es-Salaam in Tanzania. The task assig- ned to this Committee is to coordinate material, diplomatic and humanitarian support the OAU accords to the liberation movements of Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa. The OAU has also endor- sed the legitimacy of the armed struggles embarked on by the natio- nal liberation movements of Southern Africa. Its support ranges from humanitarian aid to granting the liberation movements facilities to train their military cadres in guerilla warfare. This is almost impos- sible inside the territories still under the political domination of the White-minority regimes of Rhodesia and South Africa. Also, OAU member-states have pledged to give refuge to victims of oppression inside Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa.

Because of their geographical situation, the bulk of the burden of the OAU's support for the liberation struggles of Southern Africa falls on those African countries which are in proximity to Rhodesia and South Africa. These are Botswana, Zambia, Angola and Mozam- bique. Tanzania, which was in a similar position *vis-a-vis* the war of liberation in Mozambique and still hosts the OAU Liberation Committee, has since 1976, together with Botswana, Zambia, Angola and Mozambique, come to be known as the "Frontline States".

Needless to say, the OAU stand is anathema to both Salisbury and Pretoria, as well as the governments of the Western countries whose multinationals have huge investments in Rhodesia and South Africa. This is particularly so as far as the "Frontline States" go, to the extent that all the political, economic and military venom of the Pretoria-Salisbury axis has come to fall squarely on the shoulders of the "Frontline States", both individually and collectively.

The Pretoria and Salisbury regimes view with alarm the spread of ideas of democracy and equality of all human beings which inde- pendent Africa aspires to, and it is in their interests to curb the incur- sion of these into South Africa and Namibia and Zimbabwe. To

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achieve these ends, the Pretoria and Salisbury regimes, both more powerful than their neighbours to the north, have not hesitated to bring their power to bear on the "Frontline States" and on other OAU member-States, to pressurise them into changing their resolve to support the struggle for liberation in Southern Africa. This power is manifest in the following ways :

(a) Ideological power or power of ideas.

The apartheid state of South Africa in particular, through its now-defunct Department of Information, has produced, and continues to do so, publications in the form of booklets, newspapers, and other printed matter which it seeks to disseminate throughout the "Frontline States" with the aim of projecting apartheid in a favourable light. This relentless propaganda is also aimed at demoralising the Southern African liberation movements which have their offices in these "Frontline States". The Republic of South Africa operates a powerful radio transmitter from Johannesburg to beam pro-South African ideas to independent Africa, to the extent of broadcasting in the relevant local languages. When one considers that a radio-transmitter and a tele-satellite are to culture what superbombers and Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles are to the military, one comes to grips with the immediacy of the problem.

The Frontline States which have the required facilities and capacity have responded to this ideological onslaught by granting the Southen African liberation movements time on their radio stations to beam "freedom broadcasts" to the hearts of Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa.

(b) Remunerative power or power of having goods to offer.

This is also referred to as a *quid pro quo*, Both the apartheid regime of South Africa and the White-minority regime of Rhodesia have powerful economic bases compared to the Frontline States. After all, the latter are still in the process of restructuring their economies from being suppliers of raw materials to their erstwhile colonisers, to those that can be used to improve the standards of living of their own peoples. Because of this economic imbalance in favour of the White-minority regimes of the South, both Pretoria and Salisbury have not hesitated to use their economic power to pressurise not only the Frontline States, but also other OAU members as well. Again, the long-term goal has always been to dissuade these states from their commitment of full support for the national liberation movements from Southern Africa. The economic potential of the Pretoria-

Salisbury axis has also manifested itself in the form of bribes to spies, infiltrators and agents whose task is to disrupt the activities of the national liberation movements within the OAU member countries, as well as in the White-dominated territories. The now defunct Detente Policy of the mid-seventies that the apartheid state of Pretoria had embarked upon was also within the framework of this strategy, namely that "if you accept us (the Republic of South Africa) as we are, we can cooperate for our mutual economic development".

What the racist regimes of Pretoria and Salisbury always hide is the stark reality that under the prevailing conditions, any economic relations between them and the Frontline States would always leave the Pretoria-Salisbury axis dominant. As it is now, citizens from some of the Frontline States are part of the cheap migrant labour pool which fuels the South African economy.

(c) Punitive power
It is a well-known fact that the White-minority regimes of Salisbury and Pretoria are in a relatively strong military position compared to the OAU, and the Frontline States. This has been possible through extensive military cooperation between the Pretoria-Salisbury regimes and the military-industrial complexes of the Western world including the fascist dictatorships of Latin America. This exchange of military ideas, personnel and technology has gone on in spite of UN resolutions to the contrary. The net result is that both South Africa and Rhodesia are able, almost at will, to raid, bomb and attack what they refer to as guerilla military bases inside the Frontline States. But then, according to national liberation movement and other independent sources like the Red Cross and the UN High Commission for Refugees, refugee camps, and not military bases, have been the target of such military attacks.

Yet in spite of all the ideological, economic and military pressure which the Frontline States are subjected to, their principal resolve to support the national movements of Southern Africa stands firm and unchanged in the just and correct belief that right will triumph over might, that the forces of progress will overcome those of reaction, and that the day is not far when the Southern African liberation movements will crush the Pretoria-Salisbury state apparatus through armed seizure of power.

3. Prospects of Armed Struggles in Southern Africa
Excerpts from Paper Presented by Mohammed Timol
As a South African, a South African who is of Indian origin,

my visit to India at this particular time, to represent the gallant men and women who are in the ranks of the National Liberation Movement and its army—"Umkhonto we Sizwe" (The Spear of the Nation)—and are fighting with might and main to bring into fruition the great ideals of a free democratic and non-racial South Africa, a South Africa in which it will be a crime for anybody to preach or propagate the evil doctrine and practice of apartheid, is of great importance.

We note that it was as a result of the enslavement of your great country and its people that we, South Africans of Indian origin, were forcefully uprooted from our motherland to go and work in South Africa as identured labourers for the British colonialists. The position of Black South Africans—Africans, Coloureds and Indian people —from that time to this day has not changed.

It was against this evil system of oppression and depredation against the great majority of the peoples of South Africa that Gandhiji and many South Africans waged, and continue to wage, a relentless and uncompromising struggle.

These, then, are the foundations of the solidarity and bond of friendship that was forged between the peoples of India and South Africa. It is in this spirit that your country today continues to wage a consistent struggle for the eradication of apartheid—a system that has been declared a crime against humanity by the great majority of all progressive and peace-loving people. It is in the light of this that I, as a South African of Indian origin, find it a great honour to be a representative of all South African patriots at this seminar— patriots who are languishing on Robben Island, patriots who are under house-arrest and banishment, patriots undergoing torture this very moment at the hands of the Gestapo Security Police, the Security Police responsible for the brutal murder of 50 brave sons of our country since 1963. My elder brother, Ahmed Timol, who was a member of the ANC and was involved in the underground resistance movement, was arrested by the Security Police in October 1971. Five days after his detention he was murdered. He was thrown out of the 10th floor window of the Security Police headquarters in Johannesburg.

The struggle in Southern Africa today has entered its final and decisive stage. The masses of the people are more determined than ever before to end this system of racial brutality in South Africa. We have witnessed a growing armed confrontation between the militant forces of MK of the liberation army of the people and the terrorist forces of the apartheid regime. The presence of MK

is being felt by the enemy in every nook and corner of our country. Today, the enemy can no longer say he has destroyed the ANC. He has officially admitted that our movement is everywhere and that guerrilla warfare has come to stay in South Africa. The combatants of MK are putting the enemy forces to flight in the Western Transvaal, Northern Transvaal and in all places where the enemy tries to intercept them. Their fight cannot be viewed in isolation of the unabated resistance struggle waged by our youth and workers against the whole oppressive system of apartheid.

As a result of the steadily intensified armed struggle and the resistance of our people, the economic crisis facing South Africa has deepened. The permanently disturbed political climate and the intensified activity of the international community in support of our struggle have rudely shaken the confidence of overseas investors. Presently the South African economy is at a very low ebb, aggravated by the coming into power of the new revolutionary government in Iran, the breaking of all its ties with South Africa and the stoppage of oil sales to the racist white minority regime.

Returns on investments in the apartheid state have fallen from over 18% in 1960 to just over 8%, inflation has been rising and unemployment has reached enormous proportions. In the towns alone, Black unemployment has been estimated at over 2 million or 20% of the working population. The racists have to admit that one of the root causes is the political challenge posed by the oppressed people, who have shaken the hated system of apartheid to its very foundations.

Events in Southern Africa are moving at a fast pace. A revolutionary situation is emerging in this part of the African continent. The masses of our people have decided to take the racial monster by its horns and in this confrontation no power can halt the march of our people to freedom.

The events in Soweto and thereafter, which continue to intensify, have led the White racist minority regime to rant in different directions. One of the tactics is torture and repression. Thousands of our people have been murdered and wounded in the streets, at their homes, in detention in jails. Naked violence and brutal force are an integral element of fascism in South Africa. The aim is to "terrorise" our people and to silence the national liberation movement.

Our people are not intimidated. Their spirit of resistance is ever growing. The events of Soweto have shown that there is no middle road between apartheid and national liberation. Nothing

but the overthrow of the white racist regime will satisfy the people's demand for a free and democratic South Africa.

South Africa is undoubtedly the major economic and military power in Southern Africa. During the past two decades it has embarked on a massive military build-up and prepared its entire White population for war against its own people. With its ever-growing defence budget, it has established a substantial domestic armaments industry and purchased modern defence equipment of all types from its allies abroad.

The defence budget of South Africa in 1972-73 stood at R350 million. Then, as the Portuguese forces began to suffer heavy defeats in Africa, it was increased in 1973-74 to R480 million, in 1974-75 to R700 million and in 1975-76 to R948 million. In 1976-77 defence expenditure reached R1407 million and the figure for 1977-78 is R1940 million.

Over the last decade the military budget of the fascist Pretoria regime has escalated sixfold. Why has there been such a tremendous escalation in the military budget? This can only be viewed in one context. With the advent of the liberation of Angola and Mozambique, the intensification of the armed struggle in Southern Africa by ANC, SWAPO and the Patriotic Front, the Pretoria regime is clinging to the last vestiges of power in order to perpetuate and maintain the *status quo*. The massive security measures adopted by it reflect directly the growing threat posed by the liberation struggle. Indeed, in the very heart of South Africa the staccato reports of the guns of "Umkhonto we Sizwe" can be heard. It is this development within South Africa which has made the Pretoria regime more uncertain and desperately cling to its fascist ideology which day by day is being eroded and shattered by the fighting oppressed people of South Africa under the banner of ANC.

ANC, representing the majority of our people, spearheads the struggle for liberation. In the Freedom Charter drawn up by the Congress Alliance in 1955, the movement pledged itself to fight for a non-racial South Africa.

"We the people of South Africa declare for all our country and the world to know that South Africa belongs to all who live in it, Black and White and that no government can justly claim authority unless it is based on the will of all the people".

These are the ideals we cherish, the ideals for which we fight and are prepared to lay down our lives.

Book Reviews

Africa South of the Sahara: Party Systems and Ideologies of Socialism.
By Onisimo Silveira.   Stockholm, 1976, pp. 217.

THE issues of social and political development in Third World
countries are intricate.   More often than not, they defy the
familiar ways of resolving them since they do not fully conform to or
fit the known frameworks of social enquiry and analysis.   The inade-
quacy of available frameworks of enquiry in this respect had become
increasingly evident by the 1960s.   The Western liberal approaches
witnessed their failure in relation to the issues of development in the
Third World in the demise of the developmentist approach and the
confusion created around the modernization-tradition dialectics.   In
the case of the Marxian approach it became evident in the movement
towards dependency theory (or theories!) and the conceptualization
of the "non-capitalist path of development".   Intellectually, therefore,
we are still in the process of finding answers to questions related to
the dynamics and wide variety of values, patterns and systems in the
Third World.

The book under review is a part of the continuing intellectual
debate on developments in the Third World in general and in the
more volatile region of the Third World, Africa, in particular.   It is
divided into two parts.   In the first, which deals with the evolution
of party systems, the author shows how from a competitive multi-
party system the African countries settled for a model of single-party
states.   He offers an economic and social explanation for this politi-
cal evolution and relates it to the goal of modernization and national
integration as pursued by the political parties.   The second part of
the book discusses the rationale, evolution and variations of African
socialism.   First the contents and specificities of Socialism preached
and pursued by Sekou Toure, Senghor, Nyerere and Jomo Kenyatta
are dealt with separately and then the issues of social formations and
social classes in the context of Africa are analyzed.   The two parts
of the book stand on their own, almost unrelated to each other.   It
is somewhat intriguing to note that the author has made no attempt
to spell out the nature of interaction between the evolution of party
systems on the one hand and the ideology of socialism in Africa on
the other.

The most significant aspect of Silveira's approach is his pains-
taking effort to underline the irrelevance of 'Marxian theory' by using
the Marxian idiom itself.   He says:

"Marxian theory cannot be rejected *a priori* on the one hand, nor   on the

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other can it be held that it has been conceptualized on the basis of a study of societies existing in the part of Africa under review." (p. 151)

As a result of this dilemma, the author initiates his discussion on social formation by describing the Marxian concept of "Asiatic mode of production" as being more relevant for Africa (p. 150) but concludes that "the hiatus between social forces and governmental action which results from the Marxian characterization of Asiatic socie- ties cannot be applied without the greatest reservation to sub-Saharan pre-capitalist societies" (p. 153). He confuses the question of social classes by talking about the difference between "differentiated and stratified" societies (p. 163). He identifies major classes in Africa within the Marxian framework (pp. 163-170) but not without intro- ducing naive categories like 'bureaucratic' and 'transport' bourgeoisie which distorts the Marxian scheme. In his enthusiasm to show the inadequacy of the Marxian approach the author refers only to the classical, orthodox and even dogmatic Marxism. Many of his conceptual difficulties would have been removed only if he had viewed Marxist theory as an organic and living body of thought. For instance, if he had properly grasped the relationship between the base and the superstructure, the political and cultural categories would not have been granted autonomy vis-a-vis the economic forces. He therefore fails to capture the spirit and essential principles of the theory.

No one could quarrel with the author if he had sincerely tried to show the inadequacy of the Marxian approach in understanding Black Africa. The difficulty arises when after claiming to be in sympathy with the Marxian approach, he simply and uncritically accepts the Western intellectual prescriptions for the Third World. This becomes evident only through a careful reading of the book. Mention should be made of his emphasis on political power and socio-cultural identities as against economic forces throughout the study. At one place his unreserved and uncritical preference for things Western, including institutions and even colonialism, becomes clear. He states:

"...despite its disruptive forces, the colonial impact and its survival created opportunities which led to changes in the traditional balance of power and brought new forces into the African political arena...... Western-like institutions, in spite of acting as a pressure, activate, more than traditional institutions, the modern, secular aims of the nation state." (p. 176)

This statement reopens the question of the real nature of colonialism. It also reasserts the already rejected notion of tradition-modern dichotomy in understanding developments in the Third World.

Dr. Silveira's study has a weak data base. It places heavy reliance upon secondary sources except perhaps in its four chapters on the socialism of four African leaders (Chapters 6 to 9). Its best argued and most informative chapter is the one which deals with "Political Parties in a Colonial Context" (Chapter I).

S.D. MUNI

The State of Guinea-Bissau: African Socialism or Socialism in Africa? By Peter Aaby (The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, Uppsala, 1978), Research report No. 45, p. 35.

THE author has concerned himself with the development strategies of the PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau and with the application of the concept of socialism in the context of an African country. Guinea-Bissau is a newly independent developing country which was under the weakest colonial power, Portugal, till 1974. Its backward traditional sector, mainly represented by the Balante group, remained unintegrated under Portuguese colonialism. The semi-feudal Fulas groups were integrated into the export-oriented agricultural economy to produce groundnuts for the Portuguese. There was almost no industry. Thus, at the time of independence, the PAIGC was faced with the problem of integrating all the traditional backward groups in its economy in order to achieve self-sufficiency in agricultural production for local consumption, to give peasants incentives to produce more for export, to meet the needs of importing fuel and technology, to create a surplus and establish industries for essential commodities.

The PAIGC depends on the peasants for support. It realises the necessity of changing the traditional gerontocratic and polygamous nature of relations in the rural areas. However, it has rightly avoided the use of force to bring about this transformation; instead it has chosen to educate the masses and create social and political mobilization through schools and village committees, etc.

It has adopted the policy of "self-centred development" through increased agricultural productivity to meet the needs of local consumption and export. Production of crops like rice and groundnut is being increased to reduce imports of food. However, it has to import most of the consumer goods it requires.

The PAIGC has attempted partial nationalization of the means of distribution, such as introducing controls through fixed prices and by a monopoly of import of consumer goods through People's Stores. It hopes to encourage the establishment of buying cooperatives for selling seeds, fertilizers, tools, etc. to peasants, selling cooperatives and, finally, produce cooperatives. It has doubled the prices paid to

the peasants which will raise their purchasing power.

The most urgent need of Guinea-Bissau is to create a surplus for further development which can only come from the agricultural sector. The PAIGC is ready to co-operate with foreign capital to build the material foundations of the country as it lacks expertise and capital for investment.

The author has analyzed the question of leadership and violent revolution as principles of socialism. In the post-independence phase, peasants in Guinea-Bissau were not a revolutionary group. Therefore, the important thing for the party is to create structures for mobilization and to achieve economic and social development after capturing state power.

The author finds that nationalization of the means of production, i.e. land, is not an absolute necessity for socialist development in an African context. Thus, there is no contradiction between the requirements and the development policies of the PAIGC in Guinea-Bissau. There is no structural basis for distinguishing African socialism from genuine socialist development. When a party fails to achieve economic growth or the transformative potential of a country is blocked, or else if these can be achieved only through repressive policies, it is called African socialism. When, however, the policies succeed in achieving economic growth and popular support, it is called socialist development.

The policies of the PAIGC, according to the author, show a tendency for socialist development in which exploitation of the peasants is considerably reduced. However, he does not reject the possibility of its failure either. Everything would depend on the internal developments in the party and economic growth. The author finds lack of economic data a handicap in evaluating and determining the trends in production, consumption and accumulation and in the relationship between the party and the people. He suggests that it would not mean a mechanical prediction for the future, because a failure of policy today would not necessarily mean a failure in the future.

The author has focussed on the Balante group in Guinea-Bissau (based on his field study). The PAIGC has apparently eliminated the role of the Fulas and Mandingo chiefs who had perpetuated colonial exploitation. What has happened to these great, noble families? There is also a group of lower middle class merchants who tend to join hands with the bureaucratic bourgeoisie. It would also be relevant to study the social classes in the towns. Besides a couple of assimilados, about 1.5 per cent of the population formed the lower

middle class and low-ranking government employees who had backed Portuguese colonialism (see, G. Chaliand, *Armed Struggle in Africa*). Would the absorption of the earlier lower middle class in the administration lead to the development of bureaucratic bourgeoisie and further penetration of neo-colonialism in Guinea-Bissau, despite the development policies of the PAIGC?

In the light of the author's study, it would be necessary to further analyse whether foreign investment and an export-oriented economy have led to the integration of Guinea-Bissau into a neo-colonial pattern. Or whether there is a possibility of avoiding such a development through collaboration with the socialist world? Within an export-oriented economy the relevant question to ask is whether the option of breaking away from the capitalist world is given to developing countries like Guinea-Bissau wherein the export sector only covered about 15 per cent of the imports in 1976. How will it pay for other imports and its aid debts.? The absence of basic industries further accentuates this problem.

Notwithstanding these limitations, this brief research report makes an informative study of the development policies of the PAIGC. It informs the reader about the uniqueness of the conditions in Guinea-Bissau and enables him to appreciate the problems facing this underdeveloped former colonial country.

HARPREET MAHAJAN

West African States : Failure and Promise—A Study in Comparative Politics. By John Dunn (ed.), Cambridge University Press.

WEST African states represent a wide canvas of diverse experiences in terms of their colonial past, character of national liberation struggles, and the nature of political systems. They include states that have witnessed French rule (Guinea, Senegal and the Ivory Coast), British rule (Ghana, Nigeria and Sierra Leone) and Portuguese rule (Guinea-Bissau). These colonial experiences have contributed, to a certain extent, to a variety of styles of leadership as demonstrated by Nkrumah, Sekou Toure, Houphouet-Boigny, and Senghor. The paths these countries chose to achieve their developmental objectives after attaining political independence differed widely. Problems of these West African states have attracted the attention of social scientists in the past; for example, the formation and evolution of political parties in French West Africa, the later stages of colonial rule in West Africa and one-party states (Ivory Coast) were amply explored in the valuable studies made by R. S. Morganthau, Michael Crowder and Aristide Zolberg, respectively.

The present work is a collection of essays on West African states—Ghana, Guinea, Ivory Coast, Senegal, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone. It attempts to evaluate the performances of individual political systems in these states. The fact that all the contributors have refrained from adopting traditional methods of emphasizing only constitutional and governmental structures of these states has increased the importance of the study. The essays have been woven round two predominant disciplines—political economy and political sociology.

John Dunn, after acknowledging the outstanding quality of some works in this area, spells out the limits of scholarly research in the field. According to him, "Little sustained effort has yet been made to compare these experiences and it can hardly as yet be said that many plausible ideas have been advanced on possible determinants of variations between them" (p. 17). Perhaps the book has been edited with the idea of bridging this gap.

R.W. Johnson's unconventional essay on Guinea makes interesting reading. There is a romanticised myth about the revolutionary way in which Sekou Toure defied de Gaulle and led Guinea to independence. While exploding this myth, the author defends his stand by explaining the chain of events that virtually forced Toure to opt for independence. According to him, "Toure, trapped in a corner of his own construction, sought instinctive salvation in playing to the gallery" (p. 40). Further, "Guinea independence may be celebrated as a revolution but it was won by a reluctant revolutionary in a state of psychological trauma brought on by a compulsive resort to rhetoric" (p. 40). Sekou Toure's regime is also known for its vehement attack on Western imperialism and pro-socialist attitude in international relations. The author has however exposed some of the contradictions in Guinean foreign policy. The Guinean regime, according to him, "claimed to be socialist; but it gave ambassadorial status to the West Germans and denied it to the East Germans. When the government determined to show how seriously it took its own independence, it was the Russian ambassador, Solod, who was expelled in 1961" (p. 41). The problems of Guinean polity, such as internal political rivalries within a single political party, namely Parti Democratique du Guinea, and the post-1970 era of *complot permanent* have been well analysed.

Christopher Clapham's essay on Liberia is lucidly written. The author asserts, "The most salient features of the Liberian experience over the past thirty years have been political stability and economic growth" (p. 117). The evolution of Liberian polity has been interpreted

with reference to core and and periphery groups. The Americo-Liberian community constitutes a well-knit core group. A microscopic minority, its members hold most of the crucial governmental positions. For example, the two Presidents who have held office over the past thirty years, William V.S. Tubman and William R. Tolbert, have had no trace of indigenous blood in them (p. 120). The core group has been able to maintain its hold over 99 per cent of the population which is handicapped by the lack of political power. Although the privileged position of the immigrant group is attributed to a lack of politicization of the majority, the essay does not explain why such politicization could not come about. After imagining a hypothetical situation the author observes, "Were Liberian politics to be polarized into a confrontation between indigenous and immigrant communities, then a hinterland-based government would inevitably take over in one way or another, displacing as it did the existing core centred institutions" (p. 125).

Cruise O' Brien discusses the Senegalese experiment of a multi-party system. The essay displays a strong tendency to assess its success by European standards. African political parties, unlike European parties, do not have a long past. Also it took several years for European states to establish mature bi-party or multi-party regimes. Admittedly, when the multi-party systems in France and Senegal are studied together a glaring contrast strikes the observer. These systems are not directly compared in the article but their contrasting dimensions seem to have influenced the author who takes a highly critical view of the Senegalese experiment. He fails to take note of the fact that a young country like Senegal ventured to opt for a multi-party setup. This itself could be looked upon as a progressive step. In a way, the Senegalese regime is unique in Africa, which has been plagued by military rule and one-party dictatorships. But the author intends to drive home the point that although in theory a multi-party system the Senegalese regime in practice is a one-party dictatorship by Leopold Senghor. He writes, "Leopold Senghor's remarkable political career has after all to date been devoted (for nearly the past three political decades) to the very skilful elimination of rival political groups—by absorption or, if necessary, by legalized suppression" (p. 117).

Ivory Coast's policies after independence have provoked several controversies. As a result, a balanced appraisal of them has become rather difficult. The astonishing performance of its economy in terms of the rise in its GDP, per capita income, and continuous

·trade surpluses has prompted some observers to describe it as the 'Ivorian miracle'. However, a group of scholars, led by Samir Amin, ·denounce the so-called 'Ivorian miracle' as "growth without development". According to them, the foreign domination of local economic .activity, the economic disparities between the Northern and Southern parts of the country and the aggravation of social and economic inequalities are evidence of "growth without development". Bonnie Campbell's essay "The Ivory Coast" falls in the latter category. It might differ from Samir Amin's book *Le developpement du capitalisme en Cote D' Ivoire* in degree but not in substance. According to him, "political independence has done litttle to modify foreign domination of local economic activity. Instead the previous orientation of colonial economic activity has been guaranteed by changes which have taken place both in the metropolitan ·overseas policy and in the legislative and administrative policies implemented by the local group whose own economic and political power has depended on the continuation of the previous pattern of growth." (p. 79)

John Dunn in his concluding remarks observes, "What we have tried to offer here (with all allowance for the variations in the author's theoretical tastes) is less grandiose than a contribution to a science of comparative politics. It reflects, perhaps at best, a balance between recognizing the rationality of historical process and assessing the ·openness of history, a balance which can and will be tilted to very different angles by different observers of history but which every ·observer of history must seek to hold as best he or she can. By setting these experiences side by side we can explain (or at least seek to ·explain) how what did happen in these countries could have happened (What, about these societies and their historical location, made it broadly possible). We cannot explain why it did happen." (p. 214)

The collection is a valuable addition to the study of comparative politics in general and West African states in particular.

RAJEN HARSHE

Land Holding in the Usangu Plain: A Survey of Two Villages in the Southern Highlands of Tanzania. By Knut Pipping. Research Report No. 33. The Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, 1976, 122 pp. Skr. 5.

THE Scandinavian Institute of African Studies, founded in 1962 to collect and disseminate information about Africa and to promote a scholarly exchange of ideas on topics of central concern to the developing countries, deserves congratulations on having complet-

ed 34 research projects on Africa. Its reports, based on field work done by Scandinavian and African scholars, have thrown invaluable light on several aspects of political, social and economic life in African states. The data, collected and processed in a most scientific manner, and the conclusions drawn by the scholars have helped others far away from the African continent to understand African society and politics more intimately than before. Most of the reports also highlight some of the far-reaching changes that are taking place in post-independence African society.

The research report under review deals with a survey of two villages, Ruiwa and Uhambule, situated in the Usangu Plain in the Southern Highland Province of Tanzania. The purpose of the author's study was three-fold ; (a) to map the system of landholding in the Usangu plain, (b) to find out whether the recent increase in cash crop farming had led to the emergence of an entrepreneurial class of landowners, and (c) to investigate whether any factors could be discerned that seemed to aid progress in Usangu—factors which could be isolated through comparisons of the two communities residing in Ruiwa and Uhambule representing different stages of progress. The author rightly considers the second of these objectives of the greatest political significance, because if such an entrepreneurial class was found to have emerged in the rural areas of Tanzania, it would constitute a major obstacle to the transformation of the country into a Socialist state, in accordance with the ideals of President Nyerere embodied in his well-known *Ujamma* concept.

The author seems to have succeeded in accomplishing the first of the three objectives. He has been able to map the system of landholding in the Usangu plain. His major conclusions in this respect area : (1) Land is fairly equally distributed among the farmers of Usangu ; (2) Two-thirds of the villagers are small-holders; (3) There are no absentee land-owners; (4) Purchases of land are virtually unknown ; and (5) Land has no commercial value in Usangu.

On the second objective, which the author regards as the most important feature of his study, he has come to some important conclusions which can be profitably used by the Tanzanian Government involved in building a socialist state around the concept of *Ujamma*. His main conclusions in this regard are : (1) Those who hold positions of formal authority, more often than not, *come from the wealthiest stratum so that wealth and local political power are held in the same hands* ; (2) Although it is believed that much of the

opposition to the *Ujamma* policy in Tanzania comes from the wealthier land-owners, the two villages surveyed by the author have proved that the contrary is true. That the office-holders are clearly more in favour of the official policy of *Ujamma* than those who have held no office. According to the author, his students had reported that they had encountered much suspicion and many misconceptions about *Ujamma* among the ordinary people (p. 98). However, from the author's conclusions it appears that perhaps even the wealthier persons and the office-holders are, at heart, opposed to the *Ujamma* concept. This inference can be drawn from two remarks of the author. First he surmises that "it is quite possible that many of the interviewees were not sincere when answering our questions about Ujamma" (p. 98). Secondly, says the author, "I cannot suppress the suspicion that some of the better off and the literate farmers who declared themselves in favour of *Ujamma* did so in the hope and belief that they would be able to manipulate the new system in a way that would be advantageous to them" (p. 99). From this one gets the impression that not only are the poorer people and small land-holders opposed to *Ujamma* but even some of the wealthier people and the office-holders are not supporting it whole-heartedly.

This should be an eye-opener to the Government of Tanzania which continues to implement the *Ujamma* scheme. The Government may have to take effective measures to counteract such unhealthy trends. However, it is difficult to say how far empirical data from only two villages can indicate a trend for the entire country. No countrywide survey of this nature has been undertaken by any one so far.

The third objective—investigation and isolation of factors that aided progress in Usangu—was to be achieved by comparing the two communities representing different stages of progress. The author has failed in this objective as he was unable to obtain the co-variables. Possibly, he had either used wrong or badly operationalized variables or even because he had chosen research sites 'unwisely' as he himself admits (p. 100). The author had perhaps also not framed his questionnaire properly.

The sociological survey of just two villages cannot be of much use either to the Government or to scholars. Its value is further reduced by the fact that the author himself is not sure of the correctness of the data collected by him and his team-mates. He says that "some of the responses given do not adequately express the responpondents' real opinions, and that other answers contained distortions of facts" (p. 6). About the data concerning age distribution, the

author himself points out that they are "not entirely reliable" (p. 15) Regarding the data about children, he states : "Owing to the short time at our disposal and the time and care it takes to gather this kind of information accurately, the quality of my data about children is not as high as it ought to be" (p. 22). While in earlier cases there might have been some justification for not being able to gather accurate data, in this particular one the absence of reliable data is entirely due to the author's own fault. As he himself admits it, he was short of time and he had not pointed out to the interviewers the necessity of being careful (p. 22). He also admits that he had not made any further investigations when the students gave inaccurate answers (p. 22). This is a serious lapse on his part. The author goes on to admit that the material collected by him contains 'coding errors' (p. 22). He adds, "The data about emigrant children's occupations are so incomplete that there is no point in trying to analyze them" (p. 25). These mistakes are almost unpardonable. If all his data, according to his own admission, in unreliable, it is naturally difficult to believe in the correctness of his conclusions based on it. For example, how can any reader be convinced by the author's statement that "the main demographic characteristics of Ruiwa and Uhambule show more similarities than differences between the villages" (p. 25). It is quite possible that the whole picture might have been different if the data were reliable and accurate.

However, despite these facts, the author's labours should not be deemed to have gone waste. The crowning part of his survey report appears to be Chapter VI entitled "Cooperation" in which he has provided some very useful information relating to the implementation of the *Ujamma* scheme. The statistics incorporated in this chapter may prove very useful to the Government which is presently engaged in the implementation of the scheme. Knut Pipping's survey may also be of great help to those scholars who are planning similar studies in Africa or elsewhere. In particular, they have to note why more reliable data could not collected by the author and his team-mates so that they do not commit the same mistakes which the author has committed. Difficulties of language, illiteracy among the peoples and fear of consequences in giving correct answers should be highlighted. In fact social scientists engaged in similar research in Africa or elsewhere will have to devise procedures and alternative methods to overcome these difficulties to enable more reliable data to be collected and processed. Unless this is done, no dependable conclusions can be drawn and, therefore, no appropriate remedial or follow-up action taken.   S.C. SAXENA

Activities of the Centre

THE following is an account of the activities of the Indian Centre for Africa for the quarter ended March 31, 1979:

Anti-apartheid Year

The period January-March marked the culmination of the activities organised by the Indian Centre for Africa to observe the UN International Anti-apartheid Year which ended on March 31. The activities were spread over most of the states in the country.

In New Delhi an International Anti-apartheid Seminar was organised at the Parliament House Annexe from March 16 to 18 (See also pp. 78-89). Inaugurated by Mr. Atal Bihari Vajpayee, India's Foreign Minister, the seminar was attended by Mr. Asoka Mehta, the Chairman, and members of the Indian National Committee, officials from the Ministry of External Affairs, diplomatic personnel from the African and other Missions in New Delhi, members of political parties, intellectuals and academicians as well as a large number of students, both African and Indian.

The Indian National Committee organised on January 29 at Jawaharlal Nehru University in collaboration with UNESCO Club for the observance of UN International Anti-apartheid Year a two-day seminar which was inaugurated by Mr. Asoka Mehta. A pictorial exhibition was also on view on this occasion and three films on apartheid—'The Rising Tides', 'Exile' and 'Security Council in Africa'—were screened. A two-day seminar was also organised at the Jamia Milia Islamia and another at Bhagat Singh College of Delhi University.

The Executive Secretary of the Indian National Committee, Miss Pakeeza Sultan, left on a three-week tour of Africa at the end of February. She visited Kenya, Zambia, Mozambique, Tanzania, Ethiopia and other countries to express the solidarity of the Indian people with the peoples of Africa. She met several diplomats and scholars engaged in the crusade against racialism.

In Bombay, the International Students House Association, in collaboration with Bombay University and the Indian Council for Cultural Relations, arranged a symposium and an exhibition on apartheid on February 2. The symposium was inaugurated by Mr. Asoka Mehta, and the exhibition by Mrs. Shanti Sadiq Ali. SNDT Women's University, in collaboration with Bombay University, arrang-

ed a seminar on apartheid. A mammoth Citizens' Rally to observe the International Anti-apartheid Year was convened on March 21. It was addressed by Mr. Atal Bihari Vajpayee, Minister of External Affairs, Mr. Sharad Pawar, Chief Minister of Maharashtra, Mr. Asoka Mehta, Mrs. Shanti Sadiq Ali, Mrs. Msimang, acting Chief Representative of the African National Congress, and Mr. J. N. Dixit, Secretary, ICCR.

In Calcutta, a two-day function to mark the International Anti-apartheid Year was held towards the end of March. A photographic exhibition as part of the programme was inaugurated at Sisir Mancha by Dr. Asoka Mitra, Minister of Finance, Government of West Bengal. A mushaira was organised at Great Eastern Hotel in March in which poets and singers from Delhi, Jullundar, Hyderabad and Bombay participated. Two seminars on apartheid—one at Calcutta University and the other at Jadavpur University—were also held. A number of African delegates and Indian scholars participated in them. A film show and an exhibition of books and journals on apartheid and South Africa as well as a get-together of Indian and foreign students were organised under the auspices of Lady Brabourne College.

In Chandigarh a well-attended seminar was organised with the cooperation of the universities of Rohtak, Punjab, Kurukshetra and Simla. It was inaugurated by Mr. Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer of the Supreme Court of India. Mr. H. S. Chhabra was the regional coordinator. Mr. J. N. Dixit, Secretary, ICCR, also spoke on the occasion.

At Sambalpur in Orissa a two-day seminar on apartheid was organised in March. It was inaugurated by Mr. Samarendra Kundu, Minister of State for External Affairs. The key-note address was given by Dr. Radhanath Dhar, Editor of *Samaj*, an Oriya daily. The state of Orissa had its second seminar at Bhubneshwar, organised under the aegis of the Orissa United Nations Association. It was also inaugurated by Mr. Samrendra Kundu. The Chief Justice of the Orissa High Court presided.

In Shillong, the North-eastern Hill University organised a well-attended seminar.

Patna and Bhagalpur in Bihar also saw anti-apartheid activities.

The Department of Political Science, Rajasthan University, organised a seminar on the problems of apartheid and racial discrimina-

tion. It was inaugurated by the Chairman of the Indian National Committee, Mr. Asoka Mehta.

In the southern region of India, Tamilnadu, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh were deeply involved in anti-apartheid activities. Two 16mm films—'Free' Namibia' and 'Rising Tides'—were screened in Madras city as well as in the districts. A photographic exhibition was also held. It was inaugurated by Dr. Malcolm Adiseshiah, convenor of the Tamil Nadu State Committee on Apartheid.

In Hyderabad, a seminar was organised under the auspices of the Anti-apartheid Programme Committee. All the eight universities in the state cooperated in the endeavour. A large number of local scholars participated in the discussions. It was inaugurated by Mir Akbar Ali Khan, former Governor of Orissa, presided over by Mr. B. Venkatarama Reddy, Education Minister of Andhra Pradesh, and attended by the Chief Justice of the Andhra Pradesh High Court and leaders of political parties.

At Bangalore a get-together and a two-day seminar were organised. The seminar was inaugurated by Dr. Babacar Diop, Ambassador of Senegal in India. Prof. Anirudha Gupta of Jawaharlal Nehru University and Mr. H. S. Chhabra, Editor of *Africa Diary*, participated in the discussions. A resolution condemning the apartheid policy of South Africa was adopted. A photographic exhibition was also held.

Africa Quarterly Editorial Board

A meeting of the Editorial Board of *Africa Quarterly* was held on January 12 under the chairmanship of Mr. Asoka Mehta. The meeting finalised the design of the cover page of the journal and selected articles and other material for publication in the January-March issue (Vol. XVIII). It was decided to bring out a larger issue of *Africa Quarterly* combining two numbers in order to overcome delays in the production of the journal and make it up-to-date.

Developments in Africa
Vanita Ray

THE CONTINENT

Non-aligned Meet at Maputo

FOREIGN Ministers of some 30 member countries met in the Mozambican capital, Maputo, for the first ever full ministerial meeting of the Coordinating Bureau of the Non-aligned Countries to be held outside New York. Beginning its deliberations on January 29, the meeting, which was also attended by representatives of the region's liberation groups, focussed attention on steps to intensify the liberation struggles in Southern Africa—Rhodesia, Namibia and South Africa.

In a Communique unanimously. adopted on February 2, the Non-aligned Coordinating Bureau called on member-countries to redouble their efforts to assist the liberation movements in Southern Africa and the people there to decide their own future without any outside interference. Apart from reaffirming their moral backing, the Ministers also called for substantially higher assistance to the 'frontline' states to preserve and strengthen their independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The Communique requested members of the UN, especially the Security Council, to undertake measures, including those provided under the Chapter on Sanctions, to deal with the aggressive actions of racist regimes which threatened peace and security in the region and in the rest of the world.

The Communique also expressed complete solidarity with Lesotho in its struggle to overcome "the tremendous odds" it faced "by virtue of its geographical location and consequent exploitative pressures brought on it by the surrounding apartheid regime" While expressing support for the 'frontline' states and the liberation movements of the region, the Bureau hoped that they would combine all forms of struggle in the best interests of their peoples.

Finally, the Communique, noting that Africa had given numerical and qualitative strength to the non-aligned movement and made

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it a powerful anti-colonial and anti-racist force, expressed the view that Africa provided a critical test for the success of international efforts towards the establishment of a "new order" based on justice, equality and human dignity throughout the world. "Africa must therefore remain a special concern of the non-aligned movement."

Emancipation of Africa, ending of imperialist exploitation, elimination from Africa of external power rivalries, denuclearisation of the continent and international cooperation for economic and social development—all these, the Communique said, should not be merely of regional or continental concern, but frontiers of the non-aligned movement and the UN.

Commonwealth Industries Ministers Meet

The first ever Conference of Commonwealth Industries Ministers met in Bangalore in the second week of March. Attended by 26 member-states, the three-day meet broke new ground in its decision to start an action programme on industrial cooperation among Commonwealth nations with a view to promote rapid economic cooperation.

The Industries Ministers agreed to set up an industrial development unit in the Commonwealth Secretariat with a modest fund of £5 million to be contributed by member-nations over a period of three years. The Fund would be patterned on the lines of the existing Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation (CFTC) and the criteria for determining the contributions of member nations would be their population and per capita income. India may head the list of donors among the developing countries within the Commonwealth.

On the suggestion of the Commonwealth team of industrial specialists, headed by L. K. Jha, the Conference agreed to create a Commonwealth venture capital company to provide a minimum equity capital for industrial enterprises in developing member countries. A working group is to be set up by the Commonwealth Secretary-General to go into all aspects of this proposal and to facilitate an early decision.

The meeting identified small-scale and agro-based industries, utilising appropriate technologies wherever possible, as one of the most promising areas of cooperation. Joint action was also recommended in a number of specialized activities including project identification and appraisal, manpower and entrepreneurial development, creation of an industrial infrastructure, selection of appropriate technology, procurement of finance and access to markets. To faci-

litate this the Commonwealth Secretariat would collect and analyze information on available technology, expertise, training facilities and other capabilities within member-countries and disseminate this information to all the member nations.

The concept of industrial cooperation between Commonwealth nations is not new. The Colombo Plan was based on such a concept. Nevertheless, the traditional pattern of transfer of technology, from the developed to the developing nations, has been objected to by a large number of the Third World countries. They feel that this pattern has distorted the perception of their developmental problems and has in a sense widened the technological gap between the two groups. Noting these distortions, the Conference on Technical Cooperation among Developing Countries, organized by the UN at Buenos Aires (Argentina) in September last year recommended that techniques for the transfer of technology must be such that they are understood by those who must put them into practice. The Buenos Aires Conference recognized that in these respects developing countries could teach others a great deal. The programme proposed by the Commonwealth Industries Ministers at Bangalore falls into this category.

A significant outcome of the Bangalore meeting is that India, which has offered to share its knowledge "without strings or obligations", lost no time in implementing the proposed programme. It has concluded bilateral agreements with seven Commonwealth countries—the tiny Pacific island Nauru, Bangladesh, Tanzania, the Solomon Islands, Nigeria, Fiji and Cyprus—for setting up industries, transferring technology and training personnel.

The Commonwealth Heads of State, meeting in Lusaka in August, are expected to ratify this action programme.

U.S. Naval Task Force in Indian Ocean

The US raised its naval fleet complement in the Indian Ocean from four to nine in the first week of January. Five vessels from the Seventh Fleet sailed into the region to join the four warships that had been there for the past two months. Of the nine US ships now in the Indian Ocean, six are warships (two missile-launching destroyers) and three refuelling vessels.

The Pentagon, in a statement on 9 January, indicated that the US might keep the warships in the Indian Ocean waters during the crisis in Iran. Since 1972, the US has conducted 18 periodic "show

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the flag" cruises in the Indian Ocean, each lasting up to about two months ; it has not maintained a continuing presence there.

The Indian Government expressed concern at this increased Super Power naval activity in the Indian Ocean. The Defence Minister, Jagjivan Ram, stated on 11 January, that the US move would certainly disturb the peace in the area. He reiterated India's stand that the Indian Ocean should be maintained as a zone of peace by all powers.

Later in March, the External Affairs Minister, Atal Behari. Vajpayee, in a statement made in the Lok Sabha, expressed India's "distress at the US Government's decision to despatch a carrier-led naval task force to the Indian Ocean and the Gulf area." He declared that the US step was contrary to the spirit of the UN resolution on keeping the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. The US plan, Vajpayee added, could not assist the process of bringing about stability in the region which had seen "dramatic upheavals" and was still seething with tensions and uncertainty. "Stability in the region, first and foremost, depends on the countries themselves and the resolution of bilateral problems and regional cooperation between them."

The All-India Peace and Solidarity Organization condemned the US naval military manoeuvres in the Gulf area and the Indian Ocean and said that by doubling the naval strength in this region, the US Seventh Fleet "is openly interfering in the developments in Iran and the Gulf region." In a statement issued on January 13 it added : "In order to maintain its base and political influence in the whole area from West Asia to South-East Asia, against the rising tide of the democratic forces and their victories, the US Government is planning to rearm Pakistan and send F-15 fighter planes to Saudi Arabia. Its open connivance with the Chinese rulers in the UN Security Council is part of furthering its own interests. But this military pressure and gunboat diplomacy can never succeed...."

The Soviet Union accused the US of avoiding resumption of talks on limiting military activity in the Indian Ocean region. The Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister, Georg Kornienko, stated in Moscow on 27 January that the movement of naval forces in the Indian Ocean and adjoining areas was an indication that Washington had no intention of signing the agreement. The Soviet Union refused to surrender its "freedom of action" and allow its hands to be tied by such an agreement. He also expressed concern at the pace with which the US was militarising the islands in the Indian Ocean and increasing its naval activity in the region.

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Others to condemn the US naval activity in the region were Ethiopia and the Seychelles. Ethiopia regarded it as a "manifestation of recent diplomatic and political manoeuvres of certain Western powers, in concert with international reaction" which constituted a "grave threat to stability as well as to international peace and security." Seychelles leader Albert Rene, in a letter to President Carter, stated that an American force in the Indian Ocean would intensify the power struggle in the region and delay efforts to establish a zone of peace. He added that the implementation of such a proposal would affect the good relations between the US and the people of the Indian Ocean region.

A conference of the littoral and hinterland states of the Indian Ocean is to meet in New York in July. The July meeting, to be held at ambassadorial level, will pave the way for a wider conference to consider implementation of the 1971 UN Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, which has since remained on paper.

This was the decision of the 23-nation *ad hoc* Committee on the Indian Ocean which met in March at UN headquarters. At the meeting, the Sri Lanka Chairman, B.J. Fernando, expressed concern at the current situation in the area. Alluding to the deadlock in the negotiations between Washington and Moscow on ending military activity in the area and reports of the formation of a US fleet to patrol the region, he said the situation "continues to evolve in directions that makes it all the more imperative that we strive tirelessly towards the realisation of the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace."

The Committee also decided to invite 11 "outside" nations, apart from the 44 littoral and hinterland states, to the July meeting. The countries to be invited are Britain, Canada, France, West Germany, Italy, Liberia, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the Soviet Union and the US. At an earlier meeting, held in February, the Committee had decided that China, Japan, Greece and Panama should be included along with the 44 states of the area.

"Group of 77" Meets at Arusha

Ministerial delegates from 80 of the 117 developing countries which make up the "Group of 77" met at Arusha (Tanzania) in the third week of February. After five days' deliberations, the Conference declared itself ready for a showdown with the industrialized nations over demands for world economic reforms. This consensus was arrived at after Latin American and African states agreed to proposals to stabilize commodity prices.

The highlight of the Arusha meeting was a proposal for mandatory and direct contributions of at least one million dollars by each participating government to a fund for stockpiling raw materials and evening out variations in their prices. The "common fund" proposal, envisaging the participation of both rich and poor nations, was to be presented at UNCTAD, the periodic forum where the Third World has for a generation tried to wrest better terms from the West. The industrial nations had succeeded in blocking acceptance of a common fund at previous UNCTAD sessions.

The "Group of 77" Ministers also expressed a lack of confidence in the North-South dialogue held in Paris as a rich-poor forum parallel to the UNCTAD. They agreed to study the possibility of creating a Third World secretariat to improve cooperation among poor countries and called for a large-scale transfer of resources to them as a means of strengthening the global economy. Specific proposals included increased government aid, easing of protective tariffs against Third World products and technological assistance.

The "Group of 77" also issued a political statement of condemnation of the racist regimes of Southern Africa. It read : "The Ministers reiterate their unswerving support for the heroic struggles of the peoples of Namibia, Rhodesia, South Africa and Palestine to achieve their liberation and to regain effective control over their natural resources and economic activities."

For the "Group of 77" (the name is derived from the original number of subscriber-nations that formed the lobbying group), Arusha represented the last chance to detail a common strategy to face the industrialized nations at the 5th United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) which was due to meet in May in Manila. Efforts were thus made to initiate ways to pressurize the industrialized countries to concede the Third World's major demands. These included greater access to the markets of the industrialized world, a common fund to stabilize commodity prices ; international monetary reform and rescheduling of the massive debt burden of the world's poorest countries.

Pan-African News Agency to be Established

African Information Ministers adopted a convention on April 9 establishing a Pan-African News Agency (PAFNA), following a six-day meeting in Addis Ababa. The objective of the news agency is to correct "the distorted picture of Africa, its countries and peoples, resulting from partial and negative information published by foreign

press agencies." It also aims at promoting the objectives of the OAU, assisting the liberation struggle in Africa, and setting up a data bank on member countries with a view to collecting, processing and disseminating adequate documentation.

The convention named an inter-governmental council to act as the "guiding body" of PAFNA, subject to the general policy directives of the Council of Information Ministers. It also agreed on the organization and functioning of the agency, offices of the regional pools (the capitals of Sudan, Libya, Nigeria, Zambia and Zaire were selected to serve as regional pools), sources of information and its budget.

Honecker Visits African Countries

The German Democratic Republic Head of State, Erich Honecker,toured Libya, Angola. Zambia and Mozambique in the third week of February. The state visit, which took Honecker and his top aides to these countries to confer with the Libyan leader, Gaddafi and Presidents Agostinho Neto, Kenneth Kaunda and Samora Machel, was watched with keen interest in the Western countries and the Third World. The visit improved bilateral relations with these progressive African nations and was expected to have its impact on the armed struggles against the 'white racist regimes of Rhodesia, South Africa and Namibia.

NORTH AFRICA ·

'New Style' of Government in Algeria

President Benjedid Chadli, the new Algerian leader who emerged as the compromise candidate backed by the military in the behind-the-scenes succession struggle that began when Col. Boumedienne was stricken by a rare blood disease last December, has subtly changed and introduced a 'new style' of government in Algeria. Algeria, which under the austere, revolutionary Houari Boumedienne's tight 13-year control had embarked on the revolutionary socialist path, with emphasis on industrial development, now focussed its attention on "improving the daily needs of citizens" and raising production levels, particularly in Algeria's stagnant and heavily collectivized agricultural sector.

Col. Boumedienne's policy to turn Algeria into a self-sufficient industrial nation before its oil and natural gas reserves were exhausted had left a potentially rich agricultural sector a poor step-sister in the economy. Algeria today imports two-thirds of its grain

and a third of its other food stuff. Food purchases consume more than 20 per cent of the foreign exchange earnings from oil and gas. Col. Chadli has more than once emphasized in his public speeches the importance of developing land which he maintains will remain long after the oil and gas are gone, To attain his objective of land development, a dynamic military officer, Lt. Col. Sebin Saadi, has been appointed Minister of Agriculture. Already plans are under way to effect a thorough house-cleaning and to eliminate corrupt elements.

A number of other measures have also been initiated by the Chadli Government to relieve the tight controls of 13 years. Algerians have now been given permission to travel abroad. Personal income taxes, which had fallen heavily on the middle class as inflation pushed toward an annual rate of 25%, have been slashed. Dock workers and some truck drivers are being paid on a piecework basis instead of daily wages as an incentive to productivity. The Government has also eased restrictions on private construction, notably in areas away from Algiers. In the capital, thousands of apartments, once owned by the French colonialists and now in State possession, would be put up for sale.

United States to Build Egypt Militarily

A US military delegation arrived in Cairo on January 29 amidst increasing signs that the Americans were looking to Egypt to fill the gap left by Iran as a buffer to Soviet influence in the Middle East. While the US has long courted Egypt politically, its military interest is relatively new.

An office of military cooperation was opened in late October to "assist Egypt in receiving, using and maintaining US military equipment and training". The Chief of Naval Intelligence, the Head of the Pentagon's Defence Intelligence Agency and a Deputy Secretary of Defence, visited Egypt earlier in the year. A Pentagon delegation, which was expected to resolve the financial problems holding up F-5 deliveries, is due to visit both Egypt and Saudi Arabia in the near future. This was indicated by the Egyptian Defence Minister, Kamal Hassan Ali, while speaking to troops stationed in Alexandria.

Egypt Increases Defence Budget

Egypt's military spending indicates an increase of 20 per cent in its new budget. The Egyptian Finance Minister, Ali Loutfi, anno-

unced early in January that military outlays would be boosted from a billion pounds ($1.5 billion in 1978) to $1.2 billion pounds ($1.8 billion) for the current year. The Budget, the minister said, aimed at meeting the army's "defensive needs" but refused to comment on the proportion such expenses constituted of the nation's general budget. He indicated that he was planning to ask the US, West Germany and Japan for two billion dollars in aid for the current year. He added that Egypt needed 10 billion dollars for the next five years to restore its infrastructure.

Egypt and Sudan Sign "Integration" Pact

Presidents Jaffar El Numeiry of Sudan and Sadat of Egypt signed in Khartoum on January 21 an agreement "integrating" the two countries in the economic, social and cultural spheres. Among other things, the agreement recommended the construction of a highway linking Egypt with Sudan and exchange of information on studies to coordinate educational curricula in the two countries in 1981. Drafts on the unification of labour and social welfare laws were under preparation.

The Agreement had aroused widespread hopes of political integration similar to that which existed under the Condominium before 1956. However, it did not break any new ground and its tentative nature defined the limits of the two leaders' political authority. Also, probably, the two sides had reservations about full political integration such as existed during the Condominium or of the kind that emerged during Egypt's all too brief federation with Syria in the early fifties and with Libya in the early part of the present decade.

The Condominium was a British device which both states outgrew following the Suez War, and despite President Nasser's efforts to revive it he failed dismally. Since then Sudan has jealously guarded its status which is superior to its somewhat "less equal" partnership in the Condominium. It wants to protect itself against Arab domination from the north. Sudan is relatively backward and, like Libya, is suspicious of Egyptian intentions.

What in fact draws the two countries closer is their shared aversion of Libya's Col. Gaddafi who had engineered two coup attempts against President Numeiry not long after Cairo and Khartoum rejected his proposal for a political integration of Libya, Egypt and Sudan. Moreover, Egypt and Sudan are united in their concern over the spread of Soviet influence in the Horn of Africa, leftist sub-

version in their countries and fear of revival of the rightist Muslim brotherhood.

EAST AFRICA

Idi Amin Falls

Uganda's new President, exiled Professor Yusufu Lule, and his Cabinet were sworn into office on April 13 in Kampala's Parliament Square. A jubilant crowd of Ugandans welcomed the 67-year-old quiet and courteous professor who had lived in exile for ten years. He left Uganda after being sacked as Principal of Makerere University College by Field Marshal Amin's predecessor, Milton Obote. A political neutral, he was persuaded by his fellow exiles to preside over the transition from Field Marshal Amin's brutal regime.

The new government took over after the fall of the Ugandan capital, Kampala, to the Tanzanian-aided Ugandan exiles (Uganda National Liberation Front) and the self-styled "Conqueror of the British Empire", Field Marshal Idi Amin Dada, had taken flight.

The fall of the "Hitler of Africa" (that was how President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania described his psychopathic neighbour) after eight years of a ruthlessly autocratic regime was a welcome riddance for which not only the Ugandans but the whole world would be grateful.

The eight years of Amin's absolute power, since he overthrew President Milton Obote in a coup in January 1971, were replete with striking events—painful and ridiculous. The former heavy-weight boxer who proclaimed himself "President for Life", had awarded himself high ranking positions and several decorations. Describing himself as the "Conqueror of the British Empire", the meglomaniac had threatened the British and other Western powers. He won the fraternal support of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi and the Palestinians, but failed to win the loyalty of his own countrymen or even the neighbouring Tanzanians. At home, Amin remained a tribal leader despite his pretensions to uphold the African and Arab rights against Western depredations. In fact this was carried to such an extent that he completely alienated his own people. When isolated, he did not hesitate to resort to brutal repression and indiscriminate killings to safeguard his own position. Amnesty International estimated that 300,000 Ugandans met a violent end at the hands of the Amin regime. Among them were two of the dictator's many wives.

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The tasks lying ahead of the 14-man Provisional Government of Yusufu Lule in the post-Amin Uganda are daunting indeed. Firstly, it will have to make all-out efforts for economic recovery. The economy of this potentially rich African country is now in a shambles—what with the shortage of essential commodities, the near collapse of internal resource mobilization and the staggering external debt burden. Secondly, the Government will have to undertake the uphill task of restoring a minimum level of security to the people. Amin's policy of genocide, which set tribe against tribe and manipulated communal feelings, had completely shattered the confidence of the Ugandans. So notorious had the Ugandan tyrant become that even his friends and true sympathizers—notably Libya and Kenya—had found it degrading to continue their association with him. The third major task of the Lule Government is in the sphere of external relations. The five-month military offensive by one independent country against another has created sensitive problems not only for the region but also for the OAU. There are fears that acceptance of this would be setting a precedent in a continent where colonialism had left behind a staggering range of territorial, border, national and tribal problems. It is now for the new government to convince the others that Uganda's was an exceptional case and that Tanzania's action was morally and legally justified. More so, since it was Idi Amin who had some six months ago launched the offensive against Tanzania, occupied a chunk of its territory and proclaimed it to the world. In the regional sphere it would be more than necessary to normalize relations. In this, an important part will have to be played by Tanzania because it had denied Kenya free access to its markets and through it to the other countries in Africa. For Kenya's rulers also there was no escape from normalizing relations at the regional level.

WEST AFRICA

President Sekou Toure Visits UAE

The Guinean President, Sekou Toure, paid a three-day official visit to the United Arab Emirates in the first week of March. Talks were held with President Zayed Bin Sultan Al Nahyan on bilateral relations and the situation in West Asia.

In a joint communique, issued on March 7 in Abu Dhabi and Conakry, the two leaders expressed satisfaction over the understanding, fraternity and fruitful cooperation prevailing in the relations

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between the two countries. They emphasized their keenness to develop and promote these relations in the political, economic, cultural and information spheres to serve the interests of the two countries and for the benefit of the African peoples.

The two sides reviewed the situation in West Asia and "stressed the necessity of Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Arab land, including Jerusalem, and to guarantee the rights of the Palestinian people to have their lands restored, for self-determination and the establishment of their state on their land." The two leaders condemned Israeli "expansionist activities aiming at impeding peace efforts in the region and repudiated the existing cooperation between Israel and the racial regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia."

The communique "repudiated the policy of apartheid and racial discrimination practised by the While minority Government in Pretoria and emphasized the right of the African people in South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe, in liberating themselves from colonial imperialism and to consolidate their struggle to obtain their freedom and independence." It called for the end of South African occupation of Namibia, and expressed support for the African liberation movements in South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe.

Trans-Gabon Railway

President Omar Bongo of Gabon opened in March the first stage of the Trans-Gabonese Railway which, he said, would "consolidate our national unity." This stage—a stretch of 185 km—links the port of Owendo-Libreville with Ndjole. The second stage of the 960 km. railroad will reach Francville, in the south, allowing production of manganese to be doubled from the present 1.5 million tonnes a year and the annual output of uranium to be tripled. The third stage of the railway, swinging back towards the northeast, will open up iron-ore reserves estimated at billions of tonnes and permit development of the country's forest of rare hardwoods.

Gabon is to bear half the cost for the first two stages of track construction, with the rest coming from loans by France, the US, Italy and West Germany. Saudi Arabia has promised aid to provide electronic signals.

Nigeria Announces Elections

The Head of State of Nigeria, Lt. Gen. Olusegun Obasanjo, announced on March 31 that elections would be held between July and September in preparation for turning the country over to civilian

rule. The military, which has ruled Nigeria off and on since taking over in a series of coups in 1966, was expected to hand over to elected civilians in October.

CENTRAL AFRICA

Kano Agreement Ends Civil War in Chad

An agreement was signed in the northern Nigerian city of Kano on March 15 between Chad's faction leaders to end the two-month-old hostilities in the country. Chief among the signatories to the agreement, which was brought about largely through the good offices of the Nigerian Government, were President Felix Malloum and his main opponent, Premier Hissene Habre.

The accord called for:

(i) A general ceasefire in Chad and the establishment of a neutral peace-accepting force to be provided by Nigeria. In addition, an independent monitoring commission, composed of delegates from the countries attending the Kano conference and representatives of the Chad factions, under the chairmanship of a Nigerian will be set up.

(ii) Establishment of a transitional "government of national union", which would prepare a programme leading to the installation of a freely elected government. It will be composed of all factions and its leader would be selected by them;

(iii) Demilitarization of the capital city of N'djamena, scene of much of the recent fighting;

(iv) A general amnesty for political prisoners and hostages and release of prisoners-of-war.

(v) Dissolution of all political organizations and gradual integration of military factions into the national army.

The accord ended the intermittent civil war that had been waged since 1966. The strife was mainly between Arab elements of the northern area and Christian blacks, who inhabit the south.

France Announces Withdrawal of Troops

Following the Kano agreement, France announced on March 20 that it would be withdrawing its troops from Chad. A statement by the Elysee Presidential Palace in Paris said arrangements would be made for a phased withdrawal of the forces after consultation with the Chadian Government. It added that the French National Defence Council had reviewed the situation of troops in Chad (2,500)

in the light of the Kano agreement. In view of the fact that the ceasefire would be supervised by a neutral African force, the statement said, "the mission assigned to French military elements comes to an end."

France had moved its forces into Chad in April 1978 to support the beleaguered pro-Western Government of President Felix Malloum, after the collapse of a peace agreement signed in Benghazi a month earlier, when Libyan-backed northern guerillas launched a major offensive towards the southern capital city of N'djamena, formerly Fort Lamy. Similar military interventions had been undertaken by France since 1968 to help successive Chadian governments, all dominated by the Christianized tribes of the south, in their struggle against separatist Muslim guerillas in the country's northern desert region.

The latest ceasefire agreement has lessened tensions in this Central African region, but the official French Government claim that "all elements are now in place for a Chadian solution to the problem" appears to be a little premature. Less than eight hours after the conclusion of the agreement, fighting broke out between the forces of Hissene Habre and Felix Malloum across the capital city.

Belgian Troops in Zaire

Belgium despatched, early in February, a contingent of 250 paratroopers to the coastal base of Kitona, 500 km. west of Kinshasa. It was only last year that Belgian paratroopers, along with French troops, had been airlifted into the Shaba province of Zaire to assist the hard-pressed forces of Mobutu Sese Seko.

The official explanation handed out in Brussels indicated that the troops had been sent to augment 28 officers and to train a brigade of 4,000 Zairean soldiers. Unofficially, the Belgians suggested that Kinshasa, the overcrowded capital where more than 3 million hungry Zaireans lived back to back with 20,000 well-fed Europeans and a handful of Zairean rich, was a tinder box of discontent. Since there were no signs of trouble in Kinshasa, this explanation seemed to be invalid. Possibly, other factors may have combined to bring the Belgians in. Reports from informed Zairean sources indicated that there had been unrest in the preceding week among the 4,000 Zairean soldiers under training at Kitona. The soldiers, they said, had rebelled against lack of food and pay, a problem faced by the 22,000-man Zairean army. The Belgians were apparently alarmed by these development. The Kitona brigade was being trained by them to replace the 330 Moroccan and 150 Senegalese troops who have been patrol-

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ling the copper-rich Shaba province since an invasion by Katangans last May.

More important are the problems of food shortages and deterioration in the health services. Kinshasa showed tangible signs of deterioration even though there was no indication of massive unrest. Locally posted diplomats confirmed this situation. "There is no direct visible threat", said Belgian diplomat Willy Verriest, "but the situation here is volatile." It is not a racial or political situation; "it is a question of haves and have-nots." In the capital city a combination of soaring prices, corruption, bad crops, gasoline shortages and dwindling medical services have created extreme misery.

The inflation rate is currently 70 per cent, the currency having recently been devalued by half, gasoline prices having doubled to almost four dollars a gallon and lines at pumps stretching endlessly. To make matters worse, the price of staples had also doubled, so that a family earning the usual 80 dollars a month could barely afford to buy 15 days staple manioc or rice. In addition, one of the two major hospitals had closed for lack of medicines and the other was threatened.

Belgium's decision to send troops was also partially an attempt to show support for President Mobutu whose support is essential to keep Belgium in the forefront of its relations with the other Western countries seeking to exploit Zaire's vast copper and cobalt deposits.

President Mobutu Visits UAE

The Zairean President, Mobutu Sese Seko, paid an official visit to the United Arab Emirates from March 31 to April 2. At the end of the visit, a joint communique was issued simultaneously in the capitals of Kinshasa and Abu Dhabi. The communique emphasized that the talks had been held in an atmosphere of frankness and understanding. President Sheikh Zayed of the UAE and President Mobutu stressed that the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty did not offer a solution to the Palestinian issue which was the essence of the West Asian problem. The two leaders also stressed the need for Israel to withdraw from all Arab-occupied lands, including Jerusalem, and the right of the Palestinian people to have their land restored and their state established.

The two Presidents also expressed their satisfaction with what had been achieved in the sphere of Afro-Arab cooperation and solidarity. They condemned the racist regimes in South Africa and Zimbabwe.

Zaire, GDR to Restore Ties

Zaire and the German Democratic Republic have decided to restore normal diplomatic relations and to exchange ambassadors. This decision was announced in a joint communique issued in Kinshasa on January 21, following negotiations held in Rome at the initiative of the GDR. Relations between two countries were suspended in 1977 after the first Angola-based invasion of Zaire's Shaba province.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

Elections in Rhodesia

In the first ever one-man, one-vote elections by blacks and whites for a black dominated government in Rhodesia, which began on 17 April, the United National African Council of Bishop Abel Muzorewa swept a majority of the seats in the 100-member Parliament. To its 51 seats, the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) of the Rev. Ndabaningi Sithole won 12 seats in the race for the 72 Black seats in the country's House of Assembly. The United National Federal Party (UNFP) of Chief Kaysia Ndiweni captured nine seats to come third. All the 28 seats reserved for the whites have gone to Ian Smith's Rhodesian Front.

The elections were arranged by the transitional government led by Ian Smith, Bishop Muzorewa, Ndabaningi Sithole and Chief Jeremiah Chiaru in the face of opposition from the Patriotic Front guerilla alliance of Mugabe and Nkomo.

The elections have brought in for the first time a black majority government in the country. Based on a 65 per cent African participation it would appear that the verdict was genuine. Nevertheless what is not to be lost sight of is the fact that the elections were held under the pervasive presence of martial law—voters queued up under military protection. Then again, the entire internal settlement formula —to set up a transitional government in which the whites and blacks shared power—was really an invention of Ian Smith introduced to buy time. The provisions of the Constitution which ensure White control over the levers of state power speak for themselves.

Parliamentary seats were allocated according to race. The Whites, making up just four per cent of the population, would have 28 of the 100 seats in the new House of Assembly. The blacks were to have the other 72 seats, but constitutional provisions would keep the armed forces, the civil administration, the judiciary and the police

in White hands for the next five years. The Whites were also to have veto powers in the Executive Council. These provisions ensured continued White domination over the black-led government. Further, the ineffectiveness of Bishop Muzorewa ,and Rev. Sithole was also demonstrated by their inability to prevent the Whites from dictating the country's new name. It is to be Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and not, as the blacks have long wanted, simple Zimbabwe.

UN Declares Rhodesian Poll Invalid

The Third World members of the UN Security Council, at a meeting on April 28, condemned the Rhodesian elections as a sham, declared the outcome null and void and called on all countries to withhold recognition from the black majority government.

Gabon, Nigeria, Zambia, Bangladesh, Kuwait, Bolivia and Jamaica submitted a resolution in those terms to the Council. The debate had been requested by the 49-nation UN African group. They expressed their condemnation of the elections and indicated that no settlement in Rhodesia was possible "without the participation of the Patriotic Front," the black nationalist guerillas' coalition fighting from neighbouring Zambia and Angola. Further, these states, along with the non-aligned members, expressed concern about the mounting pressure on Britain and the US to call off the 13-year old economic blockade of the breakaway British colony. They sought to ensure that the UN economic embargo against Rhodesia would not be lifted following the election of the black majority government of Bishop Muzorewa.

A similar resolution was adopted by the Security Council last month when discussing the Rhodesian raids on the alleged guerilla bases in Zambia, Mozambique and Angola.

OAU to Step Up Aid to Guerillas

Organization for African Unity Foreign Ministers have pledged to step up assistance to Rhodesian guerillas and said that the Anglo-American peace proposals for Rhodesia had been overtaken by events. The OAU Council of Ministers, which met in Nairobi in the first week of March, urged that the war in Rhodesia be intensified to ensure quick defeat of the "illegal, racist minority regime." The OAU gives assistance to the Patriotic Front guerillas based in Zambia and Mozambique.

South Africa to Explode Nuclear Device?

A nuclear implosion may be under way in South Africa. This was the theme of a UN Seminar held in London in the third week of February.

Abdul Minty, General Secretary of the British Apartheid Movement, stated that South Africa might be preparing to explode a nuclear device. He informed the delegates that a South African Government publication—*South Africa Digest*—had recently carried a report that an international conference was being organized in Cape Town in August to discuss "mobilization of South Africa's medical and other services" to deal with atomic explosions and other disasters. Further, Minty recalled that South Africa had planned to explode a nuclear device in the Kalahari desert in 1977 but was persuaded by appeals from President Carter and other Western leaders not to do so. He observed that Western policies had created a 'nuclear frankenstein' in Africa posing a grave threat to international peace and security.

Presented at the Seminar was a document by the African National Congress which revealed Pretoria's contingency plans to explode a nuclear device along its border with the neighbouring states. The document was said to have been prepared by South Africa's Atomic Energy Board in 1972 and had been secretly obtained. It showed that a 10 kiloton nuclear device could be exploded along the entire border. The document was accompanied by maps showing possible safe areas for nuclear weapons.

Western Multinational Firms Attacked

At a seminar held at Dar-es-Salaam in March, African intellectuals pilloried multinationals from the US, West Germany and Britain in building up a "savage system of exploitation" in South Africa, Rhodesia and occupied Namibia.

US trusts hold 1.6 billion dollar investments in South Africa and American banks have provided South Africa with 2,200 million dollars in loans. More than half of all long-term private investments for South Africa come from Britain. West German multinationals have shares worth 4,000 million marks in 300 subsidiaries and joint ventures with South African firms.

The UN Anti-apartheid Committee has published a list of 382 banks throughout the world which have given loans totalling $5,500 million to South Africa between 1972 and 1978. The majority of the loans have come from banks in West Germany, Britain, the US,

France and Switzerland. Smaller loans have been made by banks in Italy, Denmark, Luxembourg and Canada.

Oil Crisis in South Africa

The recent political changes in Iran and the overthrow of the Shah's regime have created a major oil crisis for South Africa, in terms of supply and cost. South Africa obtained 90 per cent of its oil from Iran. Now it is "shopping around" the world for alternative supplies, but will have to pay an increased price for them.

South Africa has enjoyed a special relationship with Iran for many years. The Shah and his father spent some years in South Africa during World War II at the invitation of General Smuts, then South Africa's Prime Minister. The Shah also maintained close relations with the present Nationalist Government in Pretoria, as he did with Israel.

Iran has a 70' million pound sterling holding in the South African parastatal company, NATREF, which processes local coal to make oil. The company is likely to be nationalised if trans-links with South Africa are finally severed. South Africa's exports to Iran, totalling about 50 million dollars, will also be hit.

Until now South Africa had obtained all its oil from Iran because in 1973 the West Asian producers agreed to an OAU request for an oil embargo against South Africa. The embargo however had not yet been tested as South Africa relied entirely on Iranian oil supplies. It is now to be seen what would be the new changes in the light of the political developments in Iran.

SWAPO to Step Up Namibia War

The South-West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) plans to extend the scope of its guerilla war in Namibia. This was announced by SWAPO leader Sam Nujoma in Cotonu, Benin, after arriving there on March 13 from Lagos, where he had had talks with the Benin Head of State Mathieu Kerekou during which he informed him of the recent developments in the Namibia conflict.

SWAPO, Nujoma said, had liberated several parts of Namibia and established its own social structures. He went on to add that SWAPO now occupied the entire northern region of Namibia and was planning to extend the war to the central region of the country. He denounced what he called an "imperialist plot" by five Western Powers to impose a "neo-colonial" solution in Namibia.

Meanwhile, the "proximity" talks on the independence plan

for Namibia between the Western five (the US, Britain, Canada, France and West Germany) on the one side and South African Foreign Minister Botha, the frontline African States and SWAPO, on the other, were recessed in New York on March 22 to allow the South African Foreign Minister to consult his government.

There were no face-to-face talks between the principal rivals at the New York Conference, but separate discussions were held by the western negotiators with the African participants who included African Foreign Ministers or their nominees from Botswana, Mozambique, Tanzania and Zambia. Angola did not join in the talks as it was engaged in lambasting Pretoria for raiding its territory at a meeting of the Security Council.

South Africa urged that SWAPO bases in the frontline states should be under UN surveillance during the proposed elections in Namibia. South Africa believed that 'SWAPO guerillas' might cross the border to "intimidate" voters in Namibia if there was no surveillance of their activities. The Western five suggested that such surveillance could be done electronically. The surveillance of SWA-. PO apart, Pretoria has demanded a voice in the composition of the UN Transition Assistance Group (UNTRAG), consisting of 7,500 military personnel of various nationalities and 1,000 civilian staff, to be stationed in Namibia during the elections leading to the country's independence.

In Cape Town on April 20, the South African Prime Minister, Pieter Botha told his country's Parliament that South Africa would apply the Western plan for a Namibian settlement provided the move was approved by the Constituent Assembly in Windhoek. The plan, formulated by the five Western countries, was first accepted by Pretoria in April 1978. But in his address to Parliament, Botha implicitly rejected UN Secretary-General Waldheim's proposals to put it into practice.

The Namibian Constituent Assembly, set up after South Africa unilaterally arranged elections in the territory last year, will vote on a motion setting up a provisional government with wide powers.

Industrial Reforms in Zambia

President Kenneth Kaunda announced in January a series of reforms to be initiated in the Zambia Industrial and Mining Corporation (ZIMCO) designed to improve the running of the state-owned industrial and commercial sector which has been frequently accused of inefficiency. ZIMCO, with a turnover in the year ended

March 1977 of Kwacha 1,551 mn (F1000 mn) and a trading profit of Kwacha 177mn, has 104,000 employees and is the largest industrial corporation outside the US. It is a 100% state-owned holding company which directly or indirectly controls over 90 companies (many with substantial foreign minority interests) including Nchanga Consolidated Copper Mines (NCCM) and Roan Consolidated Mines (RCM). The two mining companies are unaffected by the changes which abolished all ZIMCO sub-holding corporations except the Industrial Development Corporation (INDECO) and the National Export and Import Corporation.

The announcement stated that all companies which have "fulfilled no useful purpose, or drawn the corporation into massive losses" would be abolished. Zambia Airways, Zambia Railways and the Posts and Telecommunications Corporation are to be merged into ZIMCO. The net effect of these reforms is to end the previous unwieldly relations. The companies would henceforth be allowed greater freedom in pricing policies; uneconomic pricing—in part due to government delays in approving increases—has resulted in heavy losses in certain companies.

Angola, Zambia to Link Forces Against Raiders

Presidents Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia and Agostinho Neto of Angola, meeting early in March, pledged to set up a security force to repel Rhodesian and South African incursions. They agreed that an attack on one of their countries would be regarded as an attack on both. The leaders met in the Zambian town of Ndola, 200 miles north of Lusaka

Rhodesia has made repeated raids on bases of black nationalist guerillas fighting against the Rhodesian government from Zambia. Since February, the Rhodesians have struck eight times at what it said were Patriotic Front camps in Mozambique, Zambia and Angola. In March, Rhodesian planes hit a large Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) ammunition supply storage depot at Dondo, near Beira in Mozambique. This was ZANLA's main source of weapons and explosives. South Africa too has struck at SWAPO in Angola. It has also occupied parts of Zambia and Namibia.

Angolan Invasions Condemned

The Security Council has "strongly condemned" South Africa for its "premeditated, persistent and sustained armed invasions" of

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Angola and demanded that Pretoria should cease such actions immediately. The 15-nation Council, after several days of debate on a complaint made by Angola, adopted on March 29 a resolution jointly sponsored by its seven non-aligned members censuring Pretoria for violating the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Angola.

The Western members of the Council—the US, Britain and France—abstained on the resolution on the plea that they were engaged in having "proximity talks" with South Africa and leaders of SWAPO on bringing about a ceasefire in Namibia and holding elections leading to its independence. They pointed out that they did not want to endanger this initiative which was at a critcial stage.

During the discussion, South Africa admitted having attacked Angola and sought to justify its action on the ground that it was harbouring SWAPO forces.

India was one of the non-member states which firmly denounced the South African aggression. Rikhi Jaipal Singh, India's Permanent Representative at the UN, said South Africa had timed the attacks on Angola deliberately to coincide with the "so-called proximity talks." , He added: "It is clear to us that South Africa is trying to bully those involved in the talks into accepting the UN monitoring of SWAPO bases in neighbouring countries, or else to continue to face South African attacks against Botswana and Zambia." Jaipal Singh went on to say that it must be recognized that no one state or group of states had any influence. on South Africa and, therefore, it was on that basis that the Council should decide its future course of action. "Western countries will have to choose now between legality and illegality", he said. "The very presence of South Africa in Namibia is illegal and its attack against Angola is doubly illegal, and this illegality cannot be permitted to continue with impunity."

India-Africa Relations
Anup Ranjan Basu

Indian Stand on African Struggle

In his address at the ministerial session of the coordinating bureau of non-aligned nations, which was held in Maputo, Mozambique, on January 31 this year, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, India's Minister of External Affairs, urged the world community to take concrete action to dislodge the racist minority regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia. He said India would fully support a review of the existing sanctions against Southern Rhodesia so as to tighten and extend them under Article 41 of the UN Charter, as well as imposition of comprehensive economic sanctions against South Africa. He exhorted the world community to seriously implement the mandatory arms embargo against South Africa and to impose an oil embargo on not only Salisbury but also Pretoria.

India's support to the freedom struggles in Africa was hailed by President Samora Machel of Mozamibque and President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia. Mr Vajpayee called upon the non-aligned countries, particularly those which are members of the Security Council, to ensure that conditions for free and fair elections were created?

India Condemns Bombing by Rhodesia

Mr Vajpayee in a statement on January 30 observed that the racist regime in Rhodesia was continuing to sabotage all efforts to bring about a just and peaceful solution in Zambia. He said these were desperate tactics of a dying regime aimed at weakening the liberation movement and the frontline states. He called upon the colonial power responsible for Rhodesia and other powers having influence with it to take urgent action to dislodge the illegal racist regime in Rhodesia and ensure its speedy transfer to majority rule.

As a gesture of its support for the freedom fighters, India sent in February gift consignments of medicines to the Governments of Zambia and Mozambique for the victims of the Rhodesian raids.

Special Trade Cell in Africa

The Commerce Ministry of India has been thinking of setting up a special cell in Africa with a view to evolving appropriate strategies for tapping markets in that continent. The cell will act as a catalyst to promote trade and economic exchanges between India and

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Africa, besides assisting trade and industry in the planning and execution of export drives, particularly to sub-Saharan Africa. It will collect, on a continuing basis, vital market information from various sources.

STC Opens Regional Office in Africa

During his 11-day visit in early February to Kenya, Tanzania and some other African countries, Mohan Dharia, India's Commerce Minister, explored the possibilities of establishing joint ventures. In view of the immense scope for expanding Indo-African trade relations, the State Trading Corporation has decided to open a regional office in Africa.

Indo-Kenya Treaty Signed

The National Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Kenya, and the Associated Chamber of Commerce and Industry, India, signed on February 17 an agreement to promote economic and commercial ties between their countries. The agreement provides for regular exchange of information on economic developments with a view to exploring further possibilities of mutual trade. The Chambers would assist visits of commerical and economic delegations and encourage participation in national exhibitions, fairs and conferences.

A Rs. 5 crore machine tools factory with India's participation in equity and technical know-how will be set up near Nairobi. The plant, for which an agreement was signed last year, will be the first of its kind in the whole of Africa.

In January 1979, the Government of India approved a joint proposal of the General Insurance Corporation of India and the Life Insurance Corporation of India to set up a locally incorporated company in Kenya to undertake life and general insurance business. Fifty-five per cent of the equity share capital of the company will be held by the General Insurance Company and the balance by Kenyan interests.

India Signs Trade Agreement with Zambia

A trade agreement was signed between India and Zambia early this year. Under the agreement, India will export vehicles, tractors and other machinery to Zambia and will in return buy metals like copper, cobalt and zinc.

Agreement on Taxation

Another agreement, signed between India and Zambia on February 24, provides for avoidance of double taxation on incomes. The agreement seeks to remove tax obstacles hindering the flow af capital, technology and personnel between the two countries. V.V. Badami, Chairman of the Central Board of Direct Taxes, signed it on behalf of India and L.W. Bwalya, Commissioner of Taxes, on behalf of Zambia.

An Indian tax delegation had visited Zambia in November last year to initiate discussions on the subject.

India to Help Algeria Build Houses

A joint venture in construction has been finalised between India and Algeria. The state-owned Hindustan Steel Construction Co. Ltd. (HSCL) and the Algeria National Construction Company will build 1,400 housing units and three pre-fabrication factories in Algeria. A protocol to this effect was signed between the two organisations in Algeria on February 17. It envisages the possibility of further projects to be taken up jointly by the two undertakings.

Hindustan Steel will also help the Algerian Steel Industry by supplying equipment and technology to it.

The President, Sanjeeva Reddy, has sent greetings to the newly-elected President of Algeria, Chadli Benjedid.

Mauritius to Buy Kannada Films

Indian regional films have secured a major breakthrough in non-traditional markets with Mauritius purchasing four Kannada films for the first time. These are "Kala Kula," "Sahodara Saval," "Kiladi Jodi" and "Kokila."

Seewosagar Ramgoolam, Prime Minister of Mauritius, has sought India's continued cooperation to solve his country's problems.

Nigeria Seeks Aid for Small Units

Nigeria, which has launched an ambitious programme of industrialisation with small industries as the core for development, has sought Indian assistance and expertise for setting up small units. A Nigerian trade delegation which visited the Third Engineering Trade Fair in February this year has requested the public sector National Small Industries Corporation (NSIC) for plant, machinery and knowhow.

Economic Deals with Tanzania

The Industrial Development Bank of India has granted a credit of Rs. 3.1 crores to the Capital Development Authority (CDA) of Tanzania. This supplements the credit of Rs. 2 crores already sanctioned by the Government of India to the Tanzanian Government. The 10-year credit will be utilised by the CDA for purchase of Indian machinery and equipment for the construction of its new capital at Dodoma.

The total credit commitments of IDBI to Tanzania, largely for capital goods and services, now stand at Rs. 22 crores.

In February Tanzania demanded an increase of about 11 per cent in the price of raw cashew to be supplied to India under an agreement concluded between the two countries.